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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE SCENE 
1.1. SOME PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
In spring 1990 Greece had a new conservative government 
after eight years of socialist rule. One of the first major 
pre-electoral pledges of the conservative party (Nea 
Dimokratia) was the radical improvement of the country's 
poor record in the implementation of EC1 legislation. The 
idea was an expression of the political will to remedy what 
had become a national scandal. The fraudulent use of EC 
subsidies (Mendrinou 1994,86) by the Greek state had made a 
major contribution to the national political turmoil that 
led to the downfall of the socialists in the election of 
spring 1990. The pledge of the conservative party had a 
wider symbolic significance because it was a previous 
conservative government that took Greece into the EC in 
January 1981. 
Nevertheless, what the new government meant was a 
rather different story. The basic idea behind this new 
political attitude concerned the adoption of the legislative 
measures for the transposition of EC legislation into 
national law. In other words, the rapid and timely adoption 
of national legislation was the tool that was going to be 
used for the improvement of the country's implementation 
1This term is used throughout this dissertation in order to cover the 
activities of the European Economic Community until November 1993 and 
the first pillar of the Treaty on European Union thereafter. 
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profile. However, if the mere transposition of EC 
legislation into national law was the only or even the most 
important source of the problem, what has impeded a Greek 
government from doing something about this problem earlier? 
All the post-accession single-party Greek governments 
had enjoyed the support of quite robust parliamentary 
majorities. Moreover, the Greek Parliament has no 
significant past as an arena of political dissent in the 
post-dictatorial era. This means that there was not much 
that could impede previous governments from achieving this 
objective. Furthermore, one could use PASOK's anti-EC 
stance as an explanation of the country's poor 
implementation profile only between 1981 and 1985 because 
the end of its first period in office marks a quite clear 
change in the direction of a much more positive, albeit 
quite critical, pro-EC stance. Moreover, Greece had 
problems implementing EC policy before and after 1990 and 
the electoral victory of the conservative (and traditionally 
pro-EC) party. Consequently, even if the decision of the 
conservative government to focus on the legislative 
dimension of the problem went in the right direction, it was 
not a sufficient step for the improvement of the Greek 
implementation profile. What can, then, national 
governments do in order to resolve this problem? Are there 
any tools that may be used in that respect? 
Reducing the issue of implementation to one of 
producing laws which appear to give effect to EC legislation 
ignores the rich political reality which characterises the 
pluralistic societies that participate in the process of 
European integration. Consequently, even if the legislative 
2 
aspect is an important factor affecting national 
implementation profiles, it is not the only one, and 
possibly not the most important one. More importantly, it 
will be argued here that effective transposition must be 
construed as a wider process. Getting a legislative act 
through parliament is one thing. Preparing this act and 
above all, ensuring that it reflects the spirit of the 
European policy that it embodies, is another. Consequently, 
a dynamic rather than static view of the transposition 
process must be adopted. This means that on the one hand, 
we should examine the links between this stage of the 
process and what precedes it. Does the formulation of 
policy contain elements that may illuminate problems in the 
subsequent stages of the European policy process? Does 
formulation constitute an opportunity for the choice of 
methods and tools which may at least help us foresee some of 
the difficulties that may appear later, thus facilitating 
their timely resolution? 
On the other hand, pluralistic European polities embody 
many factors that could mitigate any certainties that one 
could have about subsequent effective action after 
transposition. For example, shifting majorities, powerful 
pressure groups, recalcitrant administrations create enough 
room for speculation about post-transposition gaps between 
reality and intended objectives. That automatically raises, 
once more, the issue of the national governments' margin for 
action. What can they do in order to ameliorate their 
implementation profile? Are there any strategies and tools 
that could be used in order to steer post-transposition 
implementation? 
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Two broad strategies can be envisaged: Firstly, 
governments may seek to be more pro-active by taking account 
of implementation in previous stages of the European policy 
process. This would allow them to transpose more 
effectively and finally set up national strategic mechanisms 
and procedures that facilitate monitoring and problem- 
solving during and immediately after the transposition 
phase. Secondly, they may adopt specific measures such as 
the recruitment of more and better trained staff, which will 
seek to ensure better implementation at street-level. 
Following the second strategy as a platform for the 
analysis of the implementation process would certainly 
provide rich insights about the relations between front-line 
implementers and the relevant target groups and other 
societal actors, but would be inadequate for the analysis of 
the national actions regarding a country's implementation 
profile. Discussing the implementation of the EC's 
environmental policy in Greece Giannakourou (1996,7) 
identified the creation of an independent body for the 
delivery of the so-called 'eco-label' as a significant 
innovation. Who assessed the need for this body, who 
decided to create it and which tools have been used therein? 
Street-level implementation analysis is not likely to answer 
these questions. 
This dissertation sets out to examine the first 
strategy in an attempt to draw wider lessons relating to the 
development of the integration process in Europe. Peters 
(1997,200) captured the salience of this question by 
stating that 
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[t]he capacity to implement policy is one central 
defining feature of any political system, and if in the 
future the EU is to be a functioning government then 
implementation becomes a crucial question. 
We shall first seek to examine the methods used at the 
national level for implementation-orientated formulation of 
policy and effective transposition. We shall seek to 
identify the formulating and the transposing agencies and, 
more importantly, the factors that affect the linkages 
between the relevant actors and these two stages of the 
European policy process. Then we shall examine the tools 
used by national governments in order to monitor and refine 
post-transposition implementation of EC policy. In that 
sense we shall seek to go beyond transposition without 
reaching street-level implementation. What does this bit 
beyond transposition entail? 
National governments can do a number of things here. 
They may set-up institutions and procedures that raise 
awareness about difficulties in implementation, thus making 
them an issue that must be considered in the previous stages 
of the European policy process. They may create mechanisms 
that will detect problems during implementation. They may 
diffuse information more rapidly, e. g. through focal points 
where implementers may turn to for guidance and 
clarifications. Moreover, recalcitrant behaviour may be 
rendered more costly for those individuals or institutions 
that may adopt it. Given that just like individuals, public 
organisations (ministries, agencies etc. ) have different 
attitudes towards specific situations and problems, national 
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governments may seek the most sympathetic ones for the 
implementation of policy. In short, national governments 
possess a quite large tool-kit enabling them to act in this 
part of the European policy process. 
This dissertation sets out to examine the nature of the 
tools that they use. A look at the literature on 
implementation found in the field of public policy analysis 
will outline what is involved in the process of 
implementation and will enable us to better define the level 
and the field of analysis of this dissertation. However, a 
word of caution is necessary here. The focus on the 
national governments may be misleading in the sense that it 
may give the impression that this dissertation follows the 
intergovernmentalist strand of integration theory. This 
strand places special emphasis on the role of national 
governments as the main driving force (Hoffmann 1963,11; 
1966,909; Moravcsik 1991,48-50) behind the integration 
process. Briefly, intergovernmentalists see the EC as an 
instrument in the hands of national governments (Moravcsik 
1993,507-9) which accept the limitation of the nation- 
state's sovereignty only to the extent that this facilitates 
the resolution of problems faced by the latter. The clearly 
inaccurate monolithic view of the nation-state has led 
intergovernmentalists to relax this assumption. They now 
see it as one actor in a more liberal context (Hoffmann 
1982,26; Moravcsik 1993,481; 1995). 
Nevertheless, the other two main strands of European 
integration theory, namely neo-functionalism (Haas 1964a, 
47-8; 1968,15; Lindberg 1966,235; Lindberg and Scheingold 
1970,130; Schmitter 1971,242) and federalism (Friedrich 
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1962,514; Brugmans 1967,1026; Spinelli 1983,19-20; Pinder 
1985,51; Burgess 1989,6; Sidjanski 1990,659) agree 
(directly or indirectly) that national governments are 
important players in the integration process. What differs 
is the role that they attribute to the national governments. 
While the neo-functionalists came to accept the dramatic 
effects of action taken by national governments thus 
relaxing their initial assumptions about the integration 
being an automatic process (Haas 1968, xxiii), the 
federalists perceive the national governments as parts of a 
wider federal structure that encompasses not only 
supranational but also sub-national actors. Consequently, 
one can safely argue that for all these strands of thought 
on integration, governments matter. What we seek to analyse 
is how they matter in implementation2 in the light of the 
fact that the integration process has so far led to the 
2Following one of these strands of thought in the analysis of this 
process would not enhance our insights because none of them deals with 
implementation. If this is quite natural for intergovernmentalism and 
neo-functionalism in the light of the fact that they have been 
formulated mainly during the 1960s, that is too close to the beginning 
of the integration process thus being unable to draw lessons from the 
implementation of policy, this is less natural for federalism whose 
proponents seem to ignore effectiveness in favour of other principles 
like co-operation (between the various levels of government) and 
legitimacy. Thus, the pre-occupation of intergovernmentalism and neo- 
functionalism with the formulation process and the focus of federalism 
on structures and the division of power between them limits their 
utility in the initial stage of this dissertation. 
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modification but certainly not the substitution of national 
governments. 
1.2. LESSONS FROM IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS 
1.2.1. THE CONCEPT OF IMPLEMENTATION 
The literature on the implementation of public policy 
offers four major insights relevant to our purposes. First, 
implementation is a complex process. Second, it is a 
dynamic process. Third, it has an object, namely a policy. 
Fourth, it involves a number of actors. The analysis of 
these aspects will be based on a generic question: What is 
implementation? Implementation can be defined as the 
complex and dynamic process through which a theory-based 
policy entailing means, ends and revision mechanisms is 
pursued by the relevant public authorities and private 
actors. In simple terms implementation means getting a job 
done (Jones 1984,165), that is to execute, to manage, to 
administer (Meny and Thoenig 1989,233). Let us take a 
closer look at the components of this process. 
The complex nature of implementation derives from a 
variety of factors. Defining its limits is an extremely 
difficult endeavour because it is a part of the wider policy 
process which has a cyclical form. This means that it is 
difficult to define accurately the boundaries between the 
stages of the policy process, given that they are not self- 
contained (Hogwood and Gunn 1984,10). For example, 
formulation can be based on the implementation of an 
existing policy which produces effects during the 
8 
formulation of a new policy. How can we distinguish between 
the two? However, the inability to draw clear distinctions 
between the various phases of the European policy process 
should not lead to a view of this process as a set of 
completely integrated actions. It should be viewed as the 
process in which various actors pursue their objectives by 
constantly defining, acting and assessing within a specific 
policy context. 
Complexity is a typical characteristic of 
implementation even when one attempts to define it in terms 
of the actors who participate in it. The identity and the 
number of the participants and the nature of their input 
depend on a number of parameters, like the nature of the 
activity which is being pursued, formal and informal 
arrangements, the locus, etc. For example, implementers of 
health policy include doctors, the implementation of defence 
policy is in the hands of army officers etc. Clearly, it is 
difficult to define accurately on an a priori basis every 
national and European actor who participates in 
implementation, an element that further underlines the 
complexity of this stage. The preceding analysis leads us 
to the preliminary conclusion that the concept of 
implementation is dependent on the wider concept of the 
'policy process' and the identity of the participants. 
What is being implemented? Implementation can only be 
defined by reference to this question which determines an 
object, namely policies. Although many definitions exist 
(see Hogwood and Gunn 1984,13-9 for a discussion of various 
usages of the term) policy is construed here as a set of 
means and ends bound together by a theory. Pressman and 
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Wildavsky (1984, xxiii) rightly state that policies imply 
theories. A theory, in turn, takes the form of a 
conditional phrase: If A happens, then B will be produced, 
over time T. In this sense, theories are the mechanisms 
which link ideas to reality by bringing together conditions, 
means and ends. The function of a theory3 within 
implementation analysis is of crucial importance because it 
is a pre-condition for the definition of the object of 
implementation. Policies combine the examination of an 
existing situation, a desired outcome and the ways to 
achieve it. The latter part is an element of cardinal 
importance because 
[a]ny policy or program implies an economic, and 
probably also sociological, theory about the way the 
world looks. If this theory is fundamentally incorrect, 
the policy will probably fail no matter how well it is 
implemented 
(Bardach 1977,250). 
If the theory is correct, then it combines the proper 
understanding of the existing situation, the desired outcome 
and the choice of the right methods and tools to achieve it. 
On the contrary, a mistaken theory might start with an 
appropriate understanding of the existing situation and a 
clear view of the desired outcome, but is bound to fail due 
to the choice of the wrong methods and tools. It is the 
direct link between the theory and the choice of the method 
3Based on the problem of testing their correctness, Majone (1980,152) 
draws the analogy between a policy and a scientific theory. 
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and tools necessary for the achievement of the desired 
outcome that underlines the importance of the theory 
incorporated in a given policy. This theory defines the 
paths that have to be followed in order to achieve the 
desired outcome. The 'if' of the theory either exists, or 
must be created, given that it is a condition for the 
achievement of the objective. In both cases it structures 
the next stage ('then') of the process. This analysis has 
to take into account i) the origin of this theory and ii) 
the availability of alternative theories. 
The theory is the basis of the policy which is meant to 
address a specific problem, given that policies are 
instruments. Their effectiveness does not depend only on 
the incorporation of the appropriate theory but also on what 
Sabatier and Mazmanian4 called tractability of the problem 
construed as 
the specific aspects of a social problem that affect the 
ability of governmental institutions to achieve 
statutory objectives 
(Sabatier and Mazmanian 1981,6). 
41n the framework which they developed mainly for the analysis of the 
implementation of regulatory policy, they consider the tractability of 
a problem as an independent variable analysed in the i) difficulties 
in handling change, ii) diversity of proscribed behaviour, iii) 
percentage of the population within a political jurisdiction whose 
behaviour needs to be changed and iv) extent of the behavioural change 
required of target groups (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1981,6-9). 
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Moreover, the definition of implementation as a process 
is based on the need to depict the inherent dynamism of the 
concept. The term 'pursuit' used in the working definition 
of implementation underlines the open-ended nature of the 
process which at the same time is an attempt to achieve pre- 
defined objectives. Furthermore, policies are not 
necessarily static aspects of implementation. Indeed, 
Majone and Wildavsky (1984,176-7) rightly construe 
implementation as evolution because 
[w]hen we act to implement a policy, we change it. 
This argument results from the view of policies as attempts 
to change a given situation which is inherent in the theory 
upon which the policy is based. Consequently, the 
definition of this process has to take into account the 
mechanisms for policy revision/refinement/re-formulation, 
which provide the answer to the question 'how is policy 
implemented? ' Moreover, this element concerts with the 
aforementioned conceptual link between the various stages of 
the European policy process. 
The analysis that follows is based on the distinction 
between two sets of factors, namely those relating to a) 
implementation as a process and b) the policy which is being 
discussed. This distinction results from the need to 
establish a set of factors that affect the implementation of 
policy based on the distinction between the institutional 
and wider political context on the one hand and the nature 
of the activity which is being undertaken, on the other. 
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1.2.2. THE FOCUS ON INSTITUTIONS 
The attempts to implement a policy take place in a 
historically specific context marked by the presence of a 
set of institutions that affect implementation and are also 
affected by it. Consequently, it is necessary to analyse 
the linkages between these institutions (national and 
European) not only in relation to the specific policy which 
is being implemented but also in an attempt to identify the 
impact of the wider institutional setting upon this process. 
This focus is explained by the fact that national 
governments use institutions in order to act. Consequently, 
the discussion of the attempts of national governments to 
improve their implementation profile must have an 
institutional focus. 
These institutions do not operate in a vacuum. They 
interact with other societal actors (pressure and target 
groups) which could be the direct or indirect recipients of 
the policy's desired outcomes. This clearly produces the 
need to analyse the linkages between these actors and the 
institutions during the implementation process. However, 
two elements of caution must be introduced here. First, the 
institutional setting within which implementation takes 
place includes EC institutions. Second, we depart from a 
rather agnostic basis regarding the nature of the 
interactions between the EC and the national level. Hence, 
we simply accept the multi-level (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 
1996) nature of the structure that we seek to examine. This 
view is governed by Pressman and Wildavsky's assertion 
(1984, xxiii) that implementation analysis focuses on the 
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interactions between actors who seek to forge links in the 
direction of the desired outcome. Where these actors are 
located is for this dissertation a matter of empirical 
analysis (infra, Chapters 2-5). 
When does implementation start and when does it end? 
The context provides the answer to this question. The 
adoption of the European legislative measure5 which is going 
to be implemented is considered as the beginning of this 
stage of the European policy process6. Three factors lead 
to this decision, two of them are normative while the other 
is methodological. i) The subject of this dissertation is 
the implementation of policy within a specific context, 
namely the EC. This context is characterised by the 
predominance of law. Indeed, this is a Community of law, 
where every action of the competent authorities has to be 
based on a specific legal provision. Furthermore, this 
aspect reflects the principle of the so-called Rechtsstaat 
(state of law)7 which is a part of the very foundations of 
5One should not underestimate the importance of 'soft law' (Wellens 
and Borchardt 1989) which is used extensively in the EC as a means for 
the clarification, specification or even analysis of hard law 
provisions. Soft law is issued by the institutions of the EC and 
carries their authority. 
6Discussing policy implementation in the federal system of the USA 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981,6) argue that the process starts with 
the passage of the statute. 
7This does not mean that the EC is construed as a state. On the 
contrary, the concept is used mutatis mutandis precisely because of 
this reason and also because of the influence that the member states 
are bound to exercise upon this newly emerging European polity. 
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the liberal democratic regimes that constitute the EC. 
Consequently, the same principle applies to both levels 
which are involved in the European policy process. ii) The 
second element is linked directly to the principle of 
Rechtsstaat. In democratic systems, not only should every 
action of the competent authorities be based on specific 
legal provisions, but once laws are passed, they must be 
implemented accordingly. iii) The adoption of the 
legislative measure can be considered as the provisional end 
of the negotiation/formulation process. It marks the end of 
the period that culminates in the adoption of an 
authoritative text which is meant to guide the subsequent 
action of the relevant authorities. 
These factors (normative and methodological) also help 
define the end of the same process. Indeed, the adoption of 
a new legislative measure or the amendment of the Treaty 
provisions relating to a given policy area may mark the 
provisional end of the implementation process because they 
may alter the 'rules of the game'. This end is provisional 
because the new provisions have to be implemented, even if 
they are meant to terminate the policy in question. This 
fact clearly illustrates the cyclical form of the European 
policy process. Just like a cycle, the European policy 
process has no clear beginning or end. 
Nevertheless excessive emphasis on the formal element 
risks leading to a partial analysis of implementation, one 
that may focus on the mere transposition of EC law into the 
national legal order, a type of goal displacement that would 
be detrimental to the analysis of the theory which has been 
incorporated into EC law. This risk underlines the 
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importance of Kovar's (1973,209) conceptual distinction 
between formal and administrative implementation of EC 
policy which is an inherent part of the EC because of the 
extensive use of directives and the nature of the Treaty as 
a framework-treaty (Louis 1990,74) which sets out 
objectives and methods for their achievement. Kovar defined 
formal implementation as the transposition of EC law into 
the national legal order and administrative implementation 
as the adoption of concrete individual measures. 
Although this distinction is a useful organising 
principle for the discussion of implementation in the 
context of the EC, it does not resolve the problem of the 
definition of the level of our analysis in the 
'administrative' stage. For that purpose we shall use 
Berman's important distinction (1978,164) between macro- 
implementation and micro-implementation. Discussing the 
implementation of public policy in the federal system of the 
USA Berman defined macro-implementation as the execution of 
policy by the federal government with the aim to influence 
local delivery organisations to behave in desired ways and 
micro-implementation as what the local organisations do in 
response to the federal actions. This dissertation sets out 
to examine the action taken by national governments in the 
stage of macro-implementation from the moment of the 
adoption of a policy at the European level. In other words 
we shall seek to examine the role of implementing managers 
rather than that of street-level (Lipsky 1971) or so-called 
'front-line' implementers (Sorg 1983). 
Clearly, these are ideal types in the Weberian sense of 
the term. The discussion of macro-implementation cannot be 
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totally distinguished from the discussion of micro- 
implementation. Some EC-related examples may further 
illuminate the differences between the two. In the field of 
regional policy macro-implementation involves making sure 
that applications submitted conform to the specified 
criteria for funding and that the approval of such 
applications follows prescribed rules while micro- 
implementation involves the actual use of these funds for 
the project in question. In competition policy macro- 
implementation would involve the authorisation of a merger 
of two firms, while micro-implementation would involve its 
actual supervision on the basis of the conditions set by the 
macro-implementers. 
Policies are formulated in order to be implemented. 
The question that then arises concerns the ways in which 
implementation is taken into account (if at all) during the 
formulation stage. The subsequent question is 'who 
implements policy in the European Community? ' The answer to 
this question determines the number of the levels of 
government involved in this process. The impact of the 
increased number of the levels involved is linked to the 
inherent complexity of the implementation process. The 
larger number of the levels involved adds to the complexity 
of this process not only because a larger number of actors 
have to be co-ordinated, but also because a larger number of 
organisational motivations, interests and views have to be 
taken into account. Indeed, Pressman and Wildavsky have 
underlined the importance of the number of what they called 
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'decision points'8. The importance of their contribution to 
the analysis of the implementation of public policy in the 
federal system of the USA is based, inter alia, on their 
assertion that the larger the number of decision points, the 
smaller the probability for effective implementation9. The 
view of implementation as a process points to the fact that 
some policies survive because they adapt to their 
environment. The adaptability of a policy illustrates that 
vetoes are not permanent but conditional. 
Accommodations can be made, bargains entered into, 
resistances weakened. The price of ultimate agreement 
is delay or modification of the existing program. 
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1984,116). 
Excessive emphasis on the number of these points would 
lead to the conclusion that if there is only one such point, 
the likelihood of effective implementation is greater. 
However, analysis should go beyond the purely quantitative 
element, in order to examine the quality of the input of 
each actor, their relative power and the possibilities and 
likelihood of trade-offs between them. Furthermore, one 
8They are defined as the points where an act of agreement has to be 
registered for the program to continue while 'clearance' is each 
instance in which a separate participant is required to give his 
consent (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984, xxiv). 
9Bardach's study of a different policy area (mental health reform) 
points at the importance of the same element (1977,52), although he 
also underlines the importance of the substantive issues that made the 
negotiations necessary in the first place. 
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must examine the possibility to make package deals that 
reduce the number of the decision points (Bowen 1982,8). 
However, this possibility raises the stakes for the 
participants without necessarily reducing the possibility of 
a break-down. Consequently, the analysis of the 
possibilities for package deals has to take into account 
their impact on the structure of the process and the 
linkages between the various actors. 
We have so far defined the stage of the European policy 
process that we shall examine and the level of our analysis. 
However, we are still in need of a set of concepts that will 
guide the discussion of the tools used by the national 
governments. This discussion will be facilitated by the use 
of Hood's NATO scheme (1983,1-15) which constitutes a 
useful conceptualisation of the tools of government. NATO 
stands for Nodality, Authority, Treasure and Organisation. 
Discussing the tools used by government at the point where 
it comes into contact with the world outside, Hood (1983,4- 
6) defined nodality as the property of being in the middle 
of an information or social network; authority as the power 
officially to demand, forbid, guarantee, adjudicate; 
treasure as the possession of a stock of moneys or 'fungible 
chattels' and organisation as the possession of a stock of 
people with whatever skills they may have, land, buildings, 
materials and equipment somehow arranged. 
Hood used this conceptual framework in order to discuss 
the ways in which government interacts ('detects' and 
'effects') with society. Assuming that government acts as a 
totality, he acknowledged that it is difficult to draw the 
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frontier of government, so he proceeded. on the basis of the 
view of the man in the street 
who believes... that government is what 'they' do to 'us' 
(Hood 1983,12). 
This set of concepts will provide a useful basic organising 
principle for the discussion of the efforts of national 
governments to improve their implementation profile. This 
set of concepts is useful here because it reflects 
fundamental characteristics of the EC. Authority reflects 
the importance of law in the integration process (Joerges 
1996; Charrier 1996; Weiler 1982), treasure illustrates the 
fundamental importance of economics as the basis of the 
integration process, organisation and nodality tend to 
reflect the lack of external implementing agencies and the 
subsequent need to rely on the national politico- 
administrative structures whose operation is based on the 
principle of institutional autonomy and also on target 
groups and the use of the legal principles of supremacy and 
direct effect of EC law (infra, Chapter 2). 
The emphasis placed on the procedural element of 
implementation research does not mean that the 'substantive' 
element is neglected. On the contrary, the nature of the 
activity undertaken is a very significant analytical 
parameter. 
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1.2.3. THE POLICY 
Each policy has its own logic because it corresponds to 
a specific problem. This logic is reflected upon the theory 
embodied in it thus producing the need to analyse the 
policy-specific analytical parameters. One reaches the same 
conclusion as a result of the capacity of each policy to 
structure (up to a certain extent) the behaviour of the 
actors who participate in its implementationlO. In other 
words, each policy is construed as an attempt to change 
given situations by structuring the linkages between the 
participating actors and their behaviour. What are the 
implications of this assumption? 
The type of policy which is being implemented must be 
taken into account. Different types of policies are 
conducive to different theories, entail different stakes for 
the participants, concern different institutional settings 
and target groupsll. Following Lowi (1964,1972) and his 
assertion that policies determine politics and William 
Wallace (1983,412-3) we shall distinguish between i) 
regulatory policies characterised by the extension or the 
limitation of the margin for action of various actors or 
groups of actors; ii) distributive policies which allocate 
10Majone and Wildavsky (1984,174) state that some of the ways in 
which policies shape implementation include the definition of the 
arena where implementation takes place, the identity and the role of 
the principal actors, the range of tools for action and the resources. 
11The argument presented by Windhoff-Heritier (1980,142) according to 
whom the 'clients' can be seen as hidden resources underlines the 
significance of this element. 
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resources to some segments of the society; iii) 
redistributive policies which allocate to some segments of 
the society resources taken from other segments and iv) 
constituent policies where the shape and the scope of the 
political system is at stake. 
This typology is based on the likelihood and the actual 
use of coercion, construed by Lowi as the most significant 
political fact about government. This provides the context 
within which politics takes place. Coercion is embodied in 
the concept of law as a policy instrument (Rose 1986; 
Daintith 1988) which exemplifies our view of the EC as a 
Community of law. Nevertheless, these categories are ideal 
types in the Weberian sense. In reality one has to look for 
elements which combine various types within the framework of 
the same policy. Moreover, the time factor is important 
because it alerts us to the possibility of shifts of the 
focus of policies (European and national) from one type to 
another. This could result from a number of factors like 
political majorities, priorities, that affect the policy 
process as a whole. This is the result of the 
subjective/political nature of the policy process. 
The content of the policy which is being implemented 
must also be analysed. The analysis of this parameter must 
take into account first and foremost the extent of change 
introduced by a new policy. Change can be analysed in terms 
of the specific provisions of the relevant legislative 
measures (both national and European) and in terms of the 
relations between and within the relevant actors and the 
resources needed for its implementation. The interpretation 
of policies as change helps identify sources of their 
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success or failure and also determines a part of the limits 
that a given study might have. The analysis of the content 
of the policy which is being implemented leads to better 
awareness of the generalisations that can be based on the 
study in question. 
Policies are not self-executing. They are implemented 
by organisations. Consequently, the organisational 
dimension is of particular importance12. The bottom-up 
approach to implementation research rightly stresses the 
importance of the so-called implementation structure (Hjern 
and Porter 1981) comprised of parts of many organisations 
which participate in this process. Hjern and Porter note 
(1981,222) that the analysis of the programme's objectives 
suggests an administrative imperative which, in turn, points 
to a potential pool of organisations from which an 
implementation structure is formed. The similarity with the 
top-down approach is evident. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981, 
13) rightly specify this administrative imperative to be the 
assignment of the responsibility for the implementation to 
agencies and officials committed to statutory objectives. A 
set of questions emanates from this element. 
In what way does the policy distribute the roles 
(Mayntz 1983a, 17) between the participants? Does the new 
policy entail significant changes in the relations between 
the organisational actors? In particular, does the new 
12Pressman and Wildavsky (1984,87) underlined the negative importance 
of inherent administrative antagonisms upon their case study. Rein 
and Rabinovitz (1977,14) state that a concern for institutional 
maintenance, protection and growth is the primary inspiration for 
'bureaucratic rationality'. 
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policy entail structural changes (e. g. the creation of new 
units)? Has it been formulated in a way that enables the 
relevant actors to exercise their own discretion? In short, 
how new is the policy in question? This question has to be 
answered not only in relation to the policies adopted by the 
EC but also those adopted by the member states. 
Another set of questions concerns the number and the 
content of the decision points built in the policy. Are 
there any mechanisms for package deals? Does the policy 
represent a compromise between various actors that helped 
formulate it? Are there ways in which other participants 
might affect its implementation after the end of the 
formulation stage? In particular, one should look for 
'fixers'. Bardach (1977,274) defined fixing as a concept 
that incorporates two meanings: i) 'Repairing' and ii) 
'adjusting' certain elements of the system of games, which 
constitute the implementation process. He underlined the 
political nature of 'fixing' by stating that 
it is a job for a coalition of political partners with 
diverse but complementary resources. It is therefore no 
different from any other political task 
(Bardach 1977,278). 
This is just one of the aspects that indicate the 
political nature of the implementation process. Indeed, it 
is a major wider objective of this dissertation to 
illustrate that the linkages of the previous stages of the 
European policy process and implementation are not linear 
(Hogwood and Gunn 1984,20,217; Jones 1984,29) and 
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certainly not automatic. What matters then is the 
subjectivity that may be involved in the subsequent action 
of the institutions and the individuals involved. After 
all, implementation takes place within living societies. 
Changes in the latter are bound to influence the former. 
How this may happen is what this dissertation sets out to 
examine. Browne and Wildavsky (1984a, 244) rightly 
underline the systemic function of implementation by citing 
Lowi's The End of Liberalism, where emphasis is placed on 
the failure of government to use its formal power to 
implement policies that embody the public interest. They go 
on to stress that 
[w]ho is to be blamed has an effect on what is to be 
implemented. (Emphasis added) 
Following the same vein, we shall seek to draw wider 
conclusions as to the impact of implementation upon the 
process of integration in Europe. Does the existing 
literature shed light on the questions that we seek to 
examine in this dissertation? 
1.3. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The existing literature on the implementation of EC 
policy has a number of basic characteristics. First, there 
is a rather widespread terminological confusion in the sense 
that there is no clear definition of the term 
'implementation' which is used interchangeably with the 
terms 'enforcement' and 'application' (Snyder 1993; Pappas 
x t;. 
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1995a; Duina 1997). Although it has become common ground 
that formal implementation is only a part of the wider 
implementation process, not enough attention has been given 
to the differences between the two (Siedentopf and Hauschild 
1988,95). Secondly, existing studies of formal 
implementation construe it rather statically, in a manner 
that fails to underline the importance of what precedes and 
what follows it (Schwarze et al. 1990; Schwarze, Becker and 
Pollak 1991,1993b). Thirdly, implementation analysis has 
focused on the street-level (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988a, 
1988b) or has remained practically at the EC-level despite 
acknowledging the importance of the interactions between the 
European and the national level (Laffan 1983). Fourthly, 
the national dimension of implementation profiles has not 
been identified as an important research topic and has thus 
been left unexplored. Let us take a closer look at this 
literature in order to identify other characteristics that 
it presents. 
Ciavarini Azzi (1985b, 7) noted that for almost 25 
years after the establishment of the EC the focus of the 
scientific debate was on the creation rather than the 
'application of Community law'. Indeed, the principal 
contribution of the first study (Ciavarini Azzi 1985d) is 
the fact that it opened the debate on this neglected topic. 
Although the study covers Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and the UK - thus constituting an 
interesting basis for a comparison - this fact does not 
correspond to a specific methodological consideration 
relating, for example, to their respective institutional 
arrangements. 
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Second, the significance of the use of various 
legislative measures (directive and regulation) covering a 
wide range of common activities (agriculture, environment, 
customs duties and external relations) for the analysis of 
the implementation process is undermined by the lack of a 
clear conceptual framework which would enable the 
establishment of a set of systematic conclusions relating to 
the importance of a) the nature of the legislative measures 
and b) the type of the activity (policy) in question. 
Third, the methodological weaknesses are further underlined 
by the brief analysis of country-specific case studies 
completely lacking a clear methodological objective. 
So far as this study's findings are concerned, one must 
first note that despite the attempt to link the formulation 
and implementation stages, no direct link between the two 
stages is illustrated. On the other side of the coin, its 
most significant finding is the gradual absorption by some 
central co-ordinating bodies of a role in the implementation 
stage, especially in France and the UK (Ciavarini Azzi 
1985a, 341). Second, despite the fact that the various 
national arrangements reserve for the national parliaments 
different roles in the implementation stage, there is no 
attempt to discuss the impact of the parliamentary input 
upon the quality of implementation. Third, although the 
importance of the link between the negotiation and the 
implementation stages is mentioned (Ciavarini Azzi 1985a, 
354) its existence and its significance remain unexplained. 
The second study on this topic published under the 
auspices of the European Institute of Public Administration 
(Siedentopf and Ziller 1988a, 1988b) covers ten member 
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states and constitutes the first attempt to draw general 
conclusions on the basis of a comparative approach. Their 
analysis proceeds on the basis of a set of important 
assumptions. First, the authors of this collective study 
acknowledged the lack of a clear-cut conceptual framework 
which would enable the establishment of a set of general 
conclusions. Second, based on previous work by Mayntz 
(1980b) they underlined the importance of the link between 
the formulation and implementation stages and focus on three 
fundamental factors affecting the outcome of the policy 
process, namely the characteristics of the programme, the 
implementing agencies and the target groups. 
Third, they took into account the political, economic 
and legal importance of the legal instruments which were 
implemented. These instruments had various forms 
(directives and regulations) and they covered a wide variety 
of policy areas (state aids, food, statistics, tobacco, 
heaters, life insurance etc. ) and policy types. Fourth, 
they underlined the importance of departmental attitudes and 
the role of pressure groups in the formulation and 
implementation of EC policy. 
Despite its importance, this study presents a set of 
important deficiencies relating not only to the framework 
that it utilises but also the very nature and the salience 
of the implementation process in the EC. First of all, 
although it raised the issue of the linkage between the 
formulation and the implementation stages, it did not offer 
systematic conclusions as to the ways in which formulation 
may influence implementation. Second, its field of 
reference was limited to the period preceding the Single 
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European Act which had significant implications for the EC 
system in terms of the shift of executive power from the 
Council of Ministers to the Commission (infra, Chapter 2). 
Third, although one of the most important findings was the 
existence of different national political and administrative 
styles (pragmatic or legalistic) the consequences of this 
finding on the quality of implementation remained 
unexplored. For example, the fact that the Greek style has 
been characterised as legalistic (Siedentopf and Hauschild 
1988,103) that is one which is focused on the strict 
conformity of formal rules without any pragmatic 
interpretations, does not shed light on the ways in which 
this may affect this country's poor implementation profile. 
The most recent study on this topic (Pappas 1995b) 
covers twelve member states, consequently it is the most 
comprehensive study on this topic. Furthermore, it 
constitutes a static description of the national structures 
which deal with EC policy. The first striking feature is 
the fact that despite the analysis of this process, there is 
no link to the quality of implementation. Furthermore, 
although much emphasis is placed on the nature of the 
national polities, there is no link to the implementation 
process. Secondly, the continuous use of various terms such 
as application, execution, enforcement and implementation 
(Pappas 1995a, 7-8; Belloubet-Frier 1995,288,290) without 
clear distinctions between them reinforces the ambiguity 
stemming from the lack of a proper conceptual framework. 
The latter lacuna can be partly attributed to the fact 
that the general framework which constitutes the basis of 
this collective study is centered around a) a structural 
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perspective emphasising the description of the institutions 
of each country and b) a chronological perspective covering 
the various phases of the policy process. Then the 
contributors attempt to evaluate the procedures on the basis 
of the degree of formalisation and cohesion. The choice of 
these criteria is not explained. Moreover, the first 
criterion seems rather awkward in the light of the extensive 
use of informal procedures at the European level (infra, 
Chapter 2). Finally, the lack of a case study of 
implementation in every national context undermines the 
validity of the conclusions reached on the basis of the 
second criterion (cohesion of national and Community 
procedures). 
In quantitative terms lawyers have devoted more efforts 
than political scientists in this field. The predominance 
of the legal literature is mainly due to a) the fact that 
the rule of law is one of the fundamental means used in the 
integration process and b) the emphasis of the Treaties on 
the legal control of implementation (infra, Chapter 2). 
This is also the spirit of the relevant annual reports 
published by the European Commission since 1985. The most 
significant collective study of formal implementation 
covering a large number of member states is the set of three 
volumes published under the auspices of the European 
University Institute between 1990 and 1993 (Schwarze et al. 
1990; Schwarze, Becker and Pollak 1991,1993b). The main 
characteristics of this study are threefold. First, it 
focuses mainly on the conflicts between the European and the 
national legislation and the difficulties that the member 
states faced in the process of adaptation of their 
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respective legal order. Second, it does not provide general 
conclusions about the sources of difficulties that the 
member states faced in this process. In other words, it 
deals with the 'how' rather than the 'why' of this process. 
The focus on the attitudes of national courts constitutes a 
rather illustrative example of this tendency. Finally, 
although this study covers a diverse range of policy areas 
such as food labeling and air transport, it does not link 
the nature of these activities to the quality of 
implementation. 
Another characteristic of the legal literature is its 
focus either on a part of the legal dimension, e. g. legal 
control (Ryziger 1980) or a particular aspect of the legal 
machinery of a member state, e. g. the French Conseil d'Etat 
(Simon 1992) or even its emphasis on the national 
implementing legislative measures (Bates 1989; Buffet- 
Tchakaloff 1986; Christophe Tchakaloff 1993,1994; Frangakis 
1994). The same comment applies to otherwise useful studies 
by political scientists (Lequesne 1993). 
In the light of this review we would add two more 
general comments as to the lessons that we can draw from it. 
First, the lessons for the wider integration process that 
one can draw from the analysis of implementation and its 
national dimension have been left unexplored despite the 
comparative nature of some existing studies. Secondly, 
Puchala's provocative idea regarding the politics of 
implementation has been largely ignored. Discussing 
'episodes of noncompliance in the EEC system' he used the 
term 'postdecisional politics' in order to outline 
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[t]he transmission downward and outward of regional 
directives from Brussels to the national peripheries, 
and the problems, pitfalls, and impacts involved 
[therein] 
(Puchala 1975,497-8). 
The subjectivity involved in the implementation (but also 
the wider political) process is the direction that we set 
out to explore in the light of Puchala's assertion. 
1.4. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
We have adopted a three-stage research strategy. 
Firstly, we have sought to identify the particular 
characteristics of the EC as an implementation structure 
(Chapter 2). This description is based on two distinctions, 
one between formal and informal arrangements (and their 
interactions) and one between institutional and operational 
characteristics. What kind of constraints or opportunities 
does the EC's system create for the member states in the 
implementation process? Has the system evolved and if so, 
in which direction? In the second stage the emphasis 
shifts, inevitably, to the national level (Chapters 3-5). 
We faced a significant methodological choice between the 
study of one or more member states. 
The best way to analyse the implementation process in 
the EC is through the use of comparisons. The alternatives 
would include studies of a specific member state thus 
endangering the wider validity of the conclusions that can 
be reached. Indeed, the focus on a specific state would by 
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definition tend to limit the analysis to the characteristics 
of the state in question thus undermining the opportunity 
for wider conclusions. On the contrary, although the 
comparative method does not resolve the problem of the 
representative nature of a study, it enables the researcher 
to seek conclusions that apply to a number of states. 
Indeed, the main driving force behind the choice of the 
comparative method is the need to reach valid systemic 
generalisations, rather than idiosyncratic conclusions. 
On a more positive note, the comparative method enables 
us to draw more incisive conclusions on the various 
categories of factors that affect the implementation process 
within a specific group of states (Cyr and deLeon 1975, 
37 8) . The f act that they share common important 
characteristics helps the researcher to orientate the study 
towards the possible systematic links between these 
characteristics and the outcome of the implementation 
process through the exclusion of idiosyncratic elements. 
The complexity of the implementation process underlines the 
importance of the systematic links between these 
characteristics and the result of the implementation 
process. Furthermore, the need for comparisons emanates 
from the output-side of the EC system. Indeed, the EC 
system is characterised by the extensive use of regulatory 
policies (Majone 1996a) which, in turn, are dominated by the 
principle of free competition. The very principle of 
competition (level playing field) leads to the need for the 
comparative analysis of the implementation process in the 
various member states because of the salience of the concept 
33 
of uniformity which is a fundamental element of this 
activity. 
The process of internationalisation and harmonisation 
of previously national activities accentuates the need for 
the comparative analysis of the implementation process 
(Feick and Jann 1988). This stems from the fact that 
despite the commonality of the problems and the solutions 
that have been sought and adopted at the level of the EC, 
potential sources of variation in the implementation stage 
have not been eliminated. Even within the same category of 
states, sources of variation exist as a result of i) 
different traditions relating to mechanisms and policies, 
ii) motives for the participation in the integration 
process, iii) balance of power between the various actors 
etc. Feick and Jann (1988,207) rightly underline the fact 
that irrespective of the theoretical/ideological pre- 
conceptions of the researcher as to the role of functional, 
class or group interests, it is only through empirical 
comparative studies that one can come to a conclusion 
relating to the characteristics of state activities in the 
field of public policy. 
Following Burdeau's definition (cited in Ziller 1993, 
83) of unitary states as the states where there is only one 
centre of political and governmental impetus, we shall focus 
on the analysis of the implementation process in the UK, 
France and Greece. The choice of a set of unitary states 
examined here is based on a number of factors. Irrespective 
of the theoretical perspective that one adopts in order to 
analyse the process of integration, there is evidence to 
suggest that this process has led to the creation of a 
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significant number of non-governmental actors (Mazey and 
Richardson 1993) which directly challenge the monopoly of 
the central governments in the representation of interests 
at the European level. Thus there seems to be a 
contradiction between this aspect of the integration process 
and the nature of unitary states to the extent that the 
latter seem to be unable to monopolise relations with the 
EC. 
EC policy cannot be streamlined easily through the 
traditional functional lines that characterise the division 
of labour between the various parts of the national 
administrative machineries. For example, CAP (common 
agricultural policy) combines aspects of external trade, 
financial affairs, food safety and food production which are 
dealt with by different national ministries. This produces 
a particular problem for unitary states that seek to express 
their will through the central government. Furthermore, the 
fact that the EC agenda has expanded over the years means 
that the traditional mechanisms that represented the 
'national interest' abroad, do not necessarily have this 
monopoly any more. In brief, the function of co-ordination 
has acquired a particular importance as a result of the 
participation of the nation state in the process of 
integration. In a more general sense, the very principle of 
integration, which is seen here as a product of the 
inability of the nation-state to resolve the problems of 
modern European societies, points at the importance of the 
analysis of the implementation process in unitary states. 
What is the response that these states have chosen in order 
to fulfil their obligations as external agencies of the EC? 
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The need to limit this dissertation to a manageable 
size without ignoring the need to choose a number of states 
that would facilitate valid general conclusions determined 
the number of the states. So far as the choice of these 
specific states is concerned, a number of factor can be 
invoked. First of all, these three states fit the 
definition of unitary state presented above. Although all 
three states have established some sort of second level of 
government, they remain unitary for a number of reasons. 
The British polity is characterised by the formal principle 
of 'sovereignty in parliament' which does not permit the 
creation of any other level of law-making institution (de 
Smith and Brazier 1994,15; Ziller 1993,88). Article 2 of 
the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic clearly 
stipulates that France is an indivisible republic (Guchet 
1994a, 145). Although art. 101 §1 of the Greek 
Constitution stipulates that the administration of the state 
is organised on the basis of the principle of 
decentralisation the provision of paragraph 3 of the same 
article stipulates that the self-administration of the 
peripheries is subject to the tutelage of the state. 
Moreover, these states have joined the EC at different 
stages of its development and carry with them various 
national perceptions about the utility and the possible or 
even desirable outcome of the integration process. At the 
same time, if one uses the economic/political distinction 
between the highly developed industrial northern and the 
less developed southern member states, the UK and France are 
parts of the former while Greece is a part of the latter 
group. This enables the researcher to have a fairly wide 
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view of structures where implementation takes place, that 
transcends the boundaries between the two categories. Last 
but not least, this group includes states with different 
policy traditions. Indeed, the British tradition of 
liberalism (further developed after 1979 but also within the 
context of the EC) co-exists with more protectionist 
practices typically found in France and Greece. In more 
general terms, despite the presence of common 
characteristics, there is sufficient evidence of divergence 
to enable the formulation of valid general conclusions. 
Analysis of the national structures will be based on 
four fundamental elements: i) The development of the 
division of labour at the political and the administrative 
level, including the creation of new units. The ways in 
which EC policy is perceived by the member states largely 
determines the nature of their institutional development. 
The dichotomy between forei gn and domestic policy 
constitutes the basis of the examination of this aspect of 
institutional development. Indeed, if the (clearly 
inaccurate) interpretation of EC negotiations as traditional 
international negotiations leads to the reinforcement of the 
ministries of foreign affairs, the expansion of the EC's 
agenda (Pollack 1994) and the increasing impact of the EC 
upon the conduct of government business on a daily basis 
underline the need for a much more flexible approach. What 
are the repercussions of this phenomenon on the handling of 
EC policy at the national level? 
ii) The relations between the national Executives and 
Legislatures in formulation and formal implementation must 
be examined. The EC decision-making process is by 
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definition a legislative process. This has important 
implications for the relations between the national 
executive and legislative bodies. Unlike the former, the 
latter lack any formal powers to influence directly the 
development of this process. The expanding agenda of the EC 
underlines the extent of this phenomenon. Do national 
parliaments put pressure on the respective governments and 
if so, how and what is the result? 
iii) The role of pressure groups. The extent of the 
EC's agenda and the constant attribution of powers to EC 
institutions have produced the need for national pressure 
groups to take on board the European dimension of their 
field of activity. How do they try to affect the national 
position? 
iv) The division of labour in the stage of formal 
implementation (who implements formally and how) and the 
wider implementation profile13 of each member state. 
The comparative findings (Chapter 6) underline a number 
of significant differences between the three countries. 
13Implementation profile is defined here as the broad picture of the 
implementation process in a given member state. This 'picture' is 
based on procedures under art. 169 of the Treaty (infra, Chapter 2) 
and in particular, the number of formal letters raising questions 
relating to the implementation process and the number of cases 
reaching the ECJ. Although this concept can constitute a useful 
organising principle for the analysis of implementation in a given 
country, it cannot be considered as hard evidence relating to the 
quality of the implementation process, because the evaluation of 
problems in implementation has a qualitative dimension that simply 
cannot be illustrated through quantitative data. 
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These differences then constitute the basis for the 
formulation of working hypotheses regarding implementation. 
The validity of these hypotheses can only be tested through 
a case study, namely public procurement (Chapters 7-8). 
Indeed, the use of this method will enable us to examine the 
relevance of the abstract analytical parameters and the 
validity of the hypotheses that have been formulated on the 
basis of this discussion. Nevertheless, the use of this 
method raises three fundamental methodological questions. 
i) What is the right time frame within which the 
implementation of any given policy must be analysed? ii) 
Can one draw general conclusions from the analysis of case 
studies? iii) Is the specific policy representative of its 
type? The answer to the first question can be found 
relatively easily through the relevant legislative measures. 
Secondly, one would ideally compare the implementation of a 
number of policies. However, the need to keep this 
dissertation to a manageable size has led to the choice of 
one policy. 
Indeed, public procurement has been chosen for the case 
study as a result of a number of factors. First, it is a 
policy of great political and economic salience for every 
member state. Second, in terms of type, it constitutes a 
typical example of a regulatory policy, a policy type which 
is dominant in the EC. It distributes rights and 
obligations to a number of actors in a manner that embodies 
and promotes the principle of free competition, a 
fundamental element of the prevailing economic philosophy in 
Western Europe (and the EC in particular). Thirdly, it is a 
cornerstone on the single market project. 
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1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation is based on written sources 
(including legislation and policy documents) and the 
extensive use of interviews (Appendix). The very nature of 
the topic led us to conduct 43 confidential elite interviews 
with British, French, Greek officials and civil servants of 
the European Commission, in London, Paris, Athens, Hull and 
Brussels. Semi-structured questionnaires have been used. 
Instead of seeking the official view of the institutions for 
which they work, we have sought to obtain the personal views 
of these officials in order to grasp the full richness of 
the implementation process. The direct implication of this 
was the need to avoid linking these individuals with 
specific pieces of information or opinions presented in this 
dissertation. Although in very few cases this was not 
necessary, we have discovered that for the majority of the 
interviewees, this was a pre-condition, that we have 
accepted in order to find out 
what is going on in the kitchen 
as a French official has put it. 
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Chapter 2 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS 
AN IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURE: 
THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
The objective here is to analyse the principal 
characteristics of the EC as an implementation structure in 
a manner that combines two basic approaches. We shall 
approach this issue from the point of view of the EC's 
institutional characteristics (Sections 2.1 and 2.2) before 
discussing its operational elements (Sections 2.3-2.7) in 
order to illustrate that this is a loosely coupled (Peters 
1997,188) implementation structure - primarily based on 
formal, but also informal arrangements - which provides to 
the member states considerable, albeit regulated, latitude. 
Although these arrangements refer to formal obligationsl, 
they cannot guarantee successful implementation of EC 
policy. Weakness here refers to the operation of the EC as 
a framework rather than a single structure. In short, the 
argument here is that in the light of the analysis that 
follows, one should be rather positively surprised by what 
is actually achieved by the EC, at least because it does not 
possess its own implementing agencies. 
1This view confirms the understanding of the EC as a law-intensive 
organisation (Page and Dimitrakopoulos 1997). 
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2.1. THE LACK OF EXTERNAL IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES: THE 
FOUNDATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIRECT ADMINISTRATION 
Page (1997,22-3) rightly argues that the frequent 
comparison between the European Commission and local 
administrations (or even national ministerial departments) 
is misleading because unlike the latter, the former never 
had the army of service providers frequently associated with 
local government, as this has never been a part of the 
founding fathers' project. Indeed, the High Authority (the 
forerunner of the European Commission) had to be small and 
flexible, in order to facilitate the generation of solutions 
to common European problems, rather than resolve them 
directly. 
Monnet (1976,436) had in mind what Pisani (1956,324) 
called administration de mission (task administration) a 
concept which he defined as a lean, dynamic and risk- 
orientated administration adapted to a time, problem and 
space, in other words the opposite of the traditional 
administration de gestion (management administration). The 
function of the European administration as the source of 
ideas and orientation2, rather than the implementer of the 
solutions and the subsequent need to associate the national 
administrations to the policy process, especially but not 
exclusively in the implementation stage, led some scholars 
(della Cananea 1993b, 1108; Pag n. d. 446) to depict the EC 
as a particular case of co-operative federalism, or 
2This function is reflected through the Commission's reinforced right 
of initiative which can be over-ruled only through a unanimous 
decision of the Council. 
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Vollzugsföderalismus (Lenaerts 1993,2 8) that is 
implementation federalism. 
Irrespective of the validity of this view (whose 
analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation) one must 
underline not only the subsequent need for the EC as a new 
system of government to rely on national administrations for 
the implementation of the policies3 which were to be 
formulated collectively at the European level4 but also the 
European regulation of this role of the national 
administrations (infra, Section 2.3). The reliance on 
national administrations for this stage of the policy 
process exemplifies the principle of indirect administration 
(Louis 1990,165) also known as principle of co- 
administration (Franchini 1993). It is precisely the lack 
of the EC's own external implementing agencies which gives a 
European dimension to the national administrations while it 
legitimises the formal framing of their operation. 
This, though, was not the only way in which the member 
states acquired a role in the implementation process. The 
extensive use of intergovernmental committees which 'assist' 
3This structural characteristic mirrors the important role that 
national administrations play in the formulation stage thus 
establishing what has been accurately called 'bureaucratic 
interpenetration' or 'intermingling' (Scheinman 1966,751; Wessels 
1985,17). 
4The discussion on European agencies (Kreher 1996; Wilks and McGowan 
1995) is excluded from this chapter precisely because of their policy- 
specific nature (whenever they exist) and mainly because these 
agencies have, so far, remained peripheral rather than typical 
characteristics of the EC as an implementation structure. 
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the European Commission in some of its executive functions 
became known as 'comitology'. This is one of the most 
original and significant elements of the EC's politico- 
administrative structure which can de defined as the 
institutionalised capacity of national administrations to 
influence collectively the implementation process. 
2.2. COMITOLOGY 
The analysis of comitology needs to take account of two 
basic considerations which constitute the two sources of its 
development, namely the tensions between the 
intergovernmental and the supranational institutions which 
share the formal executive power in the EC (Council of 
Ministers and European Commission respectively) and also the 
lack of external implementing agencies. 
On the one hand, formal executive power had to be 
shared between the Council of Ministers and the Commission 
thereby leading scholars to underline the EC's quadripartite 
(Pescatore 1978) characterised by the existence of an 
institution (Council of Ministers) which accumulated both 
legislative and executive powers. This distribution of 
executive power was based on art. 155 fourth indent of the 
Treaty stipulating that 
[ i) n order to ensure the proper functioning and 
development of the common market, the Commission 
shall ... exercise the powers conferred on it by the 
Council for the implementation of the rules laid down by 
the latter. 
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The terms used in this provision point to the direction 
of a principal-agent relation where the Commission (agent) 
exercised the Council's (principal) executive power if and 
when the latter chose to delegate it. The subordinate 
position of the Commission has been further underlined by 
the lack of external implementing agencies which ensured 
that it would still need a significant input from the member 
states in the implementation process even if the political 
context changed in favour of a more active role for the 
Commission. Indeed, the Council soon found it very 
difficult to cope with the initial workload of policy 
formulation and also the adoption of the implementing 
measures which were necessary if the policies were to 
produce any results. 
This functional pressure produced by the operation of 
the EC obliged the Council to use extensively various 
committees and the Commission for the implementation of 
policy. Thus, the quest for efficacy rather than an attempt 
to re-distribute executive power was at the heart of this 
development. That meant that a new and very subtle sub- 
stage of the policy process had already emerged. The 
initial distinction between formulation and implementation 
had been supplemented by another stage (between the other 
two) where European implementing measures were adopted 
before the policy reached the national level. For example, 
once a decision had been taken for the regulation of the 
market for a specific product, e. g. cereals, a specialised 
committee would meet in order to define the practicalities 
of the regulation. 
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This development is significant for four reasons, two 
methodological and two political. First, it shows that 
implementation analysis in the European Community must start 
from the European level because this is where the 
implementation process begins, with the adoption of the 
European implementing measures. In other words, one must 
adopt a top-down approach for the analysis of the 
implementation process in the EC . Secondly, the 
establishment of comitology amounted to the creation of 
another set of decision points within the implementation 
structure, although its significance depended on the powers 
of these committees. Thirdly, the dynamics of the policy 
process had already led the EC's institutional structure to 
its limits, thus obliging it to find informal solutions. 
Finally, these solutions opened a window of opportunity for 
the member states which were the only actors capable of 
filling the functional gap. The solution took the form of 
the aforementioned set of intergovernmental committees5 
grouped under the term 'comitology'. So what is the nature 
and the role of these committees in the implementation 
process? 
This system has been developed in a pragmatic manner 
which reflected the political pre-occupations that produced 
it. This is illustrated by the quantitative importance of 
5Examples of these committees include the Technical Progress Committee 
for the Adaptation of Measuring Devices and Packaging Ranges, the 
Committee on Conservation, Characterisation, Collection and 
Utilisation of Genetic Resources in Agriculture and the Scientific 
Committee on Foodstuffs. 
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these committees6 and the lack of any clear-cut principle on 
the basis of which these committees were used. Even the 
very assessment of whether they were going to be used or not 
was made on an ad hoc basis (Blumann 1993,193-4). The 
methodological implication is the inability to assess the 
exact impact of these committees on the implementation 
process. Nevertheless, it can be argued that they 
constituted an important channel through which the Council 
exerted influence on the Commission in the European sub- 
stage of the implementation process until 1987. 
The legal basis for the use of these committees could 
be found in basic legislative instruments adopted by the 
Council (mainly regulations but also directives). Their use 
was first observed in CAPT. Three types of committees had 
appeared, namely consultative, management and regulatory 
committees (della Cananea 1990,668-70). Although 
membership did not vary in the sense that they were composed 
of representatives of the member states and chaired by a 
representative of the Commission, their powers vis-a-vis the 
Commission and consequently their impact on the 
implementation process depended on the type of the 
committee. 
The SEA constituted a significant turning point in the 
development of comitology because it shifted executive power 
from the Council to the Commission (Bradley 1992,713; della 
Cananea 1990,684; Lenaerts 1993,34; Meng 1988,221) while 
6This importance does not obscure the uncertainty as to the precise 
number of these committees (van der Knaap 1996,96). 
7This is by no means a coincidence, because it is the most integrated 
policy of the EC. 
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enabling the creation of a horizontal legal basis for 
comitology. The shift of executive power from the Council 
to the Commission, which became the main locus of executive 
power at the European level, was very subtle but extremely 
significant. The shift took place as a result of the 
introduction of a third indent to art. 145 of the Treaty. 
Initially this article, which constitutes the main legal 
basis for the participation of the Council of Ministers in 
the European policy process, did not contain a reference to 
implementation. The new provision obliged the Council to 
confer on the Commission, in the acts that the Council 
adopts, powers for the implementation of the rules which 
the Council lays down. The Council may impose certain 
requirements in respect of the exercise of these powers. 
The Council may also reserve the right, in specific 
cases, to exercise directly implementing powers itself. 
The procedures referred to above must be consonant with 
principles and rules to be laid down in advance by the 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after obtaining the Opinion of the 
European Parliament. (Emphasis added) 
Thus the exercise of executive power by the Commission 
became the rule (Harnier 1991,4247; Breier 1994a, 1050). 
The Council retained the right to exercise directly this 
power itself, but only in specific (exceptional) cases. The 
symbolic integration of. the new provision into art. 145 
(which regulates the action of the Council) instead of art. 
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155 (which regulates the action of the Commission) is devoid 
of any significant impact upon the implementation process. 
Nevertheless, this point should not be over-emphasised, 
for the first legal text adopted by the Council after the 
entry into force of the SEA was based on art. 145 and 
attempted to organise comitology in an orderly manner. 
Decision 87/373 of the Council did not go as far as putting 
into practice the Declaration attached to the SEA urging the 
Council to use extensively consultative committees in order 
to facilitate the adoption of the measures based on art. 
100a (harmonisation of legislative, regulatory and 
administrative measures for the establishment of the single 
market) but it streamlined comitology procedures in a way 
which significantly reduced the ability of the member states 
to invent new forms (Ehlermann 1988,239) and has formalised 
the aforementioned three types of committees and the use of 
five procedures. So, what is the content of this set of 
decision points? 
On the one hand, consultative committees must be 
consulted by the Commission, but their opinion has no 
binding effect on the content of the implementing measures. 
On the other hand, management committees, used extensively 
in CAP (Bertram 1967; Schindler 1971) discuss and decide 
using qualified majority voting (QMV) on the implementing 
measures submitted by the Commission. In case of a negative 
opinion of the committee, the measures are notified to the 
Council which can rescind or vary the measure (using QMV). 
Finally, regulatory committees, used extensively in the 
harmonisation of national legislations, customs and 
veterinary controls, can block the measures proposed by the 
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Commission either by not deciding, or by adopting a negative 
opinion. In the second case the committee has two options: 
First, the Council can adopt (by QMV) a different view thus 
enabling the Commission to proceed accordingly. Secondly, 
the Commission can proceed only if the Council does not 
adopt a negative opinion or does not decide at all, within a 
specified period usually of three months. Yet, it remains 
unclear where each type of committee is used, because there 
are no hard rules regulating this aspect of comitology. 
So far as the functions of these committees are 
concerned, a useful distinction has been drawn between i) 
rule-interpreting, ii) fund-approving and iii) rule-setting 
functions (Schaefer 1996,16). The aforementioned tensions 
that explain the emergence of the comitology system do not 
spill over into the functions exercised by these committees. 
On the contrary, scholars have underlined the constant quest 
for consensual solutions (Neyer 1997,30) and the fact that 
these committees constitute arenas of the search for 
efficacy rather than the promotion of national8 interests 
(Roethe 1994,50). 
After the adoption of the European implementing 
measures, the locus of the implementation process shifts to 
the national level. The action of the national politico- 
administrative machineries is regulated by art. 5 of the 
Treaty. 
8The findings of the European Parliament's special committee of 
enquiry (Europäisches Parlament. Untersuchungsausschuß für BSE 1997, 
12-3) into the role of the BSE-subcommittee of the Scientific 
Veterinary Committee illustrate the limits of this view. 
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2.3. ARTICLE 5 OF THE TREATY AND THE REGULATION OF THE 
MEMBER STATES' OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT EC POLICY9 
Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome stipulates that the 
[m]ember states shall take all appropriate measures, 
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment 
of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the 
Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of 
the Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this 
Treaty. 
Its position within the text of the Treaty and more 
specifically the fact that it is part of the principles 
which constitute the hard core of the EC, or as 
Constantinesco (1987,98) has put it 
la structure profonde du consentement des auteurs de 
1'acte constitutif (the inner structure of the agreement 
of the Treaty's authors) 
constitutes both a strength and a weakness in its role as 
the general legal basis for the regulation of the 
implementation process. Precisely because it is a 
9Blanquet (1994) provides an excellent legal analysis of the wider 
implications of this article for the EC's legal order which does not 
concern this dissertation. 
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principle, it had to be abstract. Its abstract nature meant 
that it was only after the accumulation of considerable case 
law of the ECJ on this issue (Blanquet 1994) that its 
precise characteristics could be defined. This case law has 
mitigated the abstract nature of this provision and has 
turned it into a proper 'constitutional' principle of 
Community loyaltylO regulating the function of the EC as an 
implementation structure. Its wording has certainly 
contributed to the parallel that some scholars have drawn 
with the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must 
be kept) found in public international law, which embodies 
the obligation of the high contracting parts of an agreement 
to faithfully abide by its content. However, as Lenz (1994, 
33) rightly argues, the provision of art. 5 goes farther. 
This becomes more evident when a different approach is used 
for the analysis of this provision. 
One can draw a distinction between the positive and the 
negative obligations incorporated into this provision1l 
whose structure underlines its origin, namely the principle 
of federal loyalty found in federal states. Indeed, the so- 
called Bundestreue (federal loyalty) is a constitutional 
principle developed in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Hesse 1984,102). It is defined as the obligation to adopt 
a bundesfreundliches Verhalten, that is a federal-friendly 
behaviour. The development of this principle in the German 
federal context immediately after the unification in 1871 is 
10Scharpf (1994,225) prefers the term 'comity' to 'loyalty'. 
11These obligations are not necessarily symmetrical. On the contrary, 
the discussion that follows will illustrate the predominance of the 
obligations of the member states vis-ä-vis the EC. 
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an illustration of its content. Indeed, Bismarck had 
underlined the fundamental role of the federal loyalty of 
the sovereigns as the foundation upon which the German 
Empire was based. In other words, the federal construction 
(of the German state) creates the need for its constituent 
parts to be conscious of the fact that they belong to a 
wider whole (Schwarz-Liebermann von Wahlendorf 1979,783). 
Bundestreue echoes this idea. The fact that this concept 
has been devised and developed in federal states means that 
it should be treated cautiously in the analysis of the EC as 
an implementation structure, because the EC is not a state, 
although the normative intensity of this concept is a clear 
illustration that the EC goes far beyond the level of a mere 
international organisation. This is a broad idea based on a 
number of obligations incorporated into this concept. 
The first and most obvious positive obligation of the 
member states is to take every necessary measure in order to 
implement the policies which are formulated at the European 
level. The action of the member states here primarily 
concerns formal implementation occasionally irrespective of 
the form of these rules (regulation, directive or decision). 
Directives by definition (art. 189 §3 of the Treaty) entail 
the adoption of national implementing measures in order to 
achieve the objectives that they embody, while regulations 
frequently lead to the adoption of organisational (e. g. the 
creation of new agencies) or other measures (financial 
instruments etc. ) although they are directly applicable12. 
12Decisions may also require national implementing measures (Rideau 
1994,656). 
53 
In any case, the member states are under the obligation 
to use the most appropriate measures in order to achieve the 
common objectives, despite their freedom to make this choice 
on the basis of their own constitutional rules (infra, 
Section 2.4). This fact illustrates the normative 
significance attached to the concept of effet utile (Mouton 
1993) that is the desired effect, which embodies the need to 
give to the European provisions their full effect and is 
frequently used by the ECJ (Louis 1990,54) not only for the 
interpretation of EC law (infra, Sections 2.5 and 2.6) but 
also in defining the obligations of the member states under 
art. 5. In other words, the obligation to implement goes 
far beyond the mere formal implementation and covers the 
need to take every measure which is necessary including 
filling the gaps in EC policy (Blanquet 1994,44). The ECJ 
has elaborated on this point (joined cases C-205 - 215/82) 
by underlining the obligation of the member states to act on 
the basis of their own procedural and substantive rules 
whenever the European provisions do not include common rules 
to this effect. 
The second obligation entails the abolition of any 
domestic provision or practice that goes against the 
achievement of the effet utile. This obligation emanates 
from the wider need to facilitate the emergence of the 
policy's full effect by not encouraging breaches of EC law 
(Temple Lang 1987,516). The third obligation comes closer 
to the core of the concept of implementation outlined in 
Chapter 1 and involves the choice of the implementing 
agencies (Bleckmann 1981,654) and their co-ordination for 
the achievement of the effet utile (case C-240/78) . 
54 
Following the same line of thought, the member states are 
under the obligation to assist the European Commission in 
its executive function by sending their officials to 
meetings (Blanquet 19 94,162) of the committees of the 
comitology framework. 
The obligation to co-operate which is based on art. 5 
is reinforced by article 213 of the Treaty which stipulates 
that the European Commission has the right to collect every 
piece of information and to make all the necessary controls 
in order to carry out the functions attributed to it. 
Despite the view that art. 213 concerns primarily the 
relations between the Commission and individuals or firms 
(Röttinger 1994,1307) it is widely accepted (Bleckmann 
1976,487; Grunwald 1991,5358; Zuleeg 1991,139) that the 
combination of articles 5 and 213 creates a solid basis for 
the obligation of the member states to provide any 
information deemed necessary by the Commission for the 
performance of its tasks. This view also constitutes 
another illustration of the system of co-operation (von 
Bogdandy 1995, Rn. 11; Constantinesco 1987,110) between the 
member states and the EC where the former act as 'the eyes 
and the hands' of the latter (Blanquet 1994,145). 
The most frequently used expression of the obligation 
to provide information is the clause, almost invariably 
incorporated into EC directives, stipulating that the member 
states must communicate to the Commission the texts of the 
national implementing measures that they have adopted. This 
is a conditio sine qua non for the successful fulfillment of 
the Commission's role as guardian of the Treaty (infra, 
Section 2.6). The importance attached to this function is 
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the ECJ's acknowledgment (case C-96/81) that failure to 
fulfil this obligation may of itself justify recourse to the 
procedure under art. 169 of the EEC Treaty. This positive 
obligation to facilitate the control of the implementation 
process is mirrored by a symmetrical obligation focusing on 
the national level. This obligation involves the creation 
of the mechanisms for control and the wider obligation de 
diligence, a concept- which is frequently used by the ECJ. 
This entails the obligation to organise the controls 
(administrative or judicial) and the obligation of the 
relevant (implementing) authorities to actively utilise them 
in the pursuit of the effet utile (Blanquet 1994,52). 
The operation of the EC as an implementation structure 
has led to the extension of this obligation, albeit in an 
asymmetrical manner, to the European institutions (Rideau 
1994,662). This obligation is mainly focused on the 
European Commission because of its close non-hierarchical 
relations with the national administrations. This is the 
necessary product of the view of the EC as a system of co- 
operative government. Co-operation is meaningful only when 
there is a minimum of reciprocity, which does not 
necessarily entail symmetry. 
The negative obligations are based on the second 
paragraph of art. 5 and entail the general duty of the 
member states to avoid any action which could undermine the 
achievement of the objectives enshrined into the Treaty. 
This involves mainly the obligation to avoid any measure 
which could lead to legal uncertainty (Blanquet 1994,196) 
thus linking this duty to the positive obligation to abolish 
the national provisions and practices which are contrary to 
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the policies adopted at the European level. It also entails 
the obligation for the national authorities to avoid 
discriminations between domestic and European rules (Zuleeg 
1991,145). 
The preceding analysis of the regulatory content of 
art. 5 cannot conceal the fact that, although their action 
is regulated, the national administrations maintain a 
certain freedom of action. This need for a balanced 
analysis, which is more accurate because it construes the 
national administrations as 'co-dependent organisations' 
(von Bogdandy 1995, Rn. 43) is based on the relevant case 
law of the ECJ which has established and developed the 
principle of institutional autonomyl3. 
2.4. INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS 
This principle is defined as the right of the member 
states to achieve the objectives emanating from their 
participation in the European policy process through their 
own constitutional rules, in the wide sense of the term. 
This is a principle devised and established by the ECJ since 
the beginning of the 1970s. The two most significant 
characteristics in its development are i) its direct link to 
the implementation process and ii) the frequent 'bridge' to 
art. 5 of the Treaty. The examination of these elements 
13Rideau (1972) has conceptualised this principle whose analysis will 
help illuminate some of the obligations deriving from the general 
provision of art. 5 and the precise identity of the national 
institutions that it covers. 
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will shed light to the precise content and the limits of 
this principle. 
The whole concept is based on the fact that the EC does 
not interfere with the institutional structure of the member 
states. This concerns not only the relations between the 
executive and legislative bodies but the role of the 
judiciary, the number of the levels of government and the 
division of powers between them14 as well. This wide- 
ranging freedom has three fundamental implications. First, 
the ECJ has acknowledged (joined cases C-51 - 54/71) the 
fact that the member states are free to choose the 
institutions which will implement EC policies. Secondly, 
the member states are also free to choose the procedures 
through which the policies will be implemented. Thirdly, 
the same freedom applies to the choice of the form of the 
measures used in the implementation process. 
Indeed, the ECJ has recognised as early as 1971 (case 
C-39/70) that 
[w]here national authorities are responsible for 
implementing a Community regulation it must be 
recognised that in principle this implementation takes 
place with due respect for the forms and procedures of 
national law. 
The ECJ went farther (joined cases C-51 - 54/71) in order to 
establish that 
14The normative intensity of this principle reflects the significance 
of the distinct historic national developments which produced these 
institutional structures (Häberle 1994; Tsatsos forthcoming). 
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the question of how the exercise of such powers may be 
entrusted by Member States to specific national bodies 
is solely a matter for the constitutional system of each 
State. 
Moreover, it has also stated (case C-8/88) that 
it is not for the Commission to rule on the division of 
competences by the institutional rules proper to each 
Member State, or on the obligations which may be imposed 
on federal and Länder authorities respectively. 
The establishment of the principle of institutional 
autonomy by the ECJ has gone hand in hand with the creation 
of a set of limits whose objective is the unequivocal 
recognition of the concept of efficacy as the basic 
guideline that must underpin the action of the member states 
in the implementation process. The national politico- 
administrative structures which implement EC policy are the 
products of distinct national traditions. The fact that 
they share some fundamental characteristics (e. g. liberal 
democratic systems) does not necessarily eliminate the 
danger of significant variations in the outcomes of the 
implementation process. The need to limit these variations 
as much as possible is at the heart of the efforts of the 
ECJ to limit the potential negative effects of the member 
states ' institutional autonomy in the implementation 
process. These efforts concern every aspect of this 
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principle and have been integrated in judgments which are 
inextricably linked to art. 5. 
Going beyond the mere statement of the principle of 
institutional autonomy, the ECJ stated in its judgment in 
case C-8/88 that 
it is for all the authorities of the Member States, 
whether it be central authorities of the State or the 
authorities of a federated State, or other territorial 
authorities, to ensure observance of the rules of 
Community law within the sphere of their competence. 
This obligation also covers the national courts precisely 
because they are parts of the EC as an implementation 
structure (case C-14/83). The normative intensity of this 
judgment has been reinforced by the ECJ's judgment in case 
C-33/90. It has stated that 
[t]he fact that a Member State has conferred on its 
regions the responsibility for giving effect to 
directives cannot have any bearing on the application of 
Article 169. The Court has consistently held that a 
Member State cannot plead conditions existing within its 
own legal system in order to justify its failure to 
comply with obligations and time-limits resulting from 
Community directives ... [E]ach Member State... alone 
remains responsible towards the Community under Article 
169 for compliance with obligations arising under 
Community law. 
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The choice of the form of the national implementing 
measures has also been regulated (Capotorti 1988,241; 
Zuleeg 1991,143). Indeed, the ECJ has ruled in case C- 
96/81 that 
[m]ere administrative practices, which by their nature 
may be altered at the whim of the administration, may 
not be considered as constituting the proper fulfillment 
of EC obligations. The absolute terms used in this judgment 
must not be taken to mean that the use of any administrative 
measures has been considered to be unlawful. The points 
that they cannot be the main or the only type of measures 
used in the implementation process because they can, by 
definition, be altered in a way that may not be compatible 
with the principle of legal certainty. 
The limitation of the principle of institutional 
autonomy by the ECJ also includes the regulation of 
procedural aspects. In case C-240/78) the ECJ stated that 
it is... incumbent on the said national institutions to 
ensure by appropriate means that the measures which they 
adopt are co-ordinated in such a way that they do not 
jeopardize the proper functioning of the organization of 
the market. 
The ECJ reinforced this view by stating (joined cases C-205 
- 215/82) that 
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[t]he application of national law must not affect the 
scope and effectiveness of Community law. 
Taking this view further, the ECJ underlined the 
intensity of the participation of the member states in the 
formulation stage of the European policy process and the 
opportunities that this creates for successful 
implementation. In a case involving financial arrangements 
the ECJ has stated (case C-30/72) that 
by reason of their participation in the deliberations of 
the Council, the Member States are informed of the 
extent of the expenditure which might be entailed in 
applying acts adopted by that institution and are 
therefore able in good time to make the appropriate 
provisions for satisfying the financial obligations 
incurred. 
The regulation of the role of the member states as 
parts of the implementation structure also has two 
significant legal facets, namely the principles of supremacy 
and direct effect of EC law. 
2.5. THE SUPREMACY AND THE DIRECT EFFECT OF EC LAW: TWO 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN THE QUEST FOR EFFICACY 
The supremacy of EC law means that it prevails in cases 
of conflict with domestic legal rules or practices. It has 
first been established in the ECJ's judgment in the famous 
Costa/ENEL case (C-6/64). Departing from the view that the 
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Treaty of Rome has established a legal system which goes far 
beyond the ordinary international treaties, the ECJ went on 
to underline the fact that 
the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a 
body of law which binds both their nationals and 
themselves. The integration into the laws of each 
Member State of provisions which derive from the 
Community... make it impossible for the States, as a 
corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and 
subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them 
on a basis of reciprocity... The executive force of 
Community law cannot vary from one State to another in 
deference to subsequent domestic laws, without 
jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the 
Treaty... [T]he law stemming from the Treaty... could 
not ... be overridden by domestic legal 
provisions... without being deprived of its character as 
Community law... The transfer by the States from their 
domestic legal system to the Community legal system of 
the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty 
carries with it a permanent limitation of their 
sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral 
act incompatible with the concept of the Community 
cannot prevail. (Emphasis added) 
The concept of efficacy which is at the heart of the 
implementation process was also the main driving force 
behind this judgment. The ECJ accepted that the reciprocal 
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nature of the obligations emanating from EC membership would 
be severely damaged if the member states could unilaterally 
adopt measures contravening these obligations. This legal 
reasoning places emphasis on the idea of uniform 
implementation across the Community which requires the 
limitation of the powers of the member states to adopt 
conflicting unilateral measures, thus reinforcing the 
negative dimension of the principle of Community loyalty 
based on art. 5§2 of the Treaty. 
Subsequent developments in the case law of the ECJ have 
confirmed and reinforced the position adopted in the 
Costa/ENEL case. Indeed, the ECJ ruled in the equally 
famous Simmenthal judgment (case C-106/77) that 
in accordance with the principle of the precedence of 
Community law, the relationship between the provisions 
of the Treaty and directly applicable measures of the 
institutions on the one hand and the national law of the 
Member States on the other is such that those provisions 
and measures not only by their entry into force render 
automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of 
current national law but... also preclude the valid 
adoption of new legislative measures to the extent to 
which they would be incompatible with Community 
provisions... [Action in the opposite direction] would 
amount to a corresponding denial of the effectiveness of 
the obligations undertaken... pursuant to the Treaty... It 
follows from the foregoing that every national court 
must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community 
law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter 
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confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside 
any provision of national court which may conflict with 
it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule. 
This view places substantial emphasis on the role of 
the national courts as significant parts of the structure 
where implementation of EC policy takes place, by 
instructing them not to apply any contravening national 
rules irrespective of the time of their adoption. This 
means that although the member states maintain the right to 
legislate, the exercise of this right must take place within 
the boundaries created by their participation in this 
Community of law. Thus, the ECJ has enshrined to EC policy 
a legal attribute which is meant to facilitate 
implementation. This attribute produces its full effect in 
cases of conflict (between domestic and European policies) 
which reach the courts. This is where the concept of direct 
effect comes into play, in a manner that complements the 
supremacy of EC law in the quest for efficacy. 
It means that some provisions of primary and secondary 
EC law can be invoked by individuals or companies in order 
to promote or protect rights enshrined into these provisions 
even when their implementation requires the adoption of 
legislative measures which are not in place when the case 
reaches the court. This concept has been established by the 
ECJ in its van Gend & Loos judgment (case C-26/62). It 
departed again from the view that the Treaty 
is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
obligations between the contracting states... In addition 
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the task assigned to the Court of Justice... confirms 
that the states have acknowledged that Community law has 
an authority which can be invoked by their nationals 
before those courts and tribunals... Independently of the 
legislation of Member States, Community law... not only 
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended 
to confer upon them rights which become part of their 
legal heritage. 
Initially this principle concerned mainly Treaty 
provisions which had to be clear and unconditional. Indeed, 
in a set of judgments the ECJ has acknowledged the direct 
effect of a number of fundamental Treaty provisions (Rideau 
1994,683-4) including art. 7 (non-discrimination on the 
basis of nationality), art. 30 (prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions to intra-Community trade) art. 48 (free 
movement of labour) art. 52 (right of establishment) and 
art. 59 (freedom to provide services). 
The establishment of the direct effect of provisions 
contained in directives was somewhat problematic. 
Directives by nature require transposition into national law 
(formal implementation) according to the relevant domestic 
procedures. This clearly establishes a discretionary power 
for the member states. In its van Duyn judgment (case C- 
41/74) the ECJ has accepted the direct effect of precise and 
unconditional provisions of directives15 which do not entail 
a margin for manoeuvre left at the discretion of the 
national authorities. The obligation to accept the direct 
15Nevertheless the ECJ accepted that this should be assessed on an ad 
hoc basis. 
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effect of directives (whenever the relevant conditions are 
fulfilled) covers not only courts but public authorities in 
general, including sub-national governmental bodies and 
other organisations which, irrespective of their legal form, 
provide services to the public on the basis of exclusive 
rights conferred upon them, such as privatised utilities. 
More importantly, this principle has been reinforced 
significantly by the recognition by the ECJ (Barav 1993, 
106; Rideau 1994,688) of the fact that even when a member 
state has failed to transpose a directive into national law, 
the directive can produce direct effect if it fulfills the 
conditions of clarity and lack of conditions attached to EC 
legislation. This is the logical result of the need to 
avoid the use by the member states of the additional 
decision point (formal implementation) contained in the 
definition of the directive as a justification for incorrect 
implementation. 
From the point of view of the analysis of 
implementation in the EC, this is an extremely important 
finding because it reinforces the validity of our choice to 
go beyond the mere formal implementation of EC policy. This 
methodological foundation of this dissertation is further 
reinforced by the ECJ's judgment in the Reyners case (C- 
2/74) where it acknowledged that even if at the end of the 
transition from national to European competence in a policy 
area, the European institutions have not adopted the 
necessary measures envisaged by the Treaty, these provisions 
can still be invoked in courts. It is clear that EC 
policies can produce results even when the relevant measures 
have not been adopted, simply by virtue of the participation 
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of states and individuals in the process of European 
integration, hence the focus on formal implementation 
Although the European Community does not have its own 
implementing agencies, it possesses two important 
institutional guarantors of efficacy in the implementation 
process. The European Commission and the ECJ are the EC's 
own institutionalised fixers. 
2.6. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE ECJ: TWO 
INSTITUTIONALISED FIXERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
The objective here is to analyse the development of the 
role of the European Commission as an active fixer whose 
action covers every aspect of the implementation process, 
unlike the ECJ whose role is mainly passive and dependent on 
the activities of (primarily) European but also national 
actors. The analysis of the European Commission's role in 
the implementation process reveals a multitude of functions. 
Indeed this is reflected through the provision of art. 155 
first indent of the Treaty which constitutes the legal basis 
for the European Commission's role. It stipulates that 
[in]n order to ensure the proper functioning and 
development of the common market, the Commission shall 
- ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the 
measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are 
applied. 
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This role of the Commission has three basic facetsl6. 
First, it is a direct implementer in competition policy 
primarily on the basis of art. 85-94 of the Treaty. This 
role includes a number of significant functions like the 
authorisation of mergers between companies and the 
authorisation and control of state aids. Although these 
functions are performed on the basis of Treaty provisions 
and other legal texts (especially regulations) shaped mainly 
by the member states, recent literature (Cini 1996,23; 
Allen 1996,167) has underlined the discretion exercised by 
the Commission, which is embodied in basic guidelines that 
it has developed, like the so-called de minimis principle in 
mergers whereby the Commission determines whether a merger 
can be authorised on the basis of the minimal or significant 
impact that it will have on the structure of the market 
(e. g. through the formation of an oligopoly). 
Secondly, the Commission also implements the budget of 
the EC under art. 205 of the Treaty. This function is 
guided by the relevant financial regulations and constitutes 
an important demonstration of the pressures that the 
Commission attracts. Indeed, Levy (1997,210) underlined 
the fact that about 150 officials had the responsibility to 
authorise about 360,000 requests for spending in 1995. The 
Commission's margin of freedom here is shaped in a rather 
indirect manner, compared to competition policy, namely 
16These roles are ideal types in the Weberian sense since they are not 
easily distinguished from each other. Indeed, even a casual 
observation of the role of the Commission in its day-to-day practice 
will reveal the intensive interactions between them. 
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through the definition of criteria for the distribution of 
funds (Cini 1996,24-5). 
In both of these cases, one must underline the fact 
that the role of the Commission comes closer to what we have 
identified in Chapter 1 as macro-implementation. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that both in spending programmes 
and in competition policy the Commission relies on national 
administrations or even private actors for the actual 
operationalisation of many aspects of its decisions. For 
example, one could underline the obligation of companies to 
notify to the Commission their plans for a merger and the 
Commission's direct contacts with research institutes and 
researchers funded by the EC's Fourth Framework Programme on 
Research and Development. The latter aspect includes the 
selection of research projects and the authorisation of 
payments. On the other hand, the actual merger is the 
prerogative of the companies in question while in the second 
example (research grants) the conduct of research is the 
prerogative of the relevant researchers. These examples 
illustrate i) the significance of Berman's distinction and 
ii) the fact that the Commission's role in the 
implementation of policy is not that direct after all. 
More important though is the third role of the European 
Commission as the guarantor of legality in the 
implementation process. This role is defined by art. 169 of 
the Treaty which covers the failure of the member states to 
fulfil Treaty obligations. The procedure of art. 169 has 
two parts (administrative and judicial) and is composed of 
three separate stages: First, the Commission informs 
through a formal letter the interested member state of the 
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reasons why it considers that an infringement may have 
happened during the implementation process and provides a 
'reasonable deadline' for it to present its views. 
Secondly, if the said state disagrees or fails to respond 
the Commission has the right to refer the case to the ECJ 
after issuing a 'reasoned opinion' thus entering the third 
(judicial) stage of the process. On the contrary, if it 
considers that the response is valid and sufficient, the 
case is considered to be closed. 
The analysis of the Commission's role under this 
provision presents a conceptual problem, namely the 
definition of the 'failure of a member state to fulfil a 
Treaty obligation. ' One can distinguish between four types 
of failure: i) The total lack of national implementing 
measures; ii) the incorrect formal implementation; iii) 
the incorrect administrative implementation and iv) the non- 
implementation of judgments of the ECJ. They concern every 
part of the institutional structure of a member state (de 
Bellescize 1977,187)17. 
Despite a set of ground rules which regulate the action 
of the European Commission in this process18 this is an 
17The ECJ has not yet ruled on a case relating to non-implementation 
by a national court (Craig and de Bürca 1995,389). One should expect 
the ECJ to rule in favour of the inclusion of national courts in the 
scope of this obligation as it has done (supra, Section 2.3) in the 
definition of the scope of art. 5 of the Treaty (Galmot and Bonichot 
1988,20-1). 
18These rules include the use of 'reasonable' time limits and the need 
for the Commission to present the motives for its action (Candela 
Castillo and Mongin 1996,56-8). 
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eminently political function. This is based on the sources 
of information which provide the incentive for the action of 
the Commission, the identity of the decision-making body and 
the possible outcomes. On the one hand, the commission 
possesses both formal and informal sources of information. 
Formal sources are mainly found in the information clause 
integrated into EC legislation, primarily directives, which 
obliges member states to communicate to the Commission the 
texts of the essential measures adopted in order to 
implement EC policy. Commission officials can check not 
only whether the member states have adopted the relevant 
measures on time but also whether the nature and the content 
of these measures correspond to its interpretation of the 
effet utile19. Individuals, private firms and national 
administrations20 are the sources from which the Commission 
informally obtains information relating to the 
implementation process. The confidential treatment of this 
information by the Commission explains the preference for 
this channel. The assessment of the scope for action under 
art. 169 is also political as it is the political echelon of 
the Commission, namely the college of the Commissioners, 
190ne may also add the questions submitted by MEPs, which are more 
visible and equally formal. 
20Member states do not use the (otherwise similar) procedure of art. 
170 by taking another member state to the ECJ (Hartley 1994,324). An 
assessment of the obvious political risks entailed in this action is 
the rationale behind this behaviour, especially in a context which is 
characterised by the extensive use of QMV and the subsequent need to 
create voting 'alliances' in the formulation stage (Wallace 1985). 
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which is responsible for the final decision2l. Figure 2.1 
demonstrates the quantitative dimension of art. 169 
procedures22 after 1978. 
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Figure 2.1: Number of letters and referrals of cases to the 
ECJ under art. 169 procedures, 1978-96 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 1986b, 32; 
1991a, 91; 1997a, 145. 
Despite the fact that one could only have a very general 
idea of the EC's implementation profile - due to the crude 
21This underlines the value of the view which sees both an 
administrative and a political role in the Commission (Page 1997, 
Chapter 7; Ludlow 1991). 
22The general perception within national administrations that the 
European Commission normally wins in the cases that it brings to the 
ECJ is confirmed by the available data for the period between 1988 and 
1994 (Commission of the European Communities 1993a, 207-9; Commission 
des Communautes europeennes 1996,123-5; Commission of the European 
Communities 1997a, 147-9) which show a 89,8% success rate for the 
European Commission. 
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and undifferentiated nature of the data which cannot present 
a detailed picture of the nature of problems that lead to 
the use of this procedure23 -a number of comments can be 
made. 
Firstly, although there is an overall pattern that 
illustrates a clear increase in the number of procedures 
commenced by the European Commission, the same does not 
apply to the number of cases that reach the ECJ. That means 
that the Commission uses this procedure as a preventive 
rather than a punitive measure. Secondly, the differences 
between the number of cases opened by the Commission and 
those that reach the ECJ constitutes a clear illustration of 
the utility of this procedure given that a number of these 
cases are clarified and resolved during this process. 
Thirdly, the stable pattern of the cases that reach the ECJ 
should not obscure the fact that some of them are resolved 
just before or even during proceedings in the ECJ. The 
stability of the second pattern should not be overestimated 
as it may be an illustration of the limits of the 
Commission's resources, in terms of the amount of time they 
can spend on these procedures24 or the skill that they 
possess compared to their skill in formulating policy 
23However, this is the only set of available data that could depict 
the EC's implementation profile. 
24The validity of this point is illustrated by the expansion of the 
EC's agenda (Pollack 1994). Although it has been argued (Peters 1997, 
194-5) that the diversity of ideas and inputs involved in agenda- 
setting (Peters 1994) seems to make implementation more difficult this 
is a far too risky generalisation because it fails to take account of 
the nature of the problems involved in implementation. 
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(Peters 1997,191; Ludlow 1991,107). Fourthly, although 
one could attribute the dramatic increase in 1990 to the 
accession of Portugal and Spain more important is the fact 
that this pattern coincides with a pattern of increase in 
the overall legislative output (Page and Dimitrakopoulos 
1997, Figure 1). In other words, it does not demonstrate a 
deterioration in the quality of implementation. 
Although there is no room for the identification of the 
role of individual Commissioners as the main source of the 
political character of this function, it is clear that the 
limited administrative resources25 of the Commission make it 
necessary to focus on a number of specific 'important' 
cases. Deciding which case is important and which is not is 
a political issue. Moreover, the political nature of this 
action - also underlined by the particular interest shown by 
specific Commissioners like President Jenkins who pursued a 
more rigorous policy (Mendrinou 19 96,16) - has been 
acknowledged by senior Commission officials who implemented 
it (Ehlermann 1987,207). There is a number of contextual 
and administrative problems that illustrate the potential 
and the limits rather than the actual utility of this 
procedure26 thus providing a clear illustration of the 
weakness of this implementation structure. 
25A small unit of the Secretariat General of the European Commission 
deals with these issues. 
26Even when the ECJ has found that a member state has not implemented 
properly a policy, the outcome was, at least until the entry into 
force of the Treaty on European Union, not necessarily a correction of 
its behaviour, as all the Commission could formally do, was to 
commence another procedure under art. 169. 
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Indeed, the length and the relative inefficiency of 
this procedure (Ehlermann 1987,208) had a number of 
significant systemic repercussions on the role of the 
European Commission which has found alternative and much 
more flexible ways to deal with these problems. First, a 
number of informal procedures have been introduced in an 
attempt to reinforce its monitoring actions. These 
procedures include mainly the so-called reunions-paquets 
(package meetings) where Commission officials and national 
civil servants meet in the capital of the interested member 
state and discuss specific problematic cases (Thomas 1991, 
890). The success (Dewost 1990b, 79) of these procedures is 
partly due to their informal nature and the prevalent spirit 
of co-operation as opposed to the necessarily adversarial 
nature of legal proceedings. Secondly, it has also 
reinforced the opinion of those who argue in favour of a 
'decentralised control' (Ehlermann 1987,217) by affected 
individuals through the use of the concept of direct effect 
(supra, Section 2.5). 
Although a large number of problems are resolved in 
these informal meetings or even in the administrative stages 
of the procedure of art. 169, others reach the ECJ. This is 
the most obvious part of the ECJ's participation in the 
implementation process. The ECJ facilitates this process by 
issuing judgments relating to all aspects of implementation, 
formal or administrative, and has thereby been able to 
identify fundamental principles of this implementation 
structure (supra, Sections 2.3-2.5). However, the primarily 
passive role of the ECJ, is illustrated by the inability of 
the EC to implement judgments. Until 1993 and the entry 
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into force of the Treaty on European Union, the non- 
implementation of a judgment could only trigger another 
procedure under art. 169 (or art. 170), due to the initial 
weakness of the provision of art. 171. As it was not an 
effective deterrent, a number of member states had 
accumulated a significant backlog of judgments which they 
had not implemented27. The new version of art. 171 which 
has received positive comments in the light of the previous 
intransigence of the member states (Tagaras 1993,152) 
enshrined into the TEU enables the Commission to bring the 
case (after having opened a dialogue with the state in 
question) before the ECJ by specifying a lump sum or penalty 
payment which it considers appropriate. This may then be 
imposed on the member state in question. 
Aside from this post hoc function, the ECJ also exerts 
its influence during the implementation process through the 
procedure of art. 177 which organises a dialogue with 
national courts (Craig and de Bürca 1995,399; Vandersanden 
1992,3: 280) aiming at the uniform interpretation of 
(primary and secondary) EC law through the so-called 
preliminary rulings28. This is the mechanism that it has 
used in order to establish and develop the principles of 
supremacy and direct effect of EC law. The significance of 
this function of the ECJ is illustrated by the obligation of 
national courts of last instance to submit questions 
relating to the interpretation of EC law to the ECJ. 
27Unti1 the end of 1992 the UK, France and Greece had not implemented 
6,8 and 8 judgments respectively (Commission of the European 
Communities 1993a, 410-8). 
28These rulings are binding for the national courts. 
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Part of the operation of the EC after the entry into 
force of the Treaty on European Union is subject to the 
principle of subsidiarity as it is defined in art. 3b of the 
Treaty. Does this affect the implementation process? 
2.7. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY: AN IMPLEMENTATION 
PERSPECTIVE 
The explicit29 formal definition of subsidiarity found 
in art. 3b of the Treaty reconciles (Jachtenfuchs 1992; 
Peterson 1994) two contradictory views, one pro- 
integrationist which construed this principle as a means of 
resolving the problem of division of powers between the EC 
and the member states and the opposite view which promoted 
the introduction of subsidiarity as a means of re- 
nationalising EC powers. These views reflect the basic idea 
behind subsidiarity which attempts to reconcile the need for 
the constituent parts of society to maintain their own 
distinct sphere of action without undermining the collective 
element that comes with social life, an idea that can be 
traced back to a number of sources (Millon-Delsol 1993; 
Burgess 1995,15-9; Müller-Graff 1996,76-7). 
The definition incorporated in art. 3b is based on two 
distinctions: One between two levels of government (the 
European and the national) and another between two types of 
competence (exclusive and concurrent). The EC takes action 
only when and to the extent that the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
29The SEA implicitly introduced the principle of subsidiarity through 
art. 130r §4 (covering environmental policy). 
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member states. If one follows this line of reasoning, one 
comes to the conclusion that this principle does not affect 
the operation of the EC as an implementation structure. 
Indeed, the importance of the second distinction is largely 
neutralised by the fact that the Treaty does not contain a 
list of exclusive or concurrent powers (von Bogdandy and 
Nettesheim 1995, Rn. 8). This, in turn, means that the 
nature of the EC's competence will remain part of the wider 
negotiations at the European level. This applies not only 
to the formulation stage, but implementation as well. 
Even when one examines subsidiarity from the point of 
view of the distinction between the two levels of government 
(European and national) one is led to the same conclusion as 
to the ability of this principle to alter the operation of 
the EC as an implementation structure. It does not alter 
three fundamental characteristics of this structure, namely 
the lack of external implementing agencies, comitology and 
the principle of institutional autonomy of the member 
states, thus leaving unaffected the quantity and the quality 
of the decision points. On the contrary, these 
characteristics reflect both the 'active' and the 'passive' 
(Weinacht 1995) facet of subsidiarity. 
First, the lack of external implementing agencies 
embodies the institutional dimension of subsidiarity because 
it automatically places emphasis on the role of the national 
politico-administrative machineries as parts of a wider 
whole, namely the EC. They are responsible for performing 
the functions that the EC cannot perform due to the lack of 
own implementing agencies, in line with the definition of 
subsidiarity found in art. 3b. 
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Secondly, comitology can also be seen as an expression 
of subsidiarity to the extent that it opens for the national 
administrations a window of opportunity to participate, from 
an early stage, in the implementation process which affects 
them. This also reveals the quest for efficacy although 
this was not the only objective behind this phenomenon 
(supra, Section 2.2). 
Thirdly, the definition found in art. 3b rightly limits 
the implementation of subsidiarity to two levels of 
government, namely the European and the national level. A 
different approach which would underline the domestic 
repercussions of subsidiarity, e. g. by urging the member 
states to devolve power to sub-national levels (Millon- 
Delsol 1993,97; Lequesne 1997,486) would clearly 
contradict the principle of institutional autonomy which 
rightly protects30 the formal domestic distribution of power 
from any influences emanating from the operation of the EC, 
but only to the extent that the domestic structure does not 
create opportunities for ineffective implementation of EC 
policy31. By the same token, institutional autonomy 
expresses the spirit of subsidiarity to the extent that it 
reflects the need of the constituent parts of the EC to 
preserve elements of their identity without ignoring the 
quest for efficacy as part of the common action. 
30The validity of this view is illustrated by the provision of art. F 
§1 of TEU which stipulates that the European Union respects the 
national identities of its member states. 
31This view of the dual dimension of institutional autonomy has been 
confirmed by the European Council through the adoption of Declaration 
No. 19 on the implementation of Community law attached to the TEU. 
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This analysis leads us to a number of important 
conclusions. First, the European Commission has developed 
into the EC's executive body. Its function covers a rather 
limited number of actions that we have identified as parts 
of macro-implementation. This basically means that the 
Commission relies heavily on the national politico- 
administrative structures for the implementation of policy 
(macro- and micro-implementation). 
Secondly, the member states not only have a crucial 
role in implementation as the EC's implementing agencies, 
but they have also developed a system (comitology) which 
enables them to have a direct primary input in the choice of 
the European legislative (and other) implementing measures. 
The fundamental implication of this finding is the fact that 
if the member states do not i) implement formally EC policy 
and ii) implement administratively the policy that it 
embodies in an effective manner, this is certainly not due 
to the lack of participation in the previous stages and the 
information (about the policy's philosophy and objectives) 
that comes with it. 
Thirdly, the operation of the national politico- 
administrative structures in the implementation stage is 
tightly regulated by the ECJ's case law and the European 
Commission's formal powers and informal mechanisms. The 
latter aspect is of crucial importance because it 
illustrates the adaptability of the European Commission to 
its environment and more importantly the partial shift away 
from confrontational procedures which do not necessarily 
promote a spirit of co-operation. Nevertheless, the member 
states have a considerable margin of freedom through the 
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operation of the principle of institutional autonomy, which 
has a structural and, more importantly, a procedural 
dimension. 
Fourthly, the efficacy of the concepts of direct effect 
and supremacy of EC developed in the ECJ's case law largely 
depends on the willingness and the ability of the relevant 
societal actors to make use of these mechanisms in order to 
protect their interests that may be harmed during the 
implementation process. While the first dimension (ability) 
largely depends on objective criteria, that is the cost (in 
terms of time and money) involved, the second dimension 
(willingness) is largely a matter of subjective judgments 
involved in the daily operation of these actors. This is 
certainly not a criticism of these very useful concepts. It 
is rather a clear demonstration of the fact that although 
public institutions may create original and potentially 
powerful tools, their efficacy largely depends on the use 
that one may make of them. 
Our focus will now shift to the national level. We 
shall attempt to outline i) the linkages between the 
formulation and formal implementation stages and ii) the 
national implementation profiles (Chapters 3-5). Then we 
shall develop working hypotheses based on our comparative 
findings (Chapter 6). 
82 
Chapter 3 
THE UK 
3.1. THE ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE 1974 
3.1.1. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The pre-1974 arrangements for the handling of EC policy 
at the political level were marked by the constant changes 
of the operational framework and the division of labour 
between the various ministers (Wallace and Wallace 1973, 
253-4). Although the first Cabinet minister with special EC 
responsibility has been appointed as early as 1957 (Butler 
and Butler 1994,476) the period until 1974 has been 
characterised by constant changes at the political level, in 
a way that illustrated the political salience of the 
principle of British accession through the involvement of 
prominent members of the successive governments such as 
Heath, Brown and Thompson but also through the clear 
attribution of responsibility to three different albeit 
fundamental parts of the central government, namely the 
Department of Economic Affairs, the Foreign Office and the 
Cabinet Office. 
Their involvement reflected i) the predominance of 
economics in the integration process, ii) the position of 
the UK as a third country whose dealings with the EC were 
part of her foreign affairs and iii) the political salience 
of the issue which had to be dealt with at the highest 
political level. The pattern of change concerns the degree 
83 
0 
of the involvement of these ministers but only until Prime 
Minister Heath's decision to transfer the responsibility for 
the co-ordination of EC policy to the Cabinet Office. This 
fundamental choice reflected his view of EC affairs as part 
of domestic rather than foreign policy. 
At the administrative level, the gradual participation 
of 'technical' departments in the negotiations brought about 
a considerable pressure created by the need to service the 
relevant interdepartmental committees. The small 
secretariat in the Cabinet Office serving this purpose has 
gradually grown and became a distinct 'European Unit' 
(Wallace 1973,91). After June 1967 it took the 
responsibility for the preparation of discussions on the 
British accession at the level of the Cabinet. The formal 
establishment of this structure took place in 1972 when John 
Davies took charge of European affairs (Mazey 1992,6). 
The FCO developed gradually its own EC-related 
machinery (The British Imperial Calendar and Civil Service 
List 1967,1969,1971). The pre-existing European Economic 
Organisations Department has been re-named European 
Integration Department in 1970 and was juxtaposed to the 
European Communities Information Unit. They were headed by 
grade 4 officials and were supervised by grade 1 officials 
unlike other FCO departments (such as the East European and 
Soviet Department) which were supervised by grade 2 
officials. This underlined the importance attached to this 
policy area. In 1974 the EID has been divided into two 
separate departments, an 'Internal' dealing with the 
internal working and development of the EC, parliamentary 
and legal aspects of EC membership and an 'External' which 
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dealt with the EC's external relations with third countries 
and European Political Co-operation (United Kingdom. Civil 
Service Department 1974, cols. 343-4). The Permanent 
Representation of the UK to the EC (UKRep) was initially 
established in order to handle relations with the ECSC. The 
number of its staff grew gradually as a result of the 
intensification of the negotiations and in 1971 it had 
twenty-nine staff (including eighteen diplomats) and 
trainees from various departments served as third 
secretaries (Wallace 1973,91). As far as the technical 
ministries are concerned, most of the main Whitehall 
departments like MAFF quickly established divisions 
responsible for the relations with the EC. This is 
explained by the extent of the competence and activity of 
the EC in the policy areas covered by those departments. 
3.1.2. POLICY FORMULATION 
The Ministerial Committee for Europe was the locust of 
policy formulation at the political level (Sasse 1975,59). 
It was chaired by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
and membership varied according to the issues which were 
under discussion. The committee dealt with controversial 
and politically sensitive issues which had not been resolved 
1The convention of secrecy which governed the very existence and the 
work of the Cabinet committees does not permit a more detailed 
analysis of this process. However, the committees have always been 
regarded as an important feature of the British Cabinet. Some issues 
are resolved in the committees and never reach the Cabinet (Mackintosh 
1962,437-42; Hennessy 1985). 
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at the administrative level. It met whenever it was 
necessary and formulated the British negotiating position. 
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster performed three 
important functions. First, he was responsible for the 
development, the co-ordination and overall coherence of the 
UK's EC policy. Secondly, he informed the Cabinet on 
developments in this policy area thus ensuring liaison with 
the main decision-making body of the British central 
government and the Prime Minister. Thirdly, he exercised 
the function of representation by (occasionally) replacing 
the Foreign Secretary in sessions of the General Affairs 
Council thus mitigating the predominance of the Foreign 
Secretary in this field. Consequently, the Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster played, in practice, the role of a 
Minister for European affairs. John Davies who assumed this 
role was Heath's close associate and a noted pro-European 
(Stack 1983,126). 
At the administrative level, the function of collective 
co-ordination was taken-up by the Official Committee for 
Europe (Sasse 1975,59). It was chaired by a senior Cabinet 
Office official and membership included under secretaries 
from the technical ministries and a representative of UKRep. 
The committee met on a weekly basis and examined issues 
appearing in the agenda of the various working groups, 
COREPER and the Council of Ministers. 
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3.2. POST-1974 ARRANGEMENTS 
3.2.1. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
So far as the political level is concerned, one should 
first note the appointment in March 1974 of a Minister of 
State at the FCO responsible for European affairs. It 
should, however, be attributed to functional pressures 
rather than the willingness to give a high profile to the 
'external' dimension of this portfolio. Since then, this 
post has become a permanent feature of the British 
governmental system irrespective of the attitude of 
successive British governments toward the EC. Over the 
years, the structure of the political mechanism for the 
formulation of policy at the political level, took the form 
of a pyramid thus underlining its hierarchical character. 
The Cabinet remained the most senior political mechanism 
dealing with Britain's EC policy. A permanent 'EC slot' in 
its weekly meetings serves as the basis for a report by the 
Foreign Secretary on recent developments in this policy 
area. 
Below the Cabinet there is a web of committees dealing 
with EC affairs. The most prominent is the Ministerial 
Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy (OPD) which keeps 
under review the Government's defence and overseas policy 
(Dod's Parliamentary Companion 1995,822). It is chaired by 
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, the President of the Board of Trade, the 
Defence Secretary and the Attorney General are its members 
while others may be invited on an ad hoc basis. 
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During the period of the re-negotiation, the European 
Questions Committee had the responsibility for the political 
co-ordination of the British position vis-ä-vis the EC 
(Sasse 1975,68). This committee is now chaired by the 
Foreign Secretary and is known as OD (E). This structure 
remained unchanged until the beginning of the 1990s but more 
recently the bulk of EC issues were taken up and discussed 
by the Ministerial Sub-committee on European Questions, 
code-named OPD (E). It is chaired by the Foreign Secretary 
but membership is more extensive and includes Ministers with 
clear EC dimensions in their portfolios like the 
environment, transport and agriculture. Furthermore, the 
UK's Permanent Representative to the EC is also in 
attendance. The sub-committee deals with every issue 
relating to the UK's membership of the EU. 
At the administrative level, the decision of the Labour 
government in 1974 to transfer the political responsibility 
for EC policy to the Foreign Secretary had no repercussions 
upon the Whitehall machinery. The European Unit of the 
Cabinet Office has been re-named European Secretariat. 
Despite the expansion of Community competence over the years 
and especially after the Single European Act, the number of 
staff of the European Secretariat remained rather stable 
(about ten). Stability can be attributed to the growing 
involvement of Whitehall departments in the process of 
policy formulation. The staff of the European Secretariat 
is seconded from various Whitehall departments for a period 
of two years thus ensuring that knowledge of European 
affairs is constantly diffused within Whitehall. The same 
stability has been observed in UKRep during the 1970s and 
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1980s. While the Ambassador who heads UKRep is always drawn 
from the ranks of the FCO, his deputy is a senior DTI or 
Treasury official and the remaining posts are filled on a 
roughly equal basis by staff seconded from the Whitehall 
departments most heavily involved in EC policy. Currently, 
it comprises about fifty staff divided into specialised 
sections. 
Developments at the level of technical Whitehall 
departments were marked by three elements. First, in most 
cases aspects of EC policy were attributed to the 
functionally specialised divisions and units. However, the 
creation of horizontal co-ordinating units was intended to 
limit the negative effects of this functional diffusion. 
This is a trend observed in departments heavily involved in 
EC policy, such as the Treasury (European Co-ordination 
Division), the DTI (Branch 1 of the Europe, Industry and 
Technology Division) and MAFF (European Economic Community 
Directorate). Secondly, in the geographical departments 
(Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland) three different patterns 
were applied. i) Responsibility for EC issues has been 
attributed to pre-existing internal units (Northern Ireland 
Office); ii) a 'European Division' has been created (Wales) 
or iii) EC-related work has been divided between the 
regional offices of Whitehall departments (Scotland). 
Thirdly, in departments covering policy areas with limited 
EC activity EC issues are dealt with by international 
affairs units (like the Department of Health). 
A web of committees comprising senior officials from 
various departments has been created. The European 
Questions (Official) Committee deals with the many run of 
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the mill issues (Stack 1983,129) mainly through line- 
clearing - that is ensuring that an individual department's 
view on an issue does not contain any points of tensions 
with other departmental views - and the provision of advice 
on procedure, tactics and strategy for forthcoming 
negotiations (Spence 1993,59). It is chaired by an under 
secretary based in the European Secretariat and meets at 
assistant secretary level. Membership is determined 
directly by the agenda of the meeting thereby creating an 
extensive network of participants who also receive copies of 
the minutest. Due to the committee's workload, meetings 
take place formally two or three times a week but informal 
co-ordination meetings are also arranged - whenever 
necessary - either on the initiative of the European 
Secretariat or the lead department. In any case, a spirit 
of inclusion of any department that may have an interest in 
a given policy proposal is the widely prevailing 
characteristic of the administrative ethos in Whitehall in 
terms of the handling of EC policy. This is illustrated not 
only through the wide circulation of minutes of meetings, 
but also the wide participation in these meetings. 
Politically, Heath's fundamental decision to consider 
EC policy as a part of domestic policy can be interpreted as 
an attempt to expose the British politico-administrative 
structures to the European influence thus i) promoting 
'European thinking' and ii) avoiding the confinement of EC 
policy in a small part of the structures which deal with it. 
Two more factors explain this decision (Stack 1983,130). 
2lts work is complemented by the European Questions (Steering) 
Committee. 
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The objective was to i) reduce the political profile of this 
policy and ii) use the limited specialised staff in the most 
efficient way. The common element in the political and 
administrative structures is the creation of co-ordinating 
mechanisms which were necessary because of the diffusion of 
responsibilities to various actors. However, Wilson's 
decision to transfer the political responsibility for EC 
policy to the Foreign Secretary mitigated the effect of 
organisational diffusion thus creating a two-tier - and 
potentially contradictory system - where the diffused day- 
to-day work (dealt with as an extension of domestic 
responsibilities) of desk officers is streamlined into 
political structures which (from the organisational 
viewpoint) tend to reinforce its 'foreign' element. 
3.2.2. POLICY FORMULATION 
Policy documents emanating from the EC institutions are 
sent to Whitehall through UKRep and the FCO which is 
formally responsible for the handling of communications to 
and from Brussels. The limits of this formal arrangement 
are illustrated by the growing tendency of technical 
departments to establish direct links with Brussels (Spence 
1993,61). Those departments are required to signal to the 
European Secretariat the issues which are likely to cause 
interdepartmental tensions. This link of dependence 
underlines the importance of the European Secretariat as a 
mechanism that monitors developments in EC policies. Given 
that the specialised Whitehall departments are not expected 
to predict the wider impact of a policy proposal, the 
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European Secretariat needs to be informed constantly in 
order to start the process of co-ordination. 
The European Secretariat is a powerful co-ordinating 
body which organises and services the interdepartmental 
meetings aiming at the resolution of problems that occur in 
the previous stages of the policy process. It performs 
three fundamental roles. First, it ensures that the UK has 
a view on each EC policy proposal. Secondly, it makes sure 
that the UK's EC policy is consistent with the broad policy 
objectives of the British government. Thirdly, it 
supervises the practical follow-up of decisions. The fact 
that its size has remained rather small despite the 
expansion of the EC's agenda has led to the need to 
prioritise more ruthlessly. 
The FCO participates in the process of policy 
formulation before 'technical' Council meetings and more 
importantly, it provides advice on EC implications of 
domestic legislative proposals. Initially, the 
participation of the FCO in the formulation of the UK's EC 
policy was explained by its considerable experience in 
international negotiations. The validity of this argument 
has been limited by two factors. On the one hand, the 
decision has been taken to consider the European policy as 
an extension of domestic - rather than a part of foreign - 
policy. On the other hand, the participation of other 
Whitehall departments in the process of policy formulation 
grew as a result of the expansion of the EC agenda. This 
produced what one of the FCO's officials called 
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a dramatic rise in the expertise possessed by technical 
ministries. 
Those developments unavoidably led to tensions between these 
departments and the FCO with the latter's 'supremacy' being 
challenged. A Treasury official identified a tension 
between her department and the FCO 
which, like all ministries of foreign affairs, likes 
being nice to foreigners. 
The issues that gave rise to those tensions were the FCO's 
right to provide advice on EC implications of domestic 
legislative proposals and its concurrent role as co- 
ordinator of the UK's EC policy3. This made other Whitehall 
departments fear that the FCO would intervene in their 
sphere of competence thus enhancing the need of co- 
ordination. The question of the reinforcement of the FCO's 
status within Whitehall is directly linked to its posture 
towards the EC. Indeed, as the British membership broadened 
the FCO's role, its officials have been accused of 
transferring their allegiance to Brussels. According to 
Tony Benn 
the Foreign Office in a deep way has transferred its 
allegiance from Britain to Brussels... If they think it 
will interfere with our partners in the Community they 
will veto it, if they can, in Whitehall. If it isn't 
3This is more evident in the semesters when the UK holds the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers. 
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vetoed in Whitehall, they will be party to the process 
by which the Brussels Commission might veto it. And 
that is a fundamental change in allegiance. 
(Quoted by Young and Sloman 1982,80) 
In cases where the Foreign Secretary also had a pro-European 
stance like Sir Geoffrey Howe, the FCO attracted even more 
criticism. Thus, according to Norman Tebbit 
[t]he Ministry of Agriculture looks after farmers. The 
Foreign Office looks after foreigners. 
(Quoted by Clarke 1992,107) 
These accusations have, quite naturally, been rejected by an 
FCO official who called it 
a pro-British department. 
As an external part of the FCO, UKRep has been depicted as 
the hidden arm of Whitehall in Brussels (Young and Sloman 
1982,73). Benn meant to illustrate the looseness of the 
relationship between London-based ministers and the civil 
servants who work in UKRep when he described it as 'a 
mandarin's paradise' (quoted by Young and Sloman 1982,75). 
Three factors undermine the validity of this view. First, 
the ambassador who heads UKRep participates in the meetings 
of OPD (E) which is chaired by the Foreign Secretary and is 
the Cabinet's specialised committee on EC policy. The 
Permanent Representative returns to London on Fridays in 
order to participate (along with senior ECD officials) in 
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two-hour planning meetings organised by the European 
Secretariat (Clarke 1992,103). Moreover, the senior MAFF 
official working there attends weekly meetings in London 
where instructions are sorted out in preparation of next 
week's work. Secondly, the nature of the instructions 
emanating from Whitehall's co-ordinating meetings 
constitutes another important constraint on the activities 
of UKRep. They have been characterised as being 
among the tightest and most strictly adhered to 
(Edwards 1992,74). 
Thirdly, the system of same day reporting ensures a 
regular flow of information from UKRep to Whitehall which in 
turn means, as a British official has put it, 
that you can react very quickly 
to developments. A summary note contains the basic 
information emanating from the previous day's meeting in 
which UKRep's competent desk officer has participated. 
Moreover, UKRep provides a basis for Whitehall negotiators 
in Brussels. They are briefed before the meetings and this 
gives UKRep the opportunity to play the role of the last 
minute's co-ordinator. 
The growing involvement of technical departments in 
negotiations at the European level (as a result of the 
diffusion of responsibilities) enhances the need for co- 
ordinating mechanisms which can escape criticism for 'taking 
sides'. Indeed, the web of relations and mechanisms within 
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the Cabinet office put a premium on achieving agreement 
(Steiner 1987,6). The Cabinet Office provides (by the 
means of the European Secretariat) this neutral basis. 
We act in good faith 
as one of its officials has put it to us. 
Furthermore, impartiality is an extremely important 
feature given two fundamental tensions: One between 
'spending departments' and the Treasury and another, between 
the FCO and the technical departments. The profile of the 
European Secretariat as a neutral mechanism in the hard core 
of British government is enhanced by the fact that the 
responsibility for the Cabinet Office is part of the Prime 
Minister's prerogatives. Over the years, it has accumulated 
knowledge and experience on EC issues which is accessible to 
all Whitehall departments. 
The activity of the European Secretariat is 
multidimensional and covers a wide range of actors. First, 
at Cabinet-level, the Head of the Secretariat briefs the 
Prime Minister before the meetings of the European Council 
and also attends Cabinet meetings. Secondly, the major task 
of the European Secretariat is interdepartmental co- 
ordination. For that purpose the Secretariat organises 
about two hundred interdepartmental meetings per year where 
three types of issues are discussed: i) Horizontal issues 
affecting a range of departments; ii) issues concerning 
constant departmental interests applying to a range of 
proposals and iii) issues having a potential spill-over into 
the interests of other departments (Bender 1991,16). 
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Occasionally, such meetings are called on the initiative of 
the lead department. Thirdly, the European Secretariat acts 
as a think tank and collective memory for all Whitehall 
departments. It provides guidance and advice on important 
issues of the EC policy-making process such as comitology, 
competence issues and the use of the Luxembourg compromise. 
Fourthly, it monitors the process of parliamentary scrutiny 
and the implementation of EC legislation. Those functions 
are exercised in conjunction with the lead department. 
The importance of the European Secretariat's role as a 
central part of the mechanism which formulates the British 
policy emerges at the administrative level. EQ (0) has the 
responsibility for daily co-ordination and advice on EC 
procedures and negotiating tactics (Mazey 1992,15). The 
wide distribution of the minutes, which constitute the basis 
of the guidelines for the forthcoming negotiation, ensures 
the diffusion of information which is important, especially 
when it comes to advice on procedures and tactics, thus 
constituting a process of continuous diffusion of 
information. 
At the interface between the political and the 
administrative levels is EQ (S) which performs a 'pivotal' 
role. It is the clearing house between the administration 
and the ministerial level and provides guidance on other 
issues. The importance of its position is underlined by the 
rank of its members. They are deputy secretaries or under 
secretaries and the committee is chaired by the Head of the 
European Secretariat. Its pivotal role is further 
illustrated by the fact that it is responsible for the 
preparation of the meetings of OPD (E). 
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These procedures are underpinned by Whitehall's well- 
documented (Jordan and Richardson 1982; Richardson 1993a) 
close links with interest groups. Indeed, the dominant 
British policy style in this field is characterised by 
extensive consultations with interest groups which provide 
information and a more or less clear understanding of what 
is acceptable to them and what is not. Within Whitehall, 
these procedures are thought to be one of the most 
significant strengths of the British system of policy 
formulation because they enable the administration to have a 
clear view as to the possible outcomes while also enlarging 
the legitimacy of the policy process. 
The departments seek to mobilise the relevant groups in 
a way which is similar to the wide circulation of documents 
within Whitehall as a whole. Indeed, Whitehall departments 
have consultation lists (Richardson 1993a, 86) which include 
all the relevant interest groups. Furthermore, their 
representatives also contact UKRep which is seen to be 
acting 
as an unpaid agent for groups and appears to do an 
effective job 
(Mazey and Richardson 1992,105). 
However, the access to the system of policy formulation in 
Whitehall is not equally open to everyone or everywhere. 
While lead departments and UKRep are quite accessible thus 
constituting a vital channel of influence, higher echelons 
of the system and especially the European Secretariat and 
the FCO are open 
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[o]nly [to] the most senior business persons and the 
best of the lobbying firms 
(Spence 1993,68). 
This phenomenon does not subtract from the valuable 
contribution of interest groups in the British formulation 
process whose accurate and detailed view in construed by 
British civil servants as a direct result of openness to 
these groups. At the same time, limiting access to the 
European Secretariat is the natural result of the need to 
abide by an increasingly tight time schedule that this small 
team of officials faces on a daily basis. 
Although the majority of problems relating to the 
formulation of policy are resolved at the administrative 
level, the political dimension of the process is far from 
unimportant. OPD (E) meets five to eight times a year and 
deals with the political implications of EC issues although 
in-depth examination concerns only one or two issues. The 
agenda consists of issues like meetings of the Council of 
Ministers that require co-ordination at Cabinet level. The 
sub-committee reports 'as necessary' to OPD. Furthermore, 
the sub-committee's wide membership mitigates the validity 
of flexibility as an argument which seeks to explain the 
creation of Cabinet committees and sub-committees. However, 
it illustrates the interdepartmental nature of EC issues. 
As the most senior Cabinet committee dealing with EC 
policy, OPD's work is limited to major issues affecting EC 
policy. Its limited membership enables it to proceed in a 
more detailed discussion of issues and decisions of 
strategic importance. Problems that have occurred and have 
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proved impossible to resolve at the lower levels are 
discussed and resolved in the Cabinet, although this 
requires the assent of the chairman of the committee. 
3.3. WESTMINSTER AND THE FORMULATION OF THE UK'S EC POLICY 
3.3.1. THE MACHINERY FOR SCRUTINY 
It was only until after the British accession that the 
establishment of the parliamentary machinery for scrutiny 
took place. In May 1974 the House of Commons instituted the 
Select Committee on European Secondary Legislation4. 
Initially the Committee examined 
draft proposals by the Commission of the European 
Community and other documents published for submission 
to the Council of Ministers or to the European Council, 
whether or not those documents originate from the 
Commission 
(House of Commons 1995b). 
These terms of reference have been amended in 1990 (House of 
Commons 1990, col. 399) in order to extend the scope for 
scrutiny through the inclusion of wider categories of EC 
documents. 
The extension of the Committee's remit was twofold. On 
the one hand, it has the opportunity to examine documents 
emanating from the European institutions even when they do 
4This committee has been re-named Select Committee on European 
Legislation in March 1983 (Boulton 1989,657). 
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not contain legislative proposals. On the other hand, it 
will examine any other document relating to the EC after it 
has been deposited by a minister given that it might 
influence the European process of negotiation at a later 
stage. The same extension led to the inclusion of the 
common positions adopted by the Council of Ministers in the 
co-operation and co-decision procedures. 
The House of Lords instituted the Select Committee on 
European Communities in April 1974. The Committee is 
divided in five permanent specialised sub-committees 
although ad hoc sub-committees have been set up in order to 
discuss general issues (such as the progress to European 
Union)5. The Committee has been appointed 
to consider Community proposals, whether in draft or 
otherwise, to obtain all necessary information about 
them, and to make reports on those which, in the opinion 
of the Committee, raise important questions of policy or 
principle and on other questions to which the Committee 
consider that the special attention of the House should 
be drawn 
(House of Lords 1974b, col. 1229). 
5The sub-committees deal with issues concerning A) Economic and 
Financial Affairs, Trade and External Relations, B) Energy, Industry 
and Transport and the Working Environment, C) Environment, Public 
Health and Education, D) Agriculture, Fisheries and Consumer 
Protection, E) Law and Institutions (Vacher's 1995b, 290). The ad hoc 
sub-committee on fraud against the Community constitutes an example of 
an ad hoc sub-committee (Shell 1993,276-8). 
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Clearly, the scope for scrutiny is very broad not only in 
terms of the sources of documents and their form but also 
the issues that they cover. Still, the criteria for the 
distinction of those questions have not been specified thus 
providing a wide freedom of action to the members of the 
Committee. 
3.3.2. THE WORKING METHODS 
The lead department has the general responsibility for 
the supply of documents to the Committees. According to the 
initial undertaking, the documents would be deposited in the 
Commons 48 hours after they have been received by the 
British government6. They are followed by an explanatory 
memorandum prepared by the same department which either 
states the view of the government or provides information on 
a purely factual basis about the nature of the proposals 
(House of Commons 1974d, col. 1426). When the document is 
not available and the issue is likely to be discussed in the 
Council of Ministers the department prepares an un-numbered 
explanatory memorandum which serves as the basis for the 
Committee's work (Boulton 1989,774). 
The documents that have been deposited are considered 
by the Commons' Committee and sifted into one of the 
6This was the formal undertaking of the government (through the then 
Foreign Secretary Callaghan) in the first stage of the existence of 
the Committee (House of Commons 1974d, col. 1426). 
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following categories7: Documents of political or legal 
importance justifying a debate; those of political or legal 
importance which do not warranty debate; those of no 
political or legal importance and those of political or 
legal importance for which the Committee has not decided 
whether a debate is justified or not. When the Committee 
has been set up it has been decided that it - as a whole - 
should be responsible for the sift. This decision was based 
on the mere fact that the members of the Committee were 
divided on the issue of British membership (Kolinsky 1975, 
55). 
The main element of the Committee's competence was the 
fact that it was going to distinguish the documents of legal 
or political importance without entering into a discussion 
of the merits of those documents. According to the 
government's initial undertaking no minister would finalise 
a decision in the Council of Ministers if the Commons' 
Committee decided to refer the issue to the House. In a 
statement to the House, the then Foreign Secretary Callaghan 
made it clear that 
[t]he House ought to reach a conclusion on the issues 
before Ministers go to Council... it should be the normal 
and general rule 
(House of Commons 1974d, col. 1429). 
7Initially, the criteria were unclear and some proposals have been 
reported when one or more members of the Committee considered they 
were politically important (Bates 1975,27). 
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Despite this clear undertaking the Government has tried 
to maintain some margin of manoeuvre by stating that in case 
of an urgent matter a minister could get in touch with the 
Committee in order to draw its attention on this issue thus 
illustrating its importance. Furthermore it has been 
admitted that it was possible to use a reserve but the 
exceptional character of this measure has also been 
underlined by Callaghan (House of Commons 1974d, col. 1428). 
Those undertakings of the government have been subsumed by a 
Resolution adopted by the House in 1980 according to which 
no Minister of the Crown should give agreement in the 
Council of Ministers to any proposal for European 
legislation which has been recommended by the Select 
Committee on European Legislation... for consideration by 
the House before the House has given it consideration 
unless (a)that Committee has indicated that agreement 
need not be withheld, or (b)the Minister concerned 
decides that for special reasons agreement should not be 
withheld; and in the latter case the Minister should, at 
the first opportunity thereafter, explain the reasons 
for his decision to the House 
(House of Commons 1980, col. 843). 
Moreover, ministers are expected to place a reserve in 
the negotiations in the Council of Ministers until scrutiny 
has been completed (House of Commons 1989, §8). The 
aforementioned Resolution constitutes an attempt to limit 
the freedom of the British government without neglecting its 
need for some margin for manoeuvre in European negotiations. 
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This is reflected on point (b) which gives the possibility 
to ministers to proceed in the European negotiation process 
even when the Committee has not given its assent but only 
when 'special reasons' make it necessary for them to block a 
decision. This is also underlined by the terms it has used 
in order to define those reasons on the basis of criteria 
like the need to avoid a legal vacuum, the desirability of 
permitting a particular measure of benefit to the UK to come 
into force as soon as possible and the difficulty of putting 
a late reserve on a measure which will have little effect on 
the UK or which is likely to be of benefit to the UK. 
The Committee may then recommend a debate for the 
important issues. The debate can take place on the Floor of 
the House. If the recommendation for a debate on the Floor 
is accepted by the government, this will be done by the 
means of a motion which can be negatived by at least twenty 
members who rose in demonstration of their objection (House 
of Commons 1995a). Yet, debates on the Floor were generally 
not very well attended and did not attract much public 
interest (Bates 1991,122). 
The functional need for another forum for debate led to 
the proposal for the creation of five subject-orientated 
Special Standing Committees (House of Commons 1989, § 65). 
Finally, the government accepted in 1991 (House of Commons 
1991a, col. 292) the creation of two such Committees, 
European Standing Committee A (which deals with affairs 
relating to agriculture, fisheries and food, transport, 
environment and forestry commission) and B (other 
departments). The role of the Commons' Standing Committees 
on European Community Documents is to debate an issue in not 
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more than two and a half hours. At the end of their 
proceedings, the Standing Committees report the document to 
the House, together with their resolution. MPs who are not 
members of these Committees have the right to attend the 
meetings and participate in their work on an ad hoc basis 
but they do not have the right to vote. At the end of this 
process, a government motion is considered (and usually 
agreed) and then reported to the House by the chairman. The 
government may then choose to table its own motion which can 
be approved or rejected without debate (Norton 1995b, 97-8). 
The Lords' Committee has adopted a more flexible 
working method. Initially, it met fortnightly and 
distributed to the sub-committees only the proposals that 
were considered to be important on political grounds (Ryan 
and Isaacson 1975,211). However, the chairman's decision 
can be overridden by the Committee (Bates 1975,29) thus 
making the sift a collective function. Currently, the 
documents are sifted by the chairman on the basis of the 
information contained in the explanatory memorandum prepared 
by the lead Whitehall department. When a document is not 
recommended for scrutiny, the Committee does not reserve its 
opinion thus leaving the government with a free playing 
field. However, only a part of the documents which are 
attributed to the sub-committees will be scrutinised. 
The sub-committees have three options (Denza 1993a, 
742). First, they can lift the reserve. Second, they can 
send a letter to the relevant minister expressing an opinion 
on the issue or a part of it (e. g. the legal basis) also 
indicating whether the reserve is lifted or not. Third, the 
sub-committees may proceed in an in-depth analysis of the 
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document. At the end of the process which involves public 
hearings, trips abroad etc., the preliminary report is 
adopted by the chairman of the sub-committee and is debated 
until consensus is reached. The relevant minister is 
obliged to be present and respond to the remarks of the 
Committee. After the debate, the reserve of the House is 
considered to be lifted. 
In general, the only innovative measure in the House of 
Commons was the creation of permanent standing committees. 
The composition of the committees is based on the majority 
of the ruling party which means that both those who 
scrutinise and those whose action is being scrutinised 
belong to the same majority and political party thus 
reducing the potential for conflict, apart from cases of 
weak parliamentary majorities like the one which 'supported' 
the last Major government. Moreover, the two branches of 
the scrutiny mechanism are not co-ordinated and this does 
not help the efficiency of the scrutiny process. The same 
point can be made about the lack of formal co-ordination 
between those committees and the department-related select 
committees, although a certain degree of co-ordination is 
actually achieved via the clerks8. 
On the other hand, the government may use the opinion 
of the House in order to reinforce its negotiating position 
in the European process. This was clear right from its 
first steps when it was perceived as a 
sounding board in the management of Community business 
(Kolinsky 1975,56). 
8I owe this point to Professor Norton. 
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Indeed, one can depict the institutional development of this 
mechanism as a fine balance between Westminster's calls for 
a greater say in the conduct of EC policy and the 
maintenance of the government's autonomy for action. 
The remit of the Lords' Committee is broader thus 
enabling it to have a larger margin of manoeuvre in its 
action. Secondly, unlike the Commons, the initial sift in 
the Lords' Committee means that a very large number of EC 
documents is removed as unimportant thus facilitating the 
in-depth scrutiny of the remaining documents9. Thirdly, 
the Commons' Select Committee has been set up in order to 
discuss not the merit but the importance of EC documents. 
The two-tier system found in the House of Commons does not 
necessarily produce a coherent view, unlike the House of 
Lords which is entitled to discuss the merit of a document. 
For that purpose it uses the report of its relevant sub- 
committee thus maintaining an important degree of coherence. 
Fourthly, the scrutiny process in the House of Commons is 
specifically related to the aim of exerting pressure on the 
government while the Lords address a larger audience 
(Gregory 1983,119) and their reports often receive wide 
media coverage and are highly regarded in the European 
institutions (George 1992,92). 
As the pace of the EC decision-making process is often 
unpredictable, both Houses play a reactive (although the 
Lords' Committee seeks to anticipate trends in EC policy) 
rather than a pro-active role in the formulation stage as 
they lack the power to impose their will on the government. 
9lnitially, between 25 and 33% of the documents have been chosen for 
scrutiny (Ryan and Isaacson 1975,211; Brew 1979,242). 
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Indeed, the philosophy that forms the basis of the scrutiny 
machinery in Westminster is basically a procedural 
obligation. Put simply, the British government is not bound 
by the result of the scrutiny procedure thus maintaining a 
large margin of manoeuvre. It is simply obliged to consult 
the two Houses when formulating its position on a particular 
issue and this illustrates the limits of the influence that 
Westminster can exert on the British government on EC 
issues. The same limits are illustrated in the stage of 
formal implementation. 
3.4. THE FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION OF EC POLICY IN THE UK 
3.4.1. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Three factors explain the use of a very short and 
simple legal text (European Communities Act 1972) as the 
basis for the formal implementation of EC policy in the UK. 
First, the absence of a written constitution that would 
regulate the distribution of power between the various 
actors participating in this process is the dominant 
characteristic of the British legal framework. Second, the 
British accession took place fifteen years after the 
establishment of the EC. This meant that a part of the 
acquis communautaire (achievements of the EC) had already 
been formed, especially after 1968, the year when the 
transitional period leading to the customs union ended. 
Consequently, the new legal instrument should perform a 
double role. It should provide the basis for the 
implementation both of the acquis communautaire and the 
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future EC policies. Finally, the small size of the document 
and its laconic provisions served a clear political purpose, 
namely the avoidance of the perpetuation of the debate on 
the very principle of British membership. 
Indeed, this political debate would have continued if 
the Heath government had decided to create a detailed set of 
legal provisions which would include legal instruments 
implementing EC policy on an ad hoc basis. The 
parliamentary debates preceding the adoption of the relevant 
acts would inevitably further illustrate the deep divisions 
within the two major parties. Furthermore, they would also 
endanger the already unstable process whereby the 
Conservative government prepared the British entry, by 
enabling MPs to vote against the government's wishes. The 
aforementioned factors led to the adoption of the European 
Communities Act in 1972. 
Its laconic provisions constitute an attempt to 
integrate the pre-existing primary and secondary EC law into 
the British legal order. Indeed, section 2§1 stipulates 
that 
[a]ll such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and 
restrictions from time to time created or arising by or 
under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures 
from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, 
as in accordance with the Treaties are without further 
enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United 
Kingdom shall be recorded and available in law, and be 
enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the 
expression 'enforceable Community right' and similar 
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expressions shall be read as referring to one to which 
this subsection applies. 
Clearly, this provision covers a wide variety of forms 
of EC law: i) The Treaties establishing the three 
Communities, ii) other treaties entered into by the 
Communities with or without any of the member states and 
iii) secondary EC legislation adopted on the basis of the 
Treaties. However, two more elements have to be underlined. 
First, the European Communities Act incorporated EC law 
without the need for further enactment. Practically, this 
arrangement served the political purpose mentioned earlier, 
namely the marginalisation of Westminster which constituted 
the main forum of expression of disagreement against the 
principle of British membership. Furthermore, this solution 
was compatible with the very nature of the legal provisions 
that it concerned. In other words, directly applicable EC 
legislation had to be incorporated into British law. 
Secondly, the aforementioned forms of EC law concern only 
previously existing legislation. Consequently, a solution 
had to be found in order to provide the basis for the formal 
implementation of future EC policies. 
Section 2§2 of the European Communities Act 1972 
provides this basis. This provision covers two types of 
legislation. First, it covers provisions adopted 
for the purpose of implementing any Community 
obligations of the United Kingdom, or enabling any such 
obligations to be implemented, or of enabling any rights 
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enjoyed or to be enjoyed by the United Kingdom under or 
by virtue of the Treaties to be exercised. 
Second, this provision also covers legislation adopted 
for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of 
or related to any such obligation or rights or the 
coming into force, or the operation from time to time, 
of subsection (1) above. 
Clearly, while in the first case the objective was the 
creation of a general legal basis that would enable the UK 
to implement formally future EC policies, in the second case 
the provision of section 2§2 concerns the means that are 
necessary in order to render EC law operational, especially 
the provisions of the acquis communautaire that need a 
legislative follow-up. Furthermore, schedule 2 specified 
the type of instrument that was going to be used in the 
process of formal implementation of EC policy. Indeed, 
statutory instruments were going to be the main means used 
in this process. 
This choice can be explained by a set of factors that 
characterise subordinate legislation, which is defined as 
the set of rules and regulations made by executive bodies 
such as the Crown, ministers, some departments, public 
corporations and local authorities, in the British tradition 
of legislation (de Smith and Brazier 1994,359-64). Despite 
the fact that the great bulk of subordinate legislation is 
made by virtue of parliamentary authority, this type of 
legislation is, ironically, characterised by the willingness 
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to limit the parliamentary input in this process. Indeed, 
the initiative emanates from the Executive and the 
consultations with interest groups are quite intensive. 
They provide 
better data, information and thinking although at times 
it makes officials less flexible as they can be boxed in 
a position 
as a British civil servant put it. 
Thus efficiency is the factor that underpins the 
decision to use statutory instruments. Efficiency results 
from the time that is saved when Westminster is not heavily 
involved in this process. The typical characteristics of 
the legislative process leading to the adoption of primary 
legislation further explain the increasing use of delegated 
legislation (Greenwood and Wilson 1989,274). More 
specifically, the Parliament has time to enact a very small 
number of major bills and the government has the instruments 
which are necessary in order to limit, but is unable to 
avoid, parliamentary debate. Nevertheless, caution is 
necessary here because the fact that this choice is 
characterised by the limitation of the parliamentary input, 
does not mean that Westminster is totally excluded from this 
process. 
Statutory instruments adopted on the basis of the 
European Communities Act that contain i) an Order in Council 
or ii) regulations made by a minister or government 
department are subject to annulment in pursuance of a 
resolution of either House of Parliament, if they are made 
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without a draft having been approved by resolution of each 
House (European Communities Act 1972, Schedule 2§ 2). In 
other words, these statutory instruments are subject to the 
so-called affirmative resolution procedure (de Smith and 
Brazier 1994,374). This procedure is characterised by the 
need fo ra parliamentary resolution approving the 
instrument. The importance of this provision is further 
underlined by the fact that this resolution has to be 
adopted by both Houses of Parliament. 
Nevertheless, the importance of this provision should 
not be over-estimated because it is used only in a small 
number of cases. This is the result of the fact that many 
orders that practically implement EC law are made under 
other legislative instruments (Collins 1990,121) which do 
not necessarily contain a similar procedural requirement. 
Indeed, successive British governments have used powers 
previously delegated by the Parliament for the formal 
implementation of EC policy (Butt Philip and Baron 1988, 
650). The limited importance of this provision is further 
illustrated by the fact that it is used only for a number of 
statutory instruments, the remaining being subject to the 
negative resolution procedure. In this case, the instrument 
becomes effective automatically unless it is annulled by a 
resolution (Greenwood and Wilson 1989,276) following a 
prayer moved by an MP within forty days from the instrument 
being laid (de Smith and Brazier 1994,374). 
Another limit placed on the action of the Parliament 
results from the use of 'non-legislative action' as a means 
to implement EC policy, despite the fact that successive 
British governments have used formal legislation in order to 
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achieve the same objective and ii) the condemnation of this 
practice by the ECJ's case law (supra, Chapter 2). Quasi- 
legislative devices such as administrative circulars and 
codes of practice are used for that purpose (Drewry 1995, 
457). The recognition of the Parliament's limited role 
places firmly the emphasis on the Executive as the branch 
that dominates in the process of formal implementation of EC 
policy in the UK. 
3.4.2. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION 
The first question that arises concerns the identity of 
the mechanisms that deal with implementation. Generally, 
the British administrative apparatus is characterised by the 
absence of mechanisms that deal exclusively with the 
implementation of EC policy. On the contrary, the units 
which have the responsibility for formal implementation are, 
as a rule, the ones that formulate the national policy and 
then negotiate at the European level (Butt Philip 1985b, 97; 
Drewry 1995,457). 
This is the only way to do it 
as a British official put it. On the one hand, this is the 
result of a fundamental characteristic of the central 
British administration, namely its organisation on the basis 
of policy areas rather than parts of the policy processl0. 
10The exceptional nature of some bodies such as the Cabinet Office 
whose role is defined in terms of a function (co-ordination) cannot 
undermine the general validity of this point. 
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On the other hand, this also constitutes a conscious choice 
which reflects awareness of the fact that the units and the 
officials who have participated in the formulation and 
negotiation stages know what i) ministers, ii) interest 
groups, iii) the Commission want and more importantly, how 
the content of the final compromise has been defined and 
what its precise philosophy ('its spirit') is. That 
facilitates formal implementation of EC policy because as a 
British official has put it, in that way one knows 
why it is as it is, what you can do with it and what you 
can't do with it. 
However, this does not mean that mechanisms dealing 
only with a part of the wider implementation process are 
totally absent. The Litigation Department of the European 
Secretariat is an example of this type of mechanism. 
Despite the existence of departmental legal advisors, the 
Litigation Department deals with judicial proceedings 
involving the UK, and also the co-ordination of observations 
and references for preliminary rulings (Usher 1995,102-3). 
The extremely technical nature of this part of the process 
explains the existence of this specialised unit. On the 
contrary, one can be led to the same conclusion if one takes 
into account the marginal role that lawyers play (Drewry 
1995,470) in departmental decision-making processes 
dominated by the traditionally generalist British civil 
servants. At the interministerial level, EQO (L) is a 
committee composed of officials physically based in the 
Treasury Solicitor's Department, who deal with legal aspects 
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of EC policy and the conduct of litigation in the ECJ 
(Drewry 1995,470). Furthermore, a specialised unit (Single 
Market Compliance Unit) has been set up in the DTI in order 
to handle complaints by British firms regarding 
implementation of EC policy in other member states. Some of 
them are subsequently forwarded to the European Commission 
who examines them accordingly. Although the more advanced 
pursuit of these cases by each British firm involved is not 
thought to be a part of the wider business ethos, this 
function is important because it constitutes a source of 
information for the European Commission. This means that 
this specialised unit acts as a secondary detector in the 
implementation process that takes place in other member 
states. Clearly, firms which act at street-level have 
access to practices which may contravene the spirit and the 
letter of the relevant policy. 
The important role of the European Secretariat in the 
formulation process is mirrored by its participation in 
formal implementation. At least one of its officials 
ensures the provision of guidance to individual departments 
as to the way in which policy should be implemented. It is 
a reactive function in the sense that the European 
Secretariat keeps an eye on the process and intervenes only 
in problematic cases. The ethos of wide consultation within 
Whitehall is at the heart of this process. In cases of 
interdepartmental tensions, the European Secretariat seeks a 
compromise. This means that occasionally issues have to 
ascend to the political level. The European Secretariat 
assesses the need for this form of action although the 
intensity of a particular department's pre-occupations is 
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another important factor. Moreover, the European 
Secretariat periodically asks departments to submit lists of 
the measures that have been formally implemented in order to 
establish what is still outstanding thereby increasing 
awareness on a pro-active basis. The tables based on this 
set of data is then circulated within Whitehall. 
Although the cases of its intervention in day-to-day 
formal implementation are rather limited, it does intervene 
in cases of interdepartmental conflict relating to 
implementation styles. Indeed, the main source of conflict 
seems to be the strong tendency of some departments, like 
the DTI, to prefer codes of practice and administrative 
circulars as a reflection of their strong deregulatory 
culture. These pre-occupations need to be balanced by the 
traditional administrative willingness to have everything 
'cut and dried' that is clear and effective, underpinned by 
legal certainty. The need to balance preference for 'gold- 
plating' (heavier interpretative function promoted by some 
sectoral departments during formal implementation) with the 
avoidance of over-implementation (imposition of an un- 
necessary regulatory burden through what a British official 
has identified as the addition of departmental pet projects 
to national implementing measures) is the European 
Secretariat's fundamental input to the implementation 
process. 
Deregulation is one of the main issues where we will get 
called in because there is a difference of philosophy or 
approach in how a particular measure should be dealt 
with 
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as one of its officials has put it to us. 
The input provided by the Deregulation Unit of the 
Cabinet Office is currently a major aspect of that tension 
because it tends to promote copy-out as a method that 
minimises regulatory burden on industry. This practice 
actually means that in some cases EC law is implemented 
formally through its word-by-word incorporation into a 
British legal text. The first implication of this is the 
minimisation of each individual department's margin for 
interpretation during formal implementation. The second 
implication is the increasing emphasis placed on the target 
groups as the main interpreters of what a specific provision 
actually means. Emphasis is placed on the need to avoid the 
imposition of excessive regulatory burden and this is also a 
point stressed by the pressure groups in the consultations 
that take place during the process of formal implementation. 
These pre-occupations! are expressed and balanced within a 
context which is characterised by 
the tradition to try and have legal certainty. Our 
legislative instruments tend to be totally precise 
because judges and courts will look at the face of the 
text before them and say this is what it means 
as a British official has put it. 
Assessing which formula should prevail is a part of the 
political functions performed by the European Secretariat in 
the implementation process. Prominent amongst these is the 
assessment of the likelihood of a legal challenge by the 
European Commission and its potential outcome. The same 
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applies to the constant attempts of the European Secretariat 
to orientate departmental thinking towards all stages of 
implementation, e. g. through the definition of a fall-back 
strategy which may be useful in case the negotiation does 
not go the British way. This is another part of the value 
added by the European Secretariat to the domestic process of 
policy formulation. This approach is occasionally 
influenced by the 'political spin' provided by ministers who 
in later stages of the process are advised that an interest 
group has taken a different view. This triggers again a 
process of interdepartmental consultation based in the 
European Secretariat. 
The preceding analysis of the mechanisms used for the 
formal implementation of EC policy in the UK calls for a 
number of observations. First, one should underline the 
predominance of the Executive in this part of the policy 
process. Indeed, the provisions of the European Communities 
Act 1972 are formulated in a way that reflects the 
predominance of the Executive that also dominated the policy 
formulation process. Consequently, there is a relation of 
symmetrical imbalance between the executive and the 
legislative branches of government, within the wider 
framework of this policy, resulting from the dominance of 
the Executive in both parts of this process. 
Secondly, the Executive disposes of a number of 
instruments in order to formally implement EC policy. These 
instruments include both primary and (mainly) secondary 
legislation although administrative methods are also used. 
Thirdly, the fact that the units that formally implement EC 
policy are those which also formulate the national position 
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and negotiate at the European level results from the wider 
division of labour within the British administrative system 
and the awareness of the positive effects of this dual role. 
Fourthly, the importance of the central co-ordinating 
mechanism, namely the European Secretariat at the Cabinet 
Office, seems to be confirmed in implementation as well. 
The European Secretariat provides the basis for the co- 
ordination in litigious cases and also in more general legal 
issues. The marginalisation of lawyers is confirmed 
indirectly, through the exceptional nature of the role that 
they perform in this part of the European policy process. 
3.4.3. THE UK'S IMPLEMENTATION PROFILE 
National and Commission civil servants share the view 
that, in general, EC policies are implemented quite 
effectively in the UK. Figure 3.1 depicts the broad lines 
of the UK's implementation profile although caution is 
necessary here because this set of data cannot provide an 
accurate picture of the nature of the problems that lead to 
the formal letters and the referrals to the ECJ. 
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Figure 3.1: Number of letters and referrals of cases to the 
ECJ under art. 169 procedures regarding the UK, 1978-96 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 1986b, 32; 
1991a, 91; 1997a, 145. 
The first comment that one can make in the light of 
this set of data concerns the significant overall increase 
in the number of letters sent to the UK between 1978 and 
1992. Although this pattern is certainly not constant, 
given the decreases of 1980,1983,1988 and 1991, it is 
clear that the drive towards the single market has led to an 
increase in the attention that the UK has attracted from the 
European Commission. However, this pattern has affected 
only marginally the number of referrals to the ECJ. 
Indeed, the second pattern is one of a very limited 
number of cases that reach the ECJ. The almost constantly 
increasing gap between the two patterns illustrates the 
increasing pressure that the officials of the European 
Secretariat absorb on a daily basis. At a more general 
level, the widely held view both within national 
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administration and the European Commission that the UK has a 
very positive implementation profile is illustrated mainly 
during the first half of the 1980s (Commission of the 
European Communities 1985,24-7) and slightly less so during 
i) the second half of the same decade which has been marked 
by problems in the field of the single market and industrial 
affairs, and the environment (Commission of the European 
Communities 1991a, 131-2) and ii) during the first half of 
the 1990s (Commission des Communautes europeennes 1996,114- 
6) . Furthermore, judgments of the ECJ are implemented 
slowly but rather effectively in the UK (Commission of the 
European Communities 1993a, 418; Commission des Communautes 
europeennes 1996,411-2) whose government has been a major 
player (Armstrong and Bulmer 1996,279) behind the 
reinforcement of art. 171. 
Finally, the attitude of the British courts towards the 
concepts of supremacy and direct effect and the use of 
preliminary rulings under art. 177 of the Treaty has, in 
broad terms, been rather un-problematic. The question of 
supremacy of EC law has been marked by a distinction between 
two periods, before and after the beginning of the 1990s and 
the Factortame litigation (Craig 1995,3-9) . Before 
Factortame, the predominant view was that in cases of 
conflict between EC and UK law, the latter should be read in 
a way that would render it compatible with the former. 
After the Factortame litigation, supremacy of EC law has 
been considered as a natural and integral part of EC 
membership, precisely because it has been established by the 
ECJ (supra, Chapter 2) long before the British accession. 
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This idea had also been enshrined into the European 
Communities Act 1972. 
So far as the concept of direct effect is concerned, 
the British courts have generally accepted and used it 
without compunction (Craig 1995,10) although some 
provisions have presented problems in some courts like the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal, possibly as a result of 
a lower quality of advocacy before these courts (Barnard and 
Greaves 1994,1064). Finally, a somewhat restrictive set of 
guidelines issued by Lord Denning in 1974 in relation to the 
use of preliminary rulings, has gradually but steadily been 
replaced by wide use of this mechanism in addition to a 
greater vigilance about the use of the acte clair doctrine 
(infra, Chapter 4) as a reason for not submitting 
preliminary questions to the ECJ (Craig 1995,10-1). This 
has been illustrated by the rather extensive use of this 
mechanism by British courts thus accepting the 'supremacy of 
the ECJ' (Armstrong and Bulmer 1996,282). 
The preceding analysis illustrates the importance of 
the European Secretariat as a strong co-ordinating mechanism 
which brings together many actors with not necessarily 
similar views. Let us turn now to the case of France. 
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Chapter 4 
FRANCE 
4.1. THE PERIOD UNTIL 1980 
4.1.1. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The most significant domestic institutional 
repercussions of the participation of France in the Marshall 
plan and the integration process right from its beginning 
were threefold. First, a political post of a Minister for 
European affairs had been established since the beginning of 
the 1950s. It has been occupied by a number of already 
important or future prominent members of the French 
political elite, like Mollet, Pflimlin and Mitterrand. 
However, this has not been matched by the establishment of a 
corresponding administrative basis. 
Second, the interministerial nature of the new policy 
area led to the creation in 1948 (Decret no 48-1029) of the 
Interministerial Committee for European economic co- 
operation issues as a result of the need for internally co- 
ordinated implementation of the Marshall plan. It was 
chaired by the Prime Minister and it comprised the Foreign 
Minister, the Minister of Economy and Finance and other 
members of the government whose portfolios included issues 
appearing in the committee's agenda. Its tasks were 
threefold. First, it was responsible for the preparation of 
the guidelines to be given to the French negotiators for the 
programme of European reconstruction. It prepared the 
125 
decisions of the French Council of Ministers and it proposed 
the necessary measures of implementation. The committee was 
serviced by the Secretariat General du Comite 
Interministeriel pour les questions de cooperation 
economique europeenne (Secretariat General of the 
Interministerial Committee for European Economic Co- 
operation Questions), a small secretariat which became known 
as SGCI (Decret no 48-1029, art. 3). Initially, it was 
composed of one official of the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance but its staff grew gradually. The Secretary-General 
of SGCI would be chosen from the ranks of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (Decret no 52-1016, art. 7). Its tasks 
included the preparation of the committee's deliberations 
and decisions and their implementation, in association with 
the relevant parts of the French politico-administrative 
machinery. He was also a member of the French delegation 
participating in OEEC negotiations along with officials from 
other relevant ministries. 
The ratification of the Treaties of Rome in August 1957 
(Loi no 57-880) brought about new changes to the French 
institutional framework (Decret no 58-34 4) namely the 
extension of the committee's remit to deal with EC issues 
and the limitation of its members to the ministers of 
Foreign affairs, Economy and Finance, Industry and Trade. 
Two technical interministerial committees (chaired by the 
Prime Minister and the Minister of Economy and Finance 
respectively and composed of the relevant ministers and 
officials) took over the responsibility for the co- 
ordination of the national authorities responsible for the 
implementation of the Treaties. 
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De Gaulle's tenure as President of the Republic had a 
significant impact on these structures. On the one hand, he 
abolished the post of the Minister for European affairs and 
streamlined this policy through his close personal friend 
Couve de Murville, then Foreign Minister. This choice is 
explained not only through de Gaulle's willingness to 
downgrade the importance of the integration process but also 
his firm belief in the need to centralise mechanisms and 
procedures dealing with foreign policy, a part of the 
President's prerogatives. This was also illustrated by the 
gradual abandonment of the so-called Elysee committees 
(named after the President's formal basis) that he had 
createdl. The same pattern had been followed by his 
successors (Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing) until 1980. 
The development of the administrative structures 
dealing with EC policy was based on the diffusion of EC 
policy in the vertical specialised services dealing with the 
'domestic' dimension of each policy area (Gerbet 1969,196). 
On the one hand, technical ministries (like the ministries 
of Agriculture and Industry) reinforced the existing 
structures dealing with international affairs by creating 
specialised units for EC policy. This was the result of the 
need for some type of co-ordination brought about by the 
diffusion of EC policy in the various vertical services. On 
the other hand, as far as the two important horizontal 
ministries are concerned, namely the Ministry of Economy and 
1They also included the Prime Minister, the principal ministers and 
senior civil servants. There were four Elysee committees dealing with 
Algeria, foreign affairs, European affairs and economic policy (Gerbet 
1969,205). 
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Finance and the Quai d'Orsay, that is the location of 
Ministry of Foreign affairs (Gerbet 1969,198-201), both 
relied on previously existing structures (DREE, the 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs in 
the first case, and the Directorate for Political Affairs in 
the second case). 
The interpretation of EC policy as part of foreign 
policy (underlined by the role of the Foreign Minister) had 
direct repercussions on the French permanent representation 
to the EC, where the Quai d'Orsay took the leading role, 
although two thirds of the staff came from the technical 
ministries. This reflected the internal diffusion of EC 
affairs into the vertical ministerial structures and the 
increasing specialisation of the EC's Council of Ministers. 
The appointment during the 1960s of Secretary-Generals of 
the SGCI who (at the same time) occupied the post of 
director of Pompidou's cabinet2, the posts of the PM' s 
technical adviser or the President's economic and financial 
adviser (Gerbet 1975,391) enhanced the status and authority 
of this post. 
2The cabinet is a distinctive feature of the French administrative 
system (Thuillier 1982). At the interface between the political and 
the administrative level, a cabinet is the team of personal advisers 
of the President of the Republic, the PM and the ministers. They 
perform three fundamental roles, namely advice to ministers, control 
of the administration and defence of a minister's policy in 
interministerial negotiations. 
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4.1.2. POLICY FORMULATION 
The absence of a specialised minister dealing with EC 
policy and the gradual abandonment of the use of the Elysee 
committees lead us to the conclusion that the institutional 
locus for policy formulation (at the political level) was 
constituted by the government and the President of the 
Republic. Issues that could not be resolved at the 
administrative level, ascended to the political level, where 
the Prime Minister or even the President of the Republic 
took the decisions. The specificity of the French dual 
Executive is based on article 5 of the Constitution of 1958 
which stipulates that the President ensures the normal 
function of the French institutions and the continuity of 
the state through his arbitrage (arbitration) . This 
provision is reinforced by his power to chair the French 
Council of Ministers (art. 9) which is the supreme political 
body and to nominate the Prime Minister (art. 8). The Prime 
Minister directs the government's action (art. 21) which 
determines and conducts the nation's policy (art. 20). 
Although the function of political institutions depends 
heavily on the political context, in general terms, it was 
the President of the Republic who defined the general lines 
of the French policy on EC issues, while the Prime Minister 
was the co-ordinator of ministerial action. The 
orientations of EC policy were shaped in the Council of 
Ministers. Apart from the President and the Prime Minister, 
it also includes the ministres d'Etat (ministers of state) 
and the ministres (ministers), while the participation of 
the ministres delegues (deputy ministers) and the 
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secretaires d'Etat (under secretaries) varies from one 
government to another3. The President defined the agenda. 
Previous decisions and projects were finalised after having 
been prepared by other governmental institutions (Quermonne 
and Chagnollaud 1991,200). The abandonment of the Elysee 
committees has reinforced the role of the Prime Minister 
without depriving the President of his power of orientation. 
Despite the wide use of various types of Cabinet-level 
committees throughout the Fifth French Republic4, the 
3While the title of minister of state is honorary and underlines the 
importance attached to a portfolio, a minister normally heads a 
ministerial department, a deputy minister exercises limitatively 
enumerated powers conferred upon them by a minister. Finally, an 
under secretary normally follows a particular aspect of a ministerial 
portfolio (Quermonne and Chagnollaud 1991,212-3). 
4The Conseils permanents (permanent councils) meet regularly, they are 
chaired by the President of the Republic and composed of the PM, 
senior ministers and civil servants. The Conseils restreints (limited 
councils) meet irregularly and their composition varies from time to 
time although they always include the President of the Republic, 
ministers and senior civil servants. The Comites interministeriels 
(interministerial committees) are permanent bodies established by a 
legal text and include both ministers and senior civil servants The 
Comites restreints (limited committees) include ministers and civil 
servants and are convened by the PM at irregular intervals in order to 
discuss a specific topic while Reunions interministerielles 
(interministerial meetings) are chaired by members of the PM's cabinet 
or the Secretary General of the Government and include members of 
ministerial cabinets and senior officials of the relevant departments 
(Quermonne and Chagnollaud 1991,202-4,220-4). 
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Interministerial committee has not been convened frequently 
(Achard 1972,43). If de Gaulle's strong personality 
explains this phenomenon during the 1960s, the same cannot 
be said of his successors. The reinforcement of the Council 
of Ministers as a collective body and the role of the Prime 
Minister as co-ordinator of the ministers' action are two 
factors that probably explain this phenomenon. 
At the administrative level, the SGCI's important role 
has been confirmed throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Gerbet 
1969,204; 1975,392). Being at the interface between the 
political and the administrative level (but belonging to the 
latter), the SGCI performed a set of roles. First, it 
became the official channel for communication between the 
French central administration and Brussels. Secondly, it 
took the decision on the French officials who would 
participate in the negotiations in Brussels. Thirdly, the 
most important aspect of its role was the co-ordination of 
the views of the various ministries. The SGCI became the 
neutral locus where these views were confronted in the quest 
for a coherent national position. 
In this process, the SGCI benefited from its organic 
link to one part of the dual French Executive, namely the 
Prime Minister. Indeed, this link undermined the 
possibility of challenges to the role of the SGCI as the co- 
ordinator at the administrative level, by placing it away 
and above the interministerial tensions. It performed this 
role by convening meetings with senior officials from 
administrative units dealing with EC policy, including 
members of the ministerial cabinets. It was not a service 
that managed policy. This was done by the ministries. The 
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SGCI brought together officials from these ministries in 
order to create an interministerial position that took into 
consideration the need for coherence. Important persistent 
problems between ministries (e. g. budgetary issues) could 
only lead to the transfer of a dossier to higher levels of 
the hierarchy. Its only function was the preparation of the 
negotiations by distributing documents, alerting the 
relevant parts of the French administration and by trying to 
reconcile diverging positions. 
4.2. THE PERIOD AFTER 1981 
4.2.1. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The re-establishment of the political post for European 
affairs is the main institutional development that 
characterises the development of the French framework for EC 
policy after 1981. In the first socialist government formed 
by Mauroy in May 1981 it was Chandernagor who occupied the 
post of deputy minister responsible for European affairs at 
the Ministry of external relations. His powers and 
institutional position (Decret no 81-665) were characterised 
by three elements. He received a delegation of power to 
'follow' the issues relating to the implementation of the 
Treaties. He had the power to chair the Interministerial 
Committee whenever the Prime Minister could not attend. 
More importantly, he took charge of the SGCI although the 
Quai d'Orsay became the new minister's administrative basis. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the pattern of institutional 
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development at the political level was characterised by 
three fundamental aspects. 
First, the post of a Minister for European affairs 
became a permanent feature of the French institutional 
structure that dealt with EC affairs. Indeed, this post 
ceased to exist only during the first six months (March- 
August 1986) of the first cohabitation, that is the period 
during which the President of the Republic and the 
government are supported by two different political groups. 
It has been restored (Decret no 86-1029) at the request of 
Raimond, then Foreign Minister, who was overwhelmed by the 
functional pressures produced by this 'dual' portfolio. 
This request was backed by President Mitterrand's clear pro- 
European stance and his subsequent willingness to provide an 
institutional political profile to this portfolio. 
Second, the profile of the holders of this post and 
their proximity to (or distance from) President Mitterrand 
has been reflected through their formal title and 
subsequently its status. Indeed, in most cases, the 
appointees were close friends, like Dumas (Decret no 83- 
1135) and Cresson (Decret no 88-724) or collaborators of 
President Mitterrand, like Guigou (Decret no 90-980) when 
the government and the President were backed by the same 
majority. This underlined not only the importance attached 
to this portfolio by the latter but also his willingness to 
participate actively in the policy process. 
Third, this portfolio included the responsibility not 
only for the monitoring of EC policy but more importantly, 
the implementation of the Treaties, despite the lack of a 
proper administrative basis and the shifting of the 
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responsibility for the SGCI back to the Prime Minister in 
1984. The political importance attached to this post is 
clearly illustrated in Cresson's terms of reference which 
included the responsibility for the implementation of the 
single market project and the adaptation of the French 
economy, in collaboration with economic and social actors. 
The remit has remained unchanged thereafter (Decret n° 93- 
802; Decret n° 95-809). 
The development of the administrative structures 
dealing with EC policy after 1980 followed (in general 
terms) the patterns of the 1960s and 1970s. Despite the 
differences concerning their status, the services dealing 
with international affairs within technical ministries, 
continued the handling of EC policy. This phenomenon has 
been observed (Lequesne 1987b, 281-9) both in ministries 
dealing with policy areas where EC activity is weak (e. g. 
culture and communication, and education) and ministries 
responsible for policy areas with intensive EC involvement 
such as agriculture, social affairs and environment. 
Lequesne (1993,39-42) distinguished between three types of 
institutional development. 
First, the cases of Economy and Finance (Le Vigan 
1990), Budget and External Trade followed the model of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, where EC policy has been diffused 
into the specialised vertical services. Secondly, 
horizontal units co-ordinating the work of the vertical 
services of the same ministries have appeared in technical 
ministries, like the international affairs unit serving the 
ministries of Employment, Social Affairs and Health 
(Carnelutti 1992,467). Thirdly, ad hoc units or posts have 
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been created in order to promote the EC dimension within 
ministries without a wide previous experience in these 
affairs, like the ministries of Equipment, Housing, 
Transport and Environment. As far as the Quai d'Orsay is 
concerned, the reform of November 1993 (Lequertier 1994) led 
to the creation of a directorate general for European and 
economic affairs (Decret no 93-1210). 
The expansion and the diversification of the EC's 
agenda affected the SGCI in the sense that the number of the 
specialised sections grew from ten in 1986 (Lequesne 1987a, 
46) to eighteen in the mid-1990s (Doutriaux and Lequesne 
1995,104). If this expansion has been the natural result 
of the process of integration, the same cannot be said of 
the officials in charge of the SGCI. The traditional (but 
informal) link between the Secretary-General of the SGCI and 
the Presidency of the Republic or of the Government has also 
been temporarily interrupted between 1982 and 1985 as a 
result of the transfer of the political responsibility for 
the SGCI to the deputy minister. The previous link served a 
purpose that existed only in the period during which 
important issues had to be transferred to the top echelons 
of the hierarchy, before being resolved. The appointment of 
the 'Euro-minister' meant that the quest for a solution had 
to be confined to the ministerial level. Guigou's 
appointment as Secretary-General of the SGCI in 1985 re- 
established the previous link given that, at the same time, 
she was also technical adviser to the President of the 
Republic. 
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4.2.2. POLICY FORMULATION 
The intensity of the Interministerial Committee's role 
continued to decline during the first part of the 1980s when 
the two branches of the Executive were supported by the same 
majority. This phenomenon can be explained by the activity 
of President Mitterrand and the French Prime Ministers, 
especially Mauroy who made the EC an important priority of 
his tenure (Cargai 1985,99-101). The Prime Minister's 
activity is illustrated by the more frequent use of 
interministerial committees which met in Matignon, that is 
the Prime Minister's formal basis (Fournier 1987a, 224). 
Moreover, the number of the issues necessitating the 
intervention of the President increased until March 1986 
(Lequesne 1987a, 50). 
The period of cohabitation changed the political scene 
in which EC policy was formulated in a rather different way. 
The previous restoration of the PM's power over the SGCI 
facilitated his activism. The Prime Minister's cabinet 
intervened more systematically in order to take decisions on 
unresolved issues. This development was in line with 
Chirac's wish to see his cabinet play a more active role in 
EC policy formulation. The increase in the use of 
interministerial meetings and limited committees meeting in 
Matignon testify to the aforementioned change. Despite 
Chirac's attempts to limit President Mitterrand's influence 
upon the policy process, the latter managed to maintain an 
important role. Four factors facilitated this task. First, 
like his predecessors, Mitterrand headed the French 
delegation participating in the European Council meetings. 
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Second, when it came to issues falling in his remit, the 
President convened meetings where both the Prime Minister 
and the relevant ministers participated. Third, Delors 
(then President of the European Commission), Scheer (then 
French Permanent Representative in Brussels) and above all 
Guigou (then Secretary-General of the SGCI) constituted the 
network that enabled. President Mitterrand to be kept 
informed of developments in this policy area (Cohen 1989, 
492). Guigou's role was instrumental in preserving the 
principle of the President's participation. Her post meant 
that she had access to the important issues of EC policy, 
thereby facilitating her role as Mitterrand's technical 
adviser. Fourth, despite Chirac's criticism (before the 
election that brought him to power) of the socialist 
government's choice to sign the SEA and agree to the EC's 
second southern enlargement, when he became Prime minister, 
a de facto compromise has been established with the 
President's fundamental stance on EC affairs. 
During Rocard's tenure (1988-1991) the role of the two 
branches of the Executive moved closer to a more co- 
operative model. Despite the confirmation of i) the SGCI's 
link to Matignon through a circular (Republique Francaise 
1988) addressed to the members of the government and ii) the 
Secretary-General's obligation to have recourse to the PM's 
arbitrage (the exceptional character of which, has again 
been underlined) the President's activism led to a kind of 
'presidentialisation' of the process as a result of the 
increase in the number of issues finally resolved by the 
President. The re-activation of the Interministerial 
Committee through weekly meetings chaired by the Prime 
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Minister in the mid-1990s reflects the need for the co- 
ordination, at the political level, of the French policy in 
the crucial post-Maastricht era and the need to ensure the 
adoption (and implementation) of the measures necessary for 
the process of economic and monetary union. The new period 
of cohabitation that commenced in June 1997 seems to have 
provoked a mutual attempt to find a new equilibrium after 
some initial tensions (Robert-Diard, de Bresson and Franco 
1997; Vedrine 1997). 
The predominant role of the SGCI remained the most 
important element of the process of policy formulation at 
the administrative level. The interministerial meetings 
convened by the Heads of the Secretariat's specialised 
sectors are the loci of confrontation of the sectoral 
ministerial positions. Each ministry chooses the officials 
who will represent the ministry's position. Normally, they 
are chosen from the vertical specialised units, but members 
of the cabinets are occasionally present. The bargaining 
that takes place within the ministries5 should lead to a 
single position presented in the interministerial meetings. 
These meetings are convened despite the fact that the 
ministries do not always respond to the Secretariat's 
initiative as a result of tensions between various 
directorates. Thus, it can be said that the SGCI 
intensifies the pressure for intraministerial co-ordination. 
The chairman of the meeting, normally a Head of sector 
or a Deputy Secretary General, shapes the interministerial 
position on the basis of the participants' contributions. 
5The documents emanating from the European institutions constitute the 
basis of this process. 
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The sec to ral (policy-orientated) logic of ministerial 
representatives is confronted with the SGCI's horizontal 
view. Indeed, it is the only actor capable of having a view 
that transcends the boundaries of ministerial competence. 
Thus, the establishment of linkages between the various 
issues is the SGCI's fundamental prerogative. Nevertheless, 
the Quai d'Orsay and the Ministry of Economy and Finance can 
be said to have a horizontal view. In the first case, the 
Quai d'Orsay has a 
global political and legal view on various issues 
as one of its officials has put it to us. Moreover, it has 
an 
eye on the bilateral aspects of these issues. 
In the second case, the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
deals with budgetary issues which have horizontal 
implications. Yet, both of these ministries defend a 
sectoral viewpoint as the linkages that they can establish 
are based on the external or budgetary implications. On the 
contrary, the SGCI has a view that transcends these 
boundaries in the sense that political, budgetary and 
technical/sectoral implications are taken into account in 
the process of elaboration of compromises. This constitutes 
the value added to the process by the SGCI. This objective 
is achieved through the secondment of officials from 
vertical ministries who are thus in a position to have a 
sectoral view although 
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the imperative here is the interministerial dimension 
as a French official has put it. Its position close to the 
Prime Minister enables it to escape accusations of 
departmental bias because 
it acts on behalf of the Prime Minister, as an 
institution which - despite the lack of technical 
knowledge - is respected by everybody. 
This is also an indirect reflection of the French tradition 
of the use of the Prime Minister's services (his cabinet in 
particular) in the co-ordination of the wider government 
work. Indeed, in cases of other interministerial meetings 
the SGCI participates just like any other ministry 
thus underlining its high profile and the horizontal 
implications of the issues it deals with. 
The formulation process is also characterised by an 
uneven pattern of consultation of interest groups. On the 
one hand, the impact of Jacobin ideology, based on the view 
that state is the only legitimate interpreter of the public 
interest (Hall 1993,159-60), and the fragmented nature of 
some groups along partisan lines militate against the 
exercise of direct influence upon the formulation process 
although the extension of the fields covered by public 
policies led to increased need for information and advice 
while the proliferation of consultative bodies produced a 
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rather uneasy compromise between Jacobin ideals and 
pluralist politics 
(Hall 1993,162). 
On the other hand, the latest developments in the 
integration process (mainly the SEA and therefore the single 
market and the extension of QMV) had two important 
repercussions. 
First, Cresson sought to institutionalise the links to 
interest groups through the establishment of Groupes d`Etude 
et de Mobilisation, that is Study and Mobilisation Groups, 
(Lequesne 1993,72). These specialised sectoral structures 
brought together civil servants, local politicians and 
representatives of industry who sought to formulate and 
propose to the government joint positions in policy areas 
like the environment, social affairs, telecommunications 
etc. They were instituted in the late 1980s and followed 
Cresson's decline from her ministerial and prime ministerial 
post in the early 1990s. Second, the increased use of QMV 
meant that French business groups tend to shift the focus of 
their efforts to Brussels. Their action is thought to be 
supplementing - rather than challenging - the efforts of the 
government (Schmidt 1996,241) to protect the national 
interest. 
The imperative of the creation of a single and coherent 
French position constitutes the main objective of circulars 
emanating from the top echelons of the hierarchy. They 
underline the need for the ministries to go through the SGCI 
(and the permanent representation in Brussels) in order to 
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communicate with the European administration. For example, 
Chirac noted in his circular of June 1986 (Lequesne 1992, 
2: 685) the need to channel 
every piece of written correspondence between the French 
authorities and Community institutions, in particular 
the Commission, through the SGCI. (Author's 
translation) 
This is a general objective transcending the boundaries of 
the policies adopted by the various governments, be they 
overtly pro-European (like the Rocard government) or less so 
(like the Chirac government between 1986 and 1988). More 
importantly, the SGCI continued to constitute the link 
between the political and the administrative level. It can 
provoke the intervention of the Prime Minister's cabinet or 
even his personal intervention in cases of persistent 
disagreement. Yet, this instrument is still considered as 
the ultimate instrument. Let us turn now to the role of the 
French Parliament. 
4.3. THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT AND EC POLICY 
4.3.1. THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT AS AN IMPOTENT ACTOR: 1958-1990 
Although after the establishment of the ECSC the two 
Houses had created two 'commissions of control and co- 
ordination' (Gerbet 1969,206) in order to follow the 
implementation of the Treaty of Paris, the same pattern did 
not follow the adoption of the Treaties of Rome. As they 
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were deprived of true power, these commissions could only 
function as channels of information, but soon their role 
lost its significance as a result of the transition from the 
Fourth to the Fifth French Republic. This reflected not 
only the wider weakness of the French Parliament under the 
Fifth Republic but also the Gaullist view that EC affairs 
were part of foreign policy, a domain where the President of 
the Republic is an important institutional player. These 
factors militated against the establishment of an EC-related 
committee. 
It was only in 1979 that the National Assembly and the 
Senate created institutional mechanisms to monitor EC policy 
(Loi no 79-564). They took the form of one parliamentary 
delegation for each House. It was the second time that this 
type of parliamentary mechanism has been used for the 
monitoring of a particular policy area (Laporte 1981). The 
delegations were a rather weak type of scrutiny mechanism. 
They were created in order to inform the two Houses about 
the activities of the EC's institutions. Moreover, they 
depended on the government for the provision of information 
and documents. The government had to circulate the 
documents right after receiving them and in any case before 
their final examination by the EC's Council of Ministers. 
Despite the large number of documents that the delegations 
could examine, their role was limited to the submission of 
i) their conclusions to the parliamentary commission 
covering the relevant policy area and ii) an information 
report covering the activity of six months, addressed to 
their respective House. 
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These new instruments call for a number of 
observations. First, the delegations seemed weak, in line 
with the debate that took place in the two Houses (Cottereau 
1982,37). It indicated clearly that the delegations were 
intended to be a simple intermediary between the government 
and the parliamentary commissions whose right to deal with 
substantial questions of policy remained intact (Laporte 
1981,133). Second, their weakness was further underlined 
by the fact that the institutions of the EC, not the 
national Executive, were the focus of their attention. 
Third, despite the organisational and functional 
similarities (Cottereau 1982,45) with the commissions 
(proportional representation of the political groups, right 
to meet whenever they wanted, same length of the mandate), 
significant functional differences existed. They did not 
have the right to modify the position of the Executive, nor 
could they influence the national agenda. In practice, they 
complemented the work of the commissions. The commissions 
dealing with economic issues constituted the main forum of 
discussion of the delegations' conclusions (Cottereau 1982, 
52). Yet, even the importance of their most significant 
contribution to the scrutiny process, namely their 
conclusions, was mitigated by the fact that they remained 
confined to the parliamentary level. As a result of the 
aforementioned structural, functional and contextual 
weaknesses, the delegations 
were overtaken by events the very moment they were 
instituted 
(Cot 1982,36). 
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This was the direct result of the constitutional 
provision (art. 43) that limits the number of commissions to 
six and the wider weakness that characterises the position 
of the Legislature, undoubtedly an 'inheritance' of the 
Fourth Republic. The development of the integration process 
during the late 1980s (SEA) triggered a parliamentary 
initiative that led in 1990 to the modification of the 
delegations' status and role. 
4.3.2. POST-1990 DEVELOPMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE 
PERSISTENT PREDOMINANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT 
At the functional level, the focus on the institutions 
of the EC remained unchanged. The same can be said of the 
delegations' main function as channels of information of the 
National Assembly and the Senate on EC affairs and the 
government's obligation to provide the necessary documents 
whose scrutiny would start before their adoption by the EC's 
Council of Ministers. However, a number of important 
modifications have been introduced. The delegations have 
been empowered to organise hearings of ministers and 
representatives of EC institutions. Yet, the ministers were 
not obliged to accept the invitation. Despite the absence 
of an obligation, the importance of this development should 
be underlined as it introduces the principle of a link 
between government ministers and the only parliamentary 
mechanism responsible for the examination of EC policy. The 
French MEPs were granted a consultative vote when invited by 
the delegations. The special and the permanent 
J. 
parliamentary commissions could consult them on issues 
falling in the delegations' realm. The field of competence 
of the delegations has been enlarged as a result of the 
abolition of the clause limiting their action to the 
legislative domain. 
Law no 90-385 (known as Loi Josselin after the MP who 
promoted it) which modified the parliamentary mechanisms for 
the scrutiny of EC policy had a number of important 
characteristic features. First, the balanced representation 
of the commissions ensured a better diffusion of information 
on EC affairs affecting their respective policy areas. 
Secondly, the right of French MEPs to participate in the 
proceedings of the delegations reflects i) a change towards 
a more co-operative attitude towards the European Parliament 
and ii) a method that the delegations had already started 
using. Thirdly, the delegations would examine a larger 
number of documents given that the clause which limited 
their action to the legislative domain has been abolished. 
This development is important because EC legislation 
transcends the boundaries between regulations (falling in 
the remit of the government) and laws (a prerogative of the 
Parliament), a distinction which is an inherent feature of 
French public law (Groud 1991,1324). Despite the important 
changes in the institutional framework of the delegations, 
they remained unable to influence the government's EC 
policy. The changes concerned the organisational and 
functional aspects of the delegations but the most important 
problem, namely the constitutional arrangements, remained 
unresolved. 
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The debate that took place after the adoption of the 
Treaty on European Union revived the issue of parliamentary 
scrutiny of the French policy on EC affairs. Indeed, the 
national dimension of the so-called 'democratic deficit' 
constituted one of the key arguments of the anti-Maastricht 
camp, led by important politicians of the opposition like 
Seguin. This debate has been triggered by the decision of 
the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) which 
stipulated that the French Constitution had to be amended 
before the ratification of the Treaty and President 
Mitterrand's subsequent decision to call a referendum before 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The constitutional amendment resulted in the 
introduction of a new title to the French Constitution 
specifically devoted to European integration. Art. 88-4 
stipulates that 
[t]he government submits to the National Assembly and 
the Senate, right after their submission to the 
Community Council, the proposals for Community acts, 
involving provisions of legislative 
nature ... [R]esolutions can be passed according to the 
provisions of each assembly's rules of procedure 
(Author's translation). 
The reinforcement of the Parliament's role in this process 
has been depicted as the price that the government had to 
pay for the ratification of the Treaty on European Union 
(Alberton 1995,922). Did this development change the role 
of the French Parliament in EC affairs? 
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First, the introduction of this clause to the French 
Constitution is of great symbolic significance in the sense 
that it increases the role of the Parliament in this process 
to the top level of the hierarchy of legal norms. Second, 
the obligation of the government to send to the Parliament 
the documents that are necessary for the scrutiny now has 
the form of a constitutional rule. Third, the two Houses 
obtained the right to pass resolutions on EC policy. 
Fourth, the constitutional provision refers only to EC 
proposals involving provisions of legislative nature. This 
limited the scope of the process to the pre-1990 
arrangements, by excluding Community proposals involving 
provisions relating to the regulatory domain. Finally, the 
new constitutional provision does not mention the 
delegations but refers to the National Assembly and the 
Senate. The implementation of the constitutional clause 
stipulating the participation of the Parliament in the 
national process of policy formulation gave rise to a number 
of important issues. 
A circular of the Prime Minister (Republique Francaise 
1993) stipulated that the Conseil d'Etat (State Council, the 
top French administrative court) and the competent ministers 
have to clarify the legislative or regulatory nature of a 
given document thus limiting the Parliament's autonomy. 
More important is the fact that the decision of the Conseil 
d'Etat (which is the ultimate arbiter in that case) is not 
subject to any review (Rullier 1994,1712). Despite the 
symbolic importance of the 'constitutionalisation' of the 
government's obligation to consult the Parliament, the lack 
of a clause that would sanction the violation of this 
in 
obligation, undermines its practical significance (Verdier 
1994b, 1141). 
The introduction of resolutions as a means for each 
House to express its view on EC affairs constitutes the most 
important innovation. Nevertheless, the importance of this 
innovation is mitigated by the impact that they can have on 
the Executive. They cannot oblige ministers to take a 
specific course of action as this would constitute a 
violation of the constitutional rules relating to the 
division of power between the Legislature and the Executive. 
The combination of articles 20 and 52 of the French 
Constitution clearly creates a barrier against a type of 
parliamentary participation that would result in the 
Executive being led by the Legislature. Consequently, the 
resolutions should only be construed as a manifestation of 
the Parliament's opinion on a specific issue. This view is 
compatible with the jurisprudence of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel which has ruled in 1959 against the 
obligatory effect of parliamentary resolutions (Guillaume 
1992,440; Burdeau, Hamon and Troper 1993,592). 
However, the government took concrete action 
(Republique Francaise 1994b) in order to ensure that the 
innovation is not totally deprived of substance. Clear 
instructions have been given to the French Permanent 
Representative to place a 'parliamentary reserve' in COREPER 
in cases where a decision is about to be taken by the 
Council of Ministers on a document for which one of the 
Houses has illustrated its intention to express its opinion 
but has not yet completed its scrutiny. This is possible 
only when there is no urgency or a particular motive for the 
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government to proceed or when there is a gap of at least 14 
days between the placement of the reserve and the meeting of 
the Council. The nature of these conditions testifies to 
the reluctance of the government to allow too much space for 
the use of this kind of reserves. 
Once a resolution6 has been adopted, the question of 
the concrete repercussions that it can have on the action of 
the Executive is raised. Initially, the government retained 
the right to decide (through the SGCI andthe 
Interministerial Committee) on the follow-up of the 
parliamentary resolutions (Republique Francaise 1993, point 
III; Republique Francaise 1994b, point IV). Later the 
government took four measures in order to facilitate the 
information of the Houses on the follow-up of the 
resolutions initially through their Speakers, then through 
the delegations, the relevant commissions and finally 
through the routine legislative work (Rullier 1994,1725). 
The development of the French Parliament's role in the 
formulation of EC policy is one of slow but steady change. 
It took more than twenty years for the Parliament to 
introduce the first mechanisms for the scrutiny of EC 
policy. The beginning of the 1990s has been characterised 
by an increase in the pace of change in the sense that in 
three years (1990-1992) it has been enhanced considerably. 
Currently, it has a set of institutional mechanisms that 
6Between 1992 and 1994 they have tended to form three categories: i) 
Those calling the government to oppose a particular EC legislative 
measure; ii) those proposing amendments or changes of emphasis and 
iii) those including general comments on specific policy areas 
(Rizutto 1995,55). 
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enable it to form, express and publicise its view. 
Furthermore, the Balladur government has taken measures 
enabling the Parliament to delay an EC decision until it has 
completed the scrutiny of a document. These are the limits 
of its powers. Constitutional arrangements ensure that the 
government always has a large freedom of action in the 
conduct of EC policy. Moreover, the political context in 
which the latest measures have been introduced, can lead to 
the conclusion that changes in the political balance of 
power may very well result in a limitation of the 
Parliament's role. Last, but not least, the lack of 
specific provisions ensuring that the government will be 
sanctioned in cases of its constitutional obligation to 
inform the Parliament further illustrates the limits of 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
4.4. THE FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION OF EC POLICY IN FRANCE 
4.4.1. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The French Constitution of 1958 provides a wide variety 
of instruments for the formal implementation of EC policy. 
This set is characterised by the existence of instruments 
falling either in the domain of the Legislature or the 
domain of the Executive. Indeed, in the first case these 
areas include issues relating to nationality, the definition 
of crimes and penalties, the electoral system, the 
nationalisation and the privatisation of companies (art. 34 
of the French Constitution). Clearly, the issues covered by 
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the law only marginally affect the implementation of EC 
policy in France. 
On the contrary, the role of the government is very 
extensive. Its domain covers the remaining fields of public 
policy. Moreover, art. 38 of the French Constitution 
stipulates that ordonnances can be adopted by the French 
Council of Ministers in order to enable the government to 
implement its programme, in fields which are normally 
covered by the law. However, the use of this measure has to 
be limited in time. The government normally exercises its 
regulatory powers through two types of acts: a) Autonomous 
regulations are adopted on the basis of article 37 of the 
Constitution; b) classic regulations are adopted in order to 
implement the provisions of an existing law (Burdeau, Hamon 
and Troper 1993,61 7) . This set of constitutional 
provisions covers a wide range of legal measures that can be 
adopted for the implementation of EC policy in France. 
However, one should also note the imbalance between the two 
branches. This imbalance is revealed a) through the 
examination of the fields covered by each of the 
aforementioned categories of measures and b) the fundamental 
elements of the procedure for their adoption. 
So far as laws are concerned, one should note the fact 
that the constitutional basis of a predominant Executive can 
easily be found. Indeed, the fact that MPs and the Prime 
Minister share the right of initiative (art. 39) results 
from the need to ensure that the government has all the 
necessary powers to determine and conduct 'the policy of the 
Nation' (art. 20) . Moreover, other constitutional 
provisions ensure that the government has the means to 
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impose its priorities on the Legislature. Indeed, article 
48 of the Constitution stipulates that the bills introduced 
by the government have priority status in the agenda of the 
Houses. The right of the government to determine the 
priorities of the agenda of the Houses is one of the 
innovations introduced by the Constitution of 1958 (Camby 
1994,9). 
Furthermore, although ordonnances are the result of a 
delegation of power, the procedure leading to their adoption 
underlines their exceptional nature: i) The government 
requests the Parliament's authorisation; ii) the Parliament 
defines the programme that the government will implement 
through the ordonnance; iii) the Parliament sets a deadline 
for the adoption of the ordonnance and the submission of the 
draft ratification law; iv) the ordonnance adopted by the 
Council of Ministers has to be signed by the President of 
the Republic. If this is a simple procedural rule, it has 
an important political dimension in the cases of the so- 
called cohabitation resulting from the President's right to 
refuse to sign the ordonnances7. 
The preceding presentation of the various measures that 
can be used for the formal implementation of EC policy in 
France calls for a number of comments. Firstly, most of 
these measures are adopted on the basis of procedures 
dominated by the powerful French Executive. This is 
illustrated by the fact that even in cases of issues covered 
by the law, the constitutional provisions regulating the 
7lndeed, between 1986 and 1988 President Mitterrand refused to sign a 
number of ordonnances embodying the programme of privatisation 
promoted by Chirac's government (Burdeau, Hamon and Troper 1993,623). 
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proceedings in the two assemblies ensure that the government 
has the means to push the measures through until they are 
adopted. The same comment can be made about the 
ordonnances. Despite their exceptional character, the 
philosophy behind this instrument is characterised by the 
need for the government to implement its programme more 
rapidly. Secondly, despite the fact that the aforementioned 
set includes a wide range of measures, it is also 
characterised by the lack of an EC-specific provision, a 
kind of horizontal legal arrangement that would enable the 
government to proceed with the creation of the legal 
framework necessary for the formal implementation of EC 
policy in France. Nevertheless, the existence of a wide 
variety of legal instruments ensures that the government can 
make the appropriate choice on an ad hoc basis. 
4.4.2. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION 
The first question relating to the institutional 
dimension concerns the identity of the services responsible 
for the formal implementation of EC policy. The French 
administration is characterised by the absence of services 
specialising in the implementation of EC policy. This is 
the result of a fundamental characteristic of the French 
administration, namely the organisation on the basis of 
policy areas instead of parts of the policy process. 
The responsibility for the definition of the measures 
which were necessary for the implementation of the decisions 
of the French Council of Ministers relating to the 
participation of France in the programme of European 
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economic reconstruction was one of the most important powers 
of the Interministerial Committee for the questions of 
European economic co-operation (Decret no 48-1029, art. 2). 
However, this general provision did not necessarily mean 
that the SGCI would have the exclusive competence in this 
domain. On the contrary, the SGCI had to co-operate with 
the relevant parts of the French administrative apparatus in 
order to 'ensure the execution' of the Committee's decisions 
(Decret no 48-1029, art. 3). This arrangement was the 
result of i) the need to bring in the process the expertise 
of the vertical services, especially in the light of the 
nature of this policy, and ii) the fact that initially the 
SGCI was weak in terms of staffing. The validity of this 
argument has further been underlined by the fact that the 
SGCI took over the same responsibility for the ECSC-related 
policy of France (Decret no 52-1016, art. 6). 
This development followed the expansion of the 
Interministerial Committee's remit which took place in order 
to cover i) the preparation of the decisions of the French 
Council of Ministers concerning the implementation of the 
Treaty and ii) their implementation (Decret no 52-1016, art. 
2) and has been confirmed by the French provisions relating 
to the Treaties of Rome (Decret no 58-344, art. 1). This 
attribution of formal powers to the SGCI should not lead to 
the conclusion that it is the only actor in this process. 
On the contrary, the weak wording used in the aforementioned 
provisions illustrates an attempt to establish a horizontal 
role for the SGCI without limiting the number of other 
actors involved in this process. This significant, albeit 
timid, extension of the role of the SGI had no 
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repercussions upon the political level. On the contrary, 
the SGCI never played an active role in the process of 
formal implementation until 1986 thus leading Sauron (1995, 
56) to note that France had no centralised body that could 
follow this process. 
The consistent lack of a Minister for European affairs 
until 1980 confirms this view. However, even after 1980 
this view remained valid as a result of the division of 
labour within the government. Indeed, this minister had to 
'follow' the issues relating to this field, or to 'assist' 
the Minister of Foreign affairs without having any specific 
reference to this stage of the policy process. Even the 
case of Cresson was exceptional for a number of reasons: i) 
The emphasis on the 'completion of the internal market 
through the implementation of the Single Act' (Decret no 88- 
724, art. 1) was the result of the need for a wider remit 
given her status as a minister. ii) It was also exceptional 
in the sense that this division of labour lasted only for 
two years. 
The next question concerns the nature of the process 
whereby EC policy is implemented in France. Increasing 
awareness that the Single European Act would provide new 
impetus to the process of integration leading to the 
creation of the single market has been illustrated by 
Chirac's circular of May 1986 (Lequesne 1992,2: 681) 
relating to the formal implementation of EC policy. The 
procedure was characterised by the rather static focus on 
formal implementation. After the adoption of the directive, 
the SGCI would send to the SGG (Secretariat General du 
Gouvernement, that is the Secretariat General of the 
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Government) a file containing the text of the directive, a 
note relating to the process of its adoption, its objective, 
an indication of the deadline for the formal implementation, 
an indication of the lead ministry responsible for this 
policy area, a list of other ministries and their relevant 
officials with an interest in this European legislative 
instrument. Moreover, the SGCI would also designate one of 
its officials as a contact point. The Secretary-General of 
the government would request from the lead ministry a 
detailed plan (including a specific timetable) concerning 
the procedure for the adoption of the relevant measures. A 
copy of this plan had to be sent to the SGCI and to the 
Prime Minister's cabinet. Finally, the responsibility for 
the implementation of this plan (and timetable) rest with 
the SGG. The latter element is of great importance given 
the SGG's position at the heart of the French government. 
Indeed, this position enabled it to have direct recourse to 
the Prime Minister or his cabinet in case of 
interministerial tensions. The effectiveness of the 
procedure outlined in Chirac's circular has been mitigated 
by the lack of staff in SGG which would keep up with the 
deadlines for the formal implementation by putting pressure 
on the relevant ministries (Lequesne 1993,128) despite an 
'alert procedure' which enabled the SGCI to be informed by 
the European Commission - through the use of a telex - of 
any problems relating to the process of formal 
implementation (Carnelutti 1988,17). 
Nevertheless, the fact that the need for proper 
implementation of EC policy in France was also a major pre- 
occupation of the Rocard government reflects not only his 
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personal pro-European beliefs but also the importance of the 
post-SEA stage of the wider integration process. This was 
illustrated by his circular of 22 September 1988 whereby he 
placed special emphasis on the nature of the Community of 
law as an integral part of the state of law and the 
constitutional dimension of the obligation to respect it. 
Moreover, the SGCI has gradually developed a role in the 
process of formal implementation after 1987 by demonstrating 
to other parts of the French central administration that 
they should develop closer and more co-operative links with 
the European Commission (Lequesne 1993,128). 
The Maastricht Treaty provided the new impetus for 
further refinement of the process of formal implementation. 
A circular of March 1994 (Republique Francaise 1994a) 
emphasised the quality of the legal texts necessary for the 
formal implementation of EC policy and more importantly, it 
stressed (indirectly) the importance of the link between the 
process of negotiation and that of implementation. In the 
light of this fact, the circular stipulated that a study of 
the legal impact should be prepared by the lead ministry in 
view of the European negotiation. This study includes an 
opinion on the principle of the text (from a legal viewpoint 
and that of subsidiarity), a table comprising the proposed 
European provisions and the national legal texts that have 
to be amended or abolished, a list of issues posing a 
problem from the point of view of national law and a note of 
comparative law prepared by the lead ministry (if 
necessary). This study has to be sent to the SGCI within a 
month after the lead ministry has received the draft EC act. 
In turn, the SGCI sends copies to the relevant parts of the 
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administration and the Conseil d'Etat and has the right to 
call a meeting. A fiche de suivi juridique (legal follow-up 
document) is created (and constantly kept up-dated) by the 
lead ministry and distributed to the SGCI, and the Conseil 
d'Etat8 thus enabling the administration to have a precise 
and clear picture of the process. Furthermore, one official 
of the SGCI keeps up-dated a data-base including all EC 
directives that have been adopted and the stage of formal 
implementation that they have reached. This data-base 
includes specific data concerning the exact administrative 
units that deal with each directive thus facilitating 
contacts with them in cases of problems. 
Consequently, the role of the SGCI in the process of 
formal implementation is more subtle compared to its 
extensive presence in the formulation stage. Like its 
British counterpart, it is more active in cases of conflict 
during this process. In these cases it is the mechanism 
that may trigger the intervention of the PM or even the 
President through an interministerial meeting, thus 
maintaining what Lequesne described (1993,132) as a 
procedure of political review. Indeed, a French official 
highlighted the fact that 
the political solution is always available 
8The Conseil d'Etat is consulted in order to determine the regulatory 
or the legislative nature of the national implementing text. Thus it 
defines the route that has to be followed (through the government or 
the French Parliament). 
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within the French system. 
underlined the fact that 
Another French official 
the ministerial cabinets frequently provide a political 
impetus, even at the request of the administration. 
Otherwise, the SGCI performs the role of a source of 
pressure put on the technical ministries in order to 
facilitate the smooth development of the process. This is 
achieved mainly through the establishment of the 
aforementioned calendars for the formal implementation of EC 
policy and also the pressure placed on the sectoral actors 
to think of implementation and its problems during the 
formulation process. This has led Lequesne (1993,132) to 
argue that it is the capacity of the ministries to implement 
and the ability of interest groups to resist that should 
explain problems of formal implementation in France, rather 
than the lack of a co-ordinator. 
One should certainly add the fact that at the intra- 
ministerial level the units which formulate the national 
French position and then negotiate in Brussels are also 
responsible for the formal implementation of EC policy. 
This is considered within the central administration as a 
major positive aspect of the system because in the eyes of a 
French civil servant 
it leads to the integration of reality to the final 
decision. 
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This view is echoed by the complex and technical nature of 
many legislative measures relating to the single market 
project highlighted by French officials. The role of the 
SGCI re-emerges in cases of conflict between ministries 
during the process of formal implementation. Moreover, it 
is active in the reunions-paquets (supra, Chapter 2) where 
problems of the wider implementation process are discussed 
by French and Commission officials. 
Despite the centralised nature of the process9, that in 
turn ensures better monitoring, other parts of the 
administration are also active participants. This is 
especially true (Lequesne 1993,91-6) in the case of DAJ 
(Direction des Affaires Juridiques, that is the Directorate 
for Legal Affairs). Its sub-directorate for international 
economic law and EC law and the legal sector of the SGCI are 
the two actors that have a horizontal competence for legal 
issues. Despite its modest staffing (in terms of size) DAJ 
performs two fundamental functions: i) It acts as a think 
tank for issues requiring legal expertise especially when it 
comes to interpreting EC law. This is a source of tensions 
resulting from the different approach (Lequesne 1993,92) of 
the relevant actors. Indeed, while DAJ quite naturally 
places emphasis on legal aspects, economic or other sectoral 
interests are highlighted by the technical ministries. ii) 
DAJ monopolises the right to represent France in the ECJ. 
Furthermore, the intensity of the role of DAJ has also led 
to the establishment of its image as a promoter of the ECJ's 
9Pressure groups usually do not have the opportunity to contribute to 
this stage of the policy process as the administration considers this 
as one of its own prerogatives. 
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jurisprudence within the French machinery of government 
(Lequesne 1993,95). 
4.4.3. THE FRENCH IMPLEMENTATION PROFILE 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the broad characteristics of the 
French implementation profile. Despite the fact that the 
nature of the problems that led to the formal letters and 
the referrals to the ECJ cannot be depicted through this set 
of data, there is a number of comments that one can make on 
this basis. 
120 
100 --" 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
Figure 4.1: Number of letters and referrals of cases to the 
ECJ under art. 169 procedures regarding France, 1978-96 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 1986b, 32; 
1991a, 91; 1997a, 145. 
The first comment that can be made concerns the rather 
unstable pattern of the number of letters sent to France on 
the basis of art. 169. Only parts of this pattern can be 
linked to the previous analysis. Indeed, although the 
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constant increase in the number of letters between 1978 and 
1985 explains the pre-occupations that led to Chirac's 
circular, the number of letters has fallen only marginally 
between 1986 and 1988. A significant increase followed 
Rocard's similar attempts of 1988. The new increase which 
appeared in 1992 is more likely to be the result of the 
increased post-SEA legislative output relating to the single 
market. In general, this pattern is rather inconclusive. 
Secondly, the pattern of the number of cases that 
reached the ECJ only marginally reflects the number of 
letters. Indeed, the increase of 1994 reflects the increase 
in the number of letters sent in 1990 and the deadlines for 
the formal implementation of measures relating to the single 
market project. Nevertheless, one must underline the steady 
fall of the number of cases that reached the ECJ between 
1988 and 1992, a period which is characterised by the 
substantial reinforcement of the role of the SGCI in the 
process of formal implementation, the use of the reunions- 
paquets and 'alert procedures' under the impetus of Rocard's 
government. This means that the role of the aforementioned 
mechanisms is more visible in the second rather than the 
first pattern. This, in turn, points in the direction of a 
re-active role which means that they are geared towards a 
function of problem-solving rather than the detection of 
such problems. 
In more general terms, the problematic areas during the 
first half of the 1980s included the internal market and 
industrial affairs, the free movement of persons and 
services, the operation of the customs union and financial 
institutions (Commission of the European Communities 1985, 
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24-6). The same areas remained problematic during the 
second half of the 1980s while problems have occurred in 
employment, social affairs, agriculture and the environment 
(Commission of the European Communities 1991a, 130-3). So 
far as the first half of the 1990s is concerned, problems 
have appeared in consumer protection and the internal 
market, while problems in agriculture and the environment 
have persisted (Commission des Communautes europeennes 1996, 
114-8). Problems relating to the non-implementation of 
judgments of the ECJ during the same period concerned the 
free provision of services and the environment (Commission 
of the European Communities 1993a, 412-3). In short, 
problems have existed in policy areas where the EC is 
heavily involved, mainly through regulatory policies. 
Finally, the attitude of the French courts towards the 
EC law has been quite problematic until the beginning of the 
1990s. The jurisprudence of the Conseil d'Etat has created 
the greatest number and more significant problems in this 
field. Indeed, based on a strict interpretation of the 
traditional division of legislative, executive and judicial 
powers, the top administrative court of the country has 
systematically refused to acknowledge the supremacy of EC 
law over domestic legislation, until 1989 (Plötner 1995,6- 
7). However, it changed this view radically through its 
judgment in the Nicolo case (regarding the annulment of the 
1989 European election) where it acknowledged that it had 
the right to examine the conformity of laws with 
international treaties (and more importantly, assert their 
incompatibility) although it based this new view on art. 55 
of the French Constitution (Galmot 1990,10) which entails a 
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clause of reciprocity, instead of the specificity and the 
originality of the EC's legal order'°. 
The same court has also been rather reluctant to use 
the mechanism of preliminary rulings of art. 177, by using 
excessively the so-called theory of acte clair (clear act) 
which effectively prevents the ECJ from interpreting EC law 
in a uniform manner (Vandersanden 1992,3: 299) by largely 
reserving for the domestic court the right to interpret the 
provisions of EC law (Coussirat-Coustere 1988,87-8). 
Similar - although not quite as extensive and rigorous - 
were the reservations (Plötner 1995,2-5) used by the Cour 
de Cassation (Supreme Court of Appeal) and the Conseil 
Constitutionnel. 
The preceding analysis illustrates the importance of 
the SGCI as a strong co-ordinating mechanism, especially in 
the light of the multitude of actors that participate in the 
formulation process. We shall now turn to the case of 
Greece. 
10This is the legal reasoning promoted by the ECJ (supra, Chapter 2). 
However, some points of tension with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, 
mainly in the field of direct effect of directives, still persist 
(Stirn 1993,244). 
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Chapter 5 
GREECE 
5.1. FROM ASSOCIATION TO ACCESSION 
5.1.1. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The process of institutional development and some basic 
characteristics of the formulation process have been 
developed during the 1960s and the 1970s. This was the 
result of the fact that art. 72 of the association agreement 
specifically referred to the principle of the Greek 
accession as soon as the country's economy was able to 
fulfil the obligations resulting from full membership thus 
leading Skandamis (1981,19) to conclude that this was an 
'agreement of postponed accession'. 
The law passed in 1962 for the ratification of the 
association agreement (Law 4226/1962) also served as the 
legal basis of the framework of the national policy 
formulation process vis-a-vis the EC. The Minister of Co- 
ordinationl had the general competence for the relations 
1This ministry has been created in 1910 as Ministry of Agriculture, 
Trade and Industry (Athanassopoulos 1986,206). After World War II 
this post and the relevant ministry have been re-created in 1945 
(Obligatory Law 718/1945) in order to co-ordinate the reconstruction 
of the Greek economy. It became a permanent feature of the Greek 
government and it took the third position in the hierarchy of the 
ministries. It has been re-named as 'Ministry of National Economy' in 
1982. 
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with the EC. More specifically, this general competence had 
two dimensions. He was responsible for defining the 
orientations of this policy, the adaptation of the Greek 
economy to the new context and the co-ordination of the 
relevant measures taken by other ministries. He was also 
responsible for the conduct of the negotiations which were 
to take place with the European institutions and the 
representations of the member states. However, the 
principle of the Foreign Secretary's involvement has also 
been introduced albeit in an unclear manner based on the 
distinction between 'technical' and 'political' affairs. 
The period that followed the restoration of the 
democratic regime and the positive response to the Greek 
application for full membership has been characterised by 
two basic trends. First, although the new operational 
framework laid down by Law 445/1976 went along the lines of 
Law 4226/1962 given that political responsibility for EC 
policy remained a prerogative of the Minister of Co- 
ordination, three significant limitations were established. 
The Prime Minister had the power not only to give personal 
instructions as to the conduct of the negotiations but he 
could personally represent Greece. The Foreign Secretary 
obtained the power to participate in the negotiation process 
and the same applied to technical ministers for issues 
falling in their remit. Secondly, a minister without 
portfolio2 responsible for the relations with the EC 
2By virtue of art. 83 §1 of the Greek Constitution Ministers without 
portfolio are members of the Ministerial Council, the supreme 
collective governmental body. Their powers are defined by the Prime 
Minister. 
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(Presidential Decree 1141/1977) has been appointed. 
Although this was thought to be the first step towards the 
creation of a post of a Minister for European Affairs 
(Anastopoulos 1986,638) this has not materialised. 
Politically, this event marked the first breach of the 
principle according to which EC policy was going to be 
considered as a part of domestic policy. His remit was very 
wide given that he was responsible for the whole range of 
the relations between Greece and the EC (Decision of the 
Prime Minister n° 565). 
At the administrative level, institutional changes had 
two basic dimensions. On the one hand, new administrative 
units have been created within the various branches of the 
central administration in order to handle the new form of 
p011cy. On the other hand, new interministerial 
administrative bodies have also been instituted as a 
response to the multidimensional nature of the new policy. 
In the first case, the pattern of change was based on the 
intensity of the involvement in EC affairs. Thus, the 
ministries of Co-ordination, Foreign affairs and Agriculture 
rapidly created new specialised units to deal with EC 
policy. Although the relations between Greece and the newly 
established European Communities dated from 1959, it was 
only in 1962 that the Permanent Representation to the EC has 
been established in Brussels. It was a part of the 
administrative machinery of the Ministry of Co-ordination 
and comprised eleven staff. The Permanent Representative 
came either from the ranks of the Greek diplomatic corps or 
was a specialist of European economic affairs. 
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5.1.2. POLICY FORMULATION 
The multifaceted nature of EC policy underlined the 
need for some kind of interministerial co-ordination at the 
political level. During the 1960s and 1970s, the lack of a 
specific forum of discussion between ministers dealing with 
EC policy leads to the conclusion that tensions between 
ministers could be resolved either at the level of the 
Ministerial Council or by the Prime Minister. At the level 
of administrative interministerial bodies, the so-called 
European Co-operation Committee has been instituted within 
the framework of the Ministry of Co-ordination. This 
committee comprised a) senior officials from the ministries 
of Co-ordination, Foreign affairs, Economy, Trade, 
Agriculture, Industry and Labour and b) up to four renowned 
experts in the committee's field of competence. This 
element reflected a chronic deficiency of the Greek 
administration3. Moreover, other national officials who 
were normally based outside or in other parts of the central 
administration could be invited on an ad hoc basis in order 
to facilitate the committee's work. 
The Ministry of Co-ordination played a pivotal role 
given that the other 'EC units' had to consult it during the 
various stages of the policy formulation process. Their 
role included a) the collection of data on specific issues 
of their competence and the submission of proposals relating 
to the negotiations, b) the conduct of the negotiations and 
31n an attempt to resolve this problem, specialised training 
programmes for civil servants have been created. Similar programmes 
were established for judges. 
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C) the modifications of the Greek legal and institutional 
framework necessary for the adaptation of the Greek 
administration and economy to the EC regime. 
Furthermore, Law 445/1976 stipulated that a 
Consultative Committee on the Relations with the EC would be 
instituted in the Ministry of Co-ordination along with other 
specialised consultative committees which were instituted in 
order to facilitate the formulation of the Greek negotiating 
positions. Nevertheless, the appointment of a senior 
official of the Ministry of Foreign affairs as Chairman of 
the Central Negotiating Committee in 1977 underlined the 
greater involvement of this ministry in the policy process. 
Moreover, this has been interpreted as an informal re- 
allocation of the political aspects of the negotiations to 
the Ministry of Foreign affairs (Passas and Makridimitris 
1994,39). This was a prelude of the formal shift of power 
towards this ministry after the Greek accession. 
5.2. POST-1980 ARRANGEMENTS 
5.2.1. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The changes to the structure of the institutional 
framework brought about by Law 1104/1980 were threefold. On 
the one hand, the distinction between the internal co- 
ordination and the external representation has been 
introduced. On the other hand, the role of the Minister and 
the Ministry of Foreign affairs has been further reinforced. 
Finally, the distinction between political and technical 
issues has been institutionalised and became a criterion 
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which determined the role of various actors in the policy 
process. 
The Minister of Foreign affairs took over the 
responsibility for EC affairs. He was responsible for the 
definition of policy orientations on institutional issues, 
the implementation and amendment of Treaty provisions and 
the relations with the member states. The pattern of 
institutional development at the political level had three 
basic dimensions. First, the need for a Minister for 
European affairs has been understood and accepted by the 
newly formed socialist government after the election of 
October 1981 although PASOK was initially opposed to the 
principle of Greek accession. The formal status of this 
minister (under secretary or deputy minister) fluctuated on 
the basis of the personalities involved and their political 
clout within the ruling party irrespective of i) which party 
that was and ii) whether they were hostile to (PASOK 1981-4) 
or in favour of the principle of Greek membership (PASOK 
after 1985, New Democracy)4. The same pattern has been 
followed in the Ministry of National Economy which has the 
responsibility for the management of EC funds. 
Secondly, the powers of these ministers remained 
unchanged throughout the 1980s and 1990s and included not 
only the traditional parliamentary dimension, but also the 
de facto power to co-ordinate the participants in the policy 
4Examples of Deputy Ministers include Pangalos (Decision of the Prime 
Minister no Y. 57) and Christodoulou (Decision of the Prime minister 
no DGP/Q-493) while Varfis (Joint Decision of the Prime Minister and 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs no 010/464) and Papastamkos 
(Presidential Decree 478/1990) are examples of Under Secretaries. 
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formulation process, the formal power to represent Greece in 
EC bodies thus assisting or substituting the Minister of 
Foreign affairs. More importantly, they had the 
responsibility for the fulfilment of the obligations 
deriving from EC membership. Thirdly, the Economic 
Committee5 has been replaced by the Governmental Council 
(Law 1266/1982) as the only collective political body 
specifically dealing with EC policy. 
The pattern of institutional development at the 
administrative level was fourfold. First, new specialised 
bodies have been established in order to deal with specific 
parts of the policy process or specific significant aspects 
of European integration. The establishment of the Special 
EC Legal Service (ENYEK) in 1986 (Law 1640/1986) was the 
result of the need to deal with the increasing number of 
cases against Greece brought before the ECJ while the 
establishment of the Council of Economic Experts (SOE) in 
1987 (Law 1682/1987) reflected the need for specialist 
advice on EC-related economic issues and the representation 
of Greece to the EC's Monetary Committee. Secondly, the 
expansion of the EC's agenda led to the establishment of EC 
units in other parts of the administration like the 
ministries of Industry, Energy and Technology (Presidential 
Decree 381/1989), Health, Welfare and Social Security 
(Presidential Decree 138/1992), Finance (Presidential Decree 
284/1988) and Transport and Communications (Presidential 
Decree 198/1988). This development went hand in hand with 
the diffusion of the responsibility for EC affairs to the 
5It comprised ministers mainly dealing with economic portfolios (Law 
400/1976). 
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specialised/technical units and directorates within the 
various ministries. 
Thirdly, the transfer of power for issues relating to 
the Permanent Representation in Brussels from the Ministry 
of Co-ordination to the Ministry of Foreign affairs was the 
natural consequence of the changes brought about at the 
political level. More importantly, two thirds of its 
personnel are seconded from technical ministries. This has 
been interpreted as the result of the tendency of those 
ministries to create their own links to Brussels, thus by- 
passing the official route of information through the 
Ministry of Foreign affairs (Stephanou 1992,16). 
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to see any other 
effective alternative. Fourthly, the use of party political 
criteria for the selection of senior officials, which was 
part of a phenomenon widely characterising the Greek 
administrative system (Makridimitris 1992,45) affected the 
ability of the administration to develop its own expertise 
given that the changes at the political level after the 
elections resulted in changes in the senior staff that dealt 
with this policy. Furthermore, the initial recruitment of a 
new group of officials (Law 992/1979) who had solid 
knowledge of EC affairs and whose expertise was way above 
the average of Greek officials has not been matched by 
arrangements needed as a result of the development of EC 
policy. Currently (Minakaki 1992,49) the situation is 
characterised by i) the existence of a large number of 
highly qualified officials in the ministries of Foreign 
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affairs and National Economy and ii) the relative lack of 
specialised staff in other ministries6. 
5.2.2. POLICY FORMULATION 
The abolition of the Economic Committee meant that the 
function of co-ordination could be exercised at three 
different levels (Passas and Makridimitris 1994,66): i) 
The level of the Prime Minister who by virtue of art. 10 §1 
of Law 1558/1985 is responsible for resolving the disputes 
between ministers, ii) in the Ministerial Council (art. 82 § 
1 of the Greek Constitution) or iii) at the level of the 
Governmental Council. Only in exceptional cases did this 
body deal with EC-related issues of the sphere of high 
politics like the preparation of European Council meetings. 
Nevertheless, the constitutional dimension of policy 
formulation at the top political echelon is of great 
importance. According to article 82 §1 of the Greek 
Constitution, the Government defines and orientates the 
general policy of the country. The various committees and 
councils that meet under the government7 reflect a long- 
6The accumulation of large specialised staff in the two most 'EC- 
intensive' ministries has been attributed to the centralised nature of 
the process of policy formulation (Stephanou 1992,14). This does not 
reflect the fragmented process that we have discovered through the 
interviews. 
7By virtue of art. 81 §1 of the Greek Constitution, it is composed of 
the ministerial Council constituted by the Prime minister and the 
Ministers. Law 1558/1985 has added the Deputy Ministers and the 
Ministers without portfolio to the members of the Ministerial Council. 
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standing practice which started in the late 1920s. The 
existence of a large number of ministers, the different 
degrees of political proximity between some ministers and 
the Prime Minister, the complexity of issues, the fact that 
the participation of some ministers in the Ministerial 
Council would result in significant loss of time given their 
lack of knowledge on the issues that are under discussion 
are the factors that explain the existence of three types of 
committees and councils (Loverdos 1991,211). i) Some of 
them handle and clarify (on a permanent basis) important 
policy choices of the government in large policy areas 
(foreign affairs, economic policy etc. ), ii) others deal 
with specific issues while iii) ad hoc institutions deal 
with specific questions and cease to exist after the end of 
their deliberations. The flexible and rapid way in which 
those governmental structures can then take decisions does 
not resolve the issue of the status of those decisions in 
terms the Greek Constitution. This issue results from the 
fact that in the Greek constitutional framework the function 
of government is exercised by the Ministerial Council which 
is a single, indivisible and collective instrument of the 
state (Loverdos 1991,210). 
Under the aforementioned circumstances, the devolution 
of power from the supreme collective governmental body 
(Ministerial council) to committees or councils constitutes 
a violation of the Constitution. This devolution of power 
is compatible with the Constitution only when the committees 
prepare the Ministerial Council's decisions or when they 
clarify them . The use of those committees as decision- 
making instruments which have not necessarily been asked to 
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clarify or prepare the decisions of the government has 
constituted the basis of the government's operation in the 
post-dictatorial era. The fact that the governmental 
programme (presented to the Parliament before the vote of 
confidence) has been used as a substitute of the decisions 
which are supposed to be clarified by the committees 
(Athanassopoulos 1986,92) testifies to the failure of the 
government to function within the constitutional limits. 
This is also illustrated by the fact that (at least) between 
1982 and 1989 KYSYM (a sort of inner Cabinet) was the body 
that met regularly, contrary to the Ministerial Council 
which met only occasionally (Tsatsos 1993,265). The 
informal creation of the so-called Governmental Committee8 
(Makridimitris 1992,128) by the conservative government in 
April 1990 served the same objective (co-ordination) but it 
is doubtful whether this objective has been achieved (Passas 
and Makridimitris 1994,67). 
The fact that decision-making in those committees, 
under the aforementioned circumstances is frequently 
unconstitutional, is important for a number of reasons: i) 
The continuous use of this practice attaches a debatable 
element to a process which should lead to the clarification 
of policy positions. ii) As a result of that, the validity 
of those decisions seems to depend largely on the political 
will of the government either to function along the lines of 
the Constitution or not. iii) Thereby it also reflects the 
8It was chaired by the Prime minister and composed of the ministers of 
the Presidency of the Government, Foreign affairs, National Economy, 
Finance, Defence, Internal affairs and Education. 
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uncertainty which characterises the nature of the decision- 
making process at the top political level. 
The lack of an ad hoc collective body which would deal 
regularly with the differences between ministers and the 
formulation of a coherent policy leads to the reinforcement 
of the role of the Prime Minister as ultimate arbiter within 
the government. This is also the result of the general 
development of his role in the post-dictatorial era 
(Loverdos 1991,252; Makridimitris 1992,21). Nevertheless, 
in circumstances where the participation of the Prime 
Minister in the policy process is less visible, one is led 
to the conclusion that either the ministers act on a 
unilateral basis regardless of the need for co-ordination or 
the Prime Minister's Political Office resolves the problem. 
However, this permanent pattern may have just entered a 
process of change as a result of two recent developments. 
First, the new socialist government headed by Simitis 
has established a number of collective political bodies 
whose main or secondary role is the co-ordination of EC 
policy. The main collective body in EC policy is the 
Committee for the Co-ordination of Government Policy in the 
Relations with the EU (Act of the Ministerial Council no 288 
of 23 December 1996) which is chaired either by the Minister 
of Foreign affairs or his Deputy and normally includes as 
full members the Ministers of National Economy, Finance, 
Development, Agriculture, Employment and Social Security, 
Merchant Shipping, Transport and Communications. It is 
responsible for the co-ordination of the Greek policy in the 
field of European integration. Moreover, the Committee for 
the Organisation and the Co-ordination of International 
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Economic Relations also deals with EC affairs to the extent 
that it is responsible for the fulfilment of the country's 
international economic obligations. More important though 
is the second pattern established by the substantive re- 
activation of the Ministerial Council where many important 
decisions are now taken collectively. Yet, long practice 
will be needed in order to establish the extent to which 
this newly emerging trend has survived or not and, more 
importantly, its impact upon the policy process. 
As far as external representation is concerned, the 
Minister of Foreign affairs has the general competence for 
the representation of Greece within the EC. However, the 
general character of this clause has been mitigated by two 
factors. First, it is up to the Prime Minister to decide 
when to take over and secondly, the relevant technical 
minister represents Greece in the specialised sessions of 
the Council of Ministers. In the latter case, the relevant 
minister has to act in conjunction with the Minister of 
Foreign affairs who thereby has a horizontal competence. 
At the administrative level, the Ministry of Co- 
ordination has a horizontal co-ordinating role for the 
formulation of policy on the economic aspects of EC policy. 
Moreover, this ministry is responsible for the adaptation of 
the Greek economy and administration to the Community 
regime. The EC units perform a twofold role in the process 
of policy formulation (Passas and Makridimitris 1994,48). 
In the internal domain they co-ordinate the technical units 
dealing with various aspects of EC policy but they also 
inform them on new developments in this policy area 
(distribution of documents etc. ). In the external domain 
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they communicate with the Permanent Representation in 
Brussels, the EC units of other ministries and they also 
represent the ministries in negotiations both at the 
national and the European level. Greek officials have 
underlined the tendency of some EC units to prefer the 
contacts with their opposite numbers in other ministries 
because we speak the same language 
as one official has put it. Formally the decision-making 
process takes the following route: specialised unit - EC 
unit - Ministry of Foreign affairs - Permanent 
Representation - EC and backwards (Minakaki 1992,47). 
Nevertheless, this two-way communication is undermined by 
the tendency of the specialised units to work autonomously, 
in a manner which counterbalances the confinement of a 
debate over an issue between the EC units, while it 
reinforces the forces of fragmentation. Although in some 
cases this tendency is counterbalanced by circulars issued 
by the ministers, they are implemented only for a short 
period following their publication. 
The fact that the Ministry of Foreign affairs 
occasionally circulates similar documents illustrates i) the 
tendency of the ministries to act in an autonomous manner 
and ii) the de facto role of the Ministry of Foreign affairs 
as an internal co-ordinator. In many cases this role 
constitutes the basis for accusations of 
active expansionism within the central administration 
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which emanate form of officials of other ministries. 
Although Law 1104/1980 stipulated that interministerial 
committees composed of national officials would be 
instituted in the various ministries, including the Ministry 
of Co-ordination/National Economy in order to co-ordinate 
the administrative actors involved in the process of policy 
formulation, this system has been abandoned in practice 
since the early years of the Greek participation in the EC. 
Furthermore, the Consultative Committee on the Relations 
with the EC has been abolished and substituted by the 
Committee on Community Affairs. Senior officials from the 
ministries of Co-ordination, Justice, Foreign affairs, 
Trade, Finance, Agriculture, Industry and Energy were 
permanent members while officials from other ministries 
could also participate when the agenda included issues of 
their remit. Over the years, this committee has ceased to 
exist without being replaced by another collective body. 
The function of co-ordination is exercised in a 
piecemeal manner through irregular ad hoc meetings or 
through personal contacts (Passas and Makridimitris 1994, 
74). Thus, 
co-ordination at the administrative level relies on the 
quality of personal contacts between the ever-mobile 
officials in a manner that ends up being uncontrolled, 
opportunistic and above all personified 
(Passas 1993,251). 
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Indeed, a major factor behind this phenomenon is the fact 
that after each meeting at EC level, the diffusion of 
information to other ministries 
relies on the patriotism of the official who attended 
the meeting 
as a Greek official has put it. This produces the problem 
of lack of coherence in the positions presented by the 
various administrative actors in the EC. This problem 
becomes worse as a result of the tendency of the actors to 
act autonomously in a manner that is underpinned by their 
own ministry's priorities or wider functional logics defined 
on the basis of a specific stage of the policy process9. 
The frequent absence of Greek representatives from the 
various committees convened by the Council or the Commission 
is another symptom1d. Furthermore, officials of the 
Ministry of Foreign affairs underlined the fact that Greek 
negotiators frequently consent to the adoption of a policy 
proposal not because they agree with its content but because 
9An illustration of this phenomenon is the insertion of long 
transitional periods to EC legislation in a manner that is not a part 
of a wider concrete idea regarding their subsequent effective use. 
10Minakaki (1992,48) attributes this phenomenon to 'financial and 
other reasons' but as Passas and Makridimitris rightly note (1994,61- 
2) the EC covers the cost of the trip to and from Brussels. 
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Finance which receives those refunds 
does not always pass them on to the relevant ministries with the 
exception of the Ministry of National Economy since the beginning of 
the 1990s. 
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the use of a negative vote is taken into account when it 
is backed by an argument. Consequently, we tend to 
consent either because of a lack of a specific argument 
or because otherwise we would constantly use the same 
argument. 
The extent to which the administration also consults 
interested parts of the target groups also differs from one 
ministry to another and is widely linked to the personal 
views of senior officials. In general, the trend is to 
protect equally a given administrative domain not only from 
other parts of the administration, but from excessive 
'pressure' from interested parties as well. While some 
officials try to ensure that groups are kept informed of 
developments in some policy areas, others 
just read the documents that they submit 
as a Greek official has put it. Nevertheless, it is also 
clear, that when it comes to major issues, these parties 
have easier access to the political rather than the 
administrative level. The latter tends to be overwhelmed by 
the number of small organisations claiming to represent 
industry, thus either practically excluding them from the 
policy process, or leading them to the political level. 
5.3. THE GREEK PARLIAMENT IN EC POLICY FORMULATION 
Art. 3 of Law 945/1979 by which the Greek Parliament 
has ratified the Treaty of Accession stipulated that before 
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the end of each parliamentary session the government would 
submit to the Parliament a report concerning the development 
of EC affairs. This report has not been submitted until 
well after the Greek accession. This event was just one 
illustration of the Greek Parliament's inability to 
influence the process of policy formulation. 
However, the role of the Parliament during the period 
that preceded the accession was that of a forum for debate 
on the principle of Greek membership (Frangakis 1986,85-93) 
instead of the institutional mechanism that would give to 
the Parliament the possibility to exert influence upon the 
government's policy by articulating its own views. This 
debate took place within a political and constitutional 
framework which was characterised by a dominant ruling party 
and the weak role of the Parliament in the field of foreign 
policy (Venizelos 1986,49). 
During the first half of the 1980s, the Parliament has 
been informed in very few occasions about EC affairs. The 
lack of a specific intra-parliamentary institution that 
would deal with this policy area was the main factor that 
explains this phenomenon. However, on various occasions, 
the government presented to the Parliament elements of its 
EC policy. In 1984 Prime Minister Papandreou announced to 
the Parliament the reasons which led him to the decision to 
use the veto in the Dublin summit of the same year while 
discussing the next Mediterranean enlargement of the EC. 
Moreover, while the socialist government remained rather 
reserved vis-a-vis the process of integration, the 
Parliament constituted the forum where its pro-European 
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members begun substituting the previous anti-EC image with a 
more positive attitude. 
The strong socialist majority constituted another 
factor which led (until the end of the 1980s) the Parliament 
to constitute the forum where EC policy has occasionally 
been clarified or presented rather than formulated11. The 
wider political context has also contributed to the same 
effect. Indeed, the submission in May 1989 of a general 
report on the development of the participation of Greece in 
the EC did not provide the basis for a more active 
involvement of the Parliament in EC policy formulation as a 
result of the elections that took place in the same month 
(loakimidis 1991,15). 
Nevertheless, a new active Speaker (Tsaldaris) who was 
supported by the newly established conservative majority 
changed partially this situation. The Parliament's internal 
rules of procedure provided the legal basis for the creation 
of the EC Affairs Committee (Decision no 3076/2008 of the 
Speaker). Article 49 §1 stipulated that the Speaker can 
create international relations committees provided for by 
international treaties or committees necessary for the co- 
operation between the national and the European Parliament, 
111t should be noted that in the Greek constitutional system, there 
have been cases in the past where the Parliament had created 
institutions in order to monitor the formulation and the 
implementation of foreign policy. The international relations 
committee stipulated by art. 35 of the 1927 Greek Constitution where 
former Prime Ministers were ex officio members thereby underlining its 
high profile is an example of this practice (Venizelos 1986,51). 
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the Parliaments of other states or international 
organisations. 
Initially the committee had twenty-five members: 
Chaired by one of the Deputy Speakers of the Parliament, it 
also comprised twelve national MPs and twelve Greek MEPs. 
While the chairman of the committee is designated by the 
Speaker, the vice chairmen (one MP and one MEP) and the 
secretary are elected by the committee. The distribution of 
seats between the political parties is based on the number 
of their parliamentary seats, consequently, the ruling party 
always has a majority in the committee. Although the number 
of the members has been augmented to twenty-nine in 1992 
(Decision no 5197/4001 of the Speaker) and thirty-one in 
November 1993 (Decision no 6412/4665 of the Speaker), the 
criterion remained unchanged thereby giving a clear majority 
to the ruling party. 
The internal rules of procedure of the Parliament have 
also been modified, so now art. 32A constitutes the legal 
basis of the special permanent European Community Affairs 
Committee. From the institutional viewpoint, the change in 
the title of the committee is not insignificant. Normally, 
permanent committees (Tsatsos 1993,214) deal with specific 
policy areas, scrutinise legislative proposals or projects 
relating to their field of competence and have thirty-seven 
to fifty members. In other words, unlike the international 
relations committees, they are permanent integral parts of 
the parliamentary machinery. Consequently, this change 
meant the reinforcement of the role of the committee at the 
intra-parliamentary level. As far as the terms of reference 
are concerned, initially the committee dealt with 
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institutional issues, questions relating to the European 
Parliament, EC policy issues, texts emanating from EC 
institutions which must be submitted to the Parliament for 
ratification and EC-related decisions of other permanent and 
special parliamentary committees. After the amendment of 
the Parliament's internal rules of procedure, the 
committee's remit has been extended. 
Although the terms of reference remain quite vague, it 
can monitor the process of convergence between Greece and 
the EC and the development of the process of integration in 
general. While the government keeps the committee informed 
about the projects relating to EC policy, the proposals put 
forward in the Council of Ministers and the actions of the 
Greek public authorities, the committee also deals with 
issues brought to its attention by its chairman, MPs, MEPs 
or other parliamentary committees. Consequently, the remit 
of the committee is quite wide and so is (theoretically) its 
margin of manoeuvre in the policy process. However, the 
crucial point concerns the relations between the committee 
and the government. 
The committee works in a rather decentralised manner. 
A rapporteur plays the leading role and the committee can 
call for ministers (whose presence is, then, obligatory), 
MPs, officials. According to art. 32A §3 of the internal 
rules of parliamentary procedure ministers can also be 
invited before and after the meetings of the Council of 
Ministers. Decisions need the assent of the absolute 
majority of the present members. The committee's report 
(which also includes the opinion of the minority) is then 
submitted to the Parliament. Depending on its content, it 
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is either sent to the relevant permanent committee or to the 
plenary session. 
The report has no binding effect upon the government. 
Although the right of the plenary session to discuss and 
deliberate on political issues and pass resolutions has not 
been foreseen by the internal rules of parliamentary 
procedure, this can be based on the following elements 
(Giannis 1991): i) The constitutional right of the 
Parliament to monitor the action of the government, ii) the 
fact that if the plenary session did not have this right, 
then the committee would practically loose a substantial 
part of its powers, thereby contradicting its own existence, 
iii) the right of the Parliament to contribute in more 
substantial ways to the political process which leads to the 
conclusion that it can also express its opinion and iv) the 
lack of an explicit clause forbidding such resolutions. In 
practice, although the committee has a wide remit, the 
impact that it can have on the policy formulation process is 
rather limited. Its membership and the nature of its 
decisions do not enable it to exert influence on ministers 
during the policy formulation process. 
Indeed, the participation of MEPs constitutes both an 
advantage and a disadvantage for the committee. On the one 
hand, their experience and knowledge of EC institutions and 
policies constitute a precious source of information for the 
committee. On the other hand, precisely because they are 
primarily members of a body which is not part of the Greek 
polity they could not control the actions of the Greek 
ministers. Even when the Parliament used classic methods of 
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parliamentary scrutiny12 the result has been limited thereby 
not permitting the Parliament13 to play a substantial role 
in the policy formulation process (Vassilouni 1990,7). 
Finally, the committee's orientation towards more general 
issues, such as the Conference of the Parliaments of the EC 
and the Conference of the Specialised EC Affairs Committees 
(Giannis 1993,8) rather than the day-to-day negotiation 
between the member states, testifies to its inability to 
influence EC policy. 
5.4. THE FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION EC POLICY IN GREECE 
5.4.1. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The Greek Constitution of 1975 as amended in 1986 
incorporates a set of provisions that constitute the basis 
of the legal framework for the formal implementation of EC 
12Both the Greek Constitution and the internal rules of parliamentary 
procedure provide a wide range of means that enable the Parliament to 
control the action of the government. Those methods include reports, 
the submission of documents, various types of questions, the creation 
of ad hoc committees and the Prime minister's question time (Tsatsos 
1993,218-21). It should also be mentioned that one of each year's 
four extraordinary debates concerns the Greek policy on EC affairs. 
13The case of the ratification of the Single European Act through the 
use of art. 36 §2 of the Greek Constitution - according to which the 
President of the Republic needs the assent of the Parliament in order 
to ratify some international agreements - without this assent 
testifies to the Parliament's inability to play a substantial role in 
the policy process (Passas 1988b, 111). 
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policy in Greece. Indeed, apart from the normal legislative 
procedure which is based on articles 73-77 of the 
Constitution, articles 43,44 and 78 have served as the 
general constitutional framework for this purpose. The 
general provision of article 43 enables the Executive to 
take a wide range of measures in this process. These 
measures take three forms. On the one hand, article 43 §1 
stipulates that the President of the Republic has the power 
to adopt decrees for the implementation of laws. The use of 
this provision for the adoption of legal acts necessary for 
the formal implementation of EC policy depends on the 
existence of a clear legal basis in a previously existing 
law (Louis 1978,297). On the other hand, the provision of 
art. 43 §2 empowers the President to adopt regulatory 
decrees on the basis of a proposal submitted by the relevant 
minister. These decrees have to be based on - and are 
limited by -a special delegation of legislative power. 
Furthermore, they can be adopted by other administrative 
institutions, but in that case they can only regulate 
particular issues, issues of local interest, or technical 
issues. 
The provision of article 43 §4 has constituted in 
practice the main legal basis for the adoption of measures 
of secondary legislation facilitating the formal 
implementation of EC policy in Greece. Indeed, according to 
this provision the Parliament meeting in plenary session may 
adopt laws delegating power to the President of the Republic 
to adopt regulatory decrees for the regulation of issues 
specified by the laws in a general framework. These laws 
determine the general principles and the orientation of the 
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regulation and the time-limit for the use of the delegation 
of power. 
The President of the Republic also has the power, by 
virtue of art. 44 § 1, to adopt legislative acts on a 
proposal of the Ministerial Council, in cases of exceptional 
urgency and unforeseen necessity. These acts must be 
submitted to the Parliament for ratification (by virtue of 
article 72 § 1) within forty days from their adoption or 
forty days from the convocation of the Parliament. They 
become invalid if they are not submitted to the Parliament 
within the aforementioned periods or if they are not 
ratified by the Parliament within three months after their 
submission. Finally, article 78 §5 stipulates that anti- 
dumping or compensaLo y measures can be adopted in the 
framework of the relations of Greece with international 
economic organisations on- the basis of framework-laws, or 
measures aiming at ensuring the country's position from the 
point of view of the balance of trade. 
The need for the creation of a secondary legislative 
framework for the formal implementation of EC policy in 
Greece has been felt immediately after the conclusion of the 
association agreement. Indeed, the role of the Minister of 
Co-ordination as stipulated by Law 4226/1962 seemed to cover 
the stage of formal implementation. This is the result of 
the general clause by virtue of which this minister was 
responsible for the adoption of measures aiming at the 
'adaptation of the Greek economy'. The horizontal role of 
the ministry of Co-ordination also included the supervision 
of the relevant measures taken by other ministries. 
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Law 445/1976 confirmed the pivotal role of the Minister 
of Co-ordination through the introduction of a clearer 
clause stipulating that he was responsible for the adoption 
of the measures necessary for the implementation of the 
agreements with the EC and the 'adaptation' of the Greek 
administration (and economy) to the Community regime. 
Moreover, this ministry retained the power to supervise the 
implementation of the relevant measures adopted by other 
ministries. The role of the specialised services 
responsible for the relations with the EC has been 
reinforced through the attribution of the power to submit 
proposals for the adaptation of the legal and institutional 
framework and the implementation of the Treaty of Accession. 
Law 945/1979 passed for the ratification of the Treaty 
of Accession specified the form of the legal instruments 
that would be used for the formal implementation of i) the 
acquis communautaire and ii) future EC policies. Indeed, 
presidential decrees were going to be adopted before the end 
of 1981 (first year of Greek membership) in order to bring 
the Greek legislation in line with EC law and also for the 
formal implementation of transitional provisions of the 
Treaty of Accession, on the basis of the general principles 
and the spirit of EC law (supra, Chapter 2). Law 992/1979 
empowered interministerial committees to prepare the 
legislative measures for the formal implementation of the 
acquis communautaire. 
The need to provide a horizontal legal basis for the 
formal implementation of EC policy led to the adoption of 
Law 1338/1983. This was necessary because of the failure of 
the Greek administration to complete within the prescribed 
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period the process initiated by Law 945/1979 and Law 
992/1979. The duration of the delegation of legislative 
power has been extended until the end of 1983. However, 
this provision contained two exceptions. First, EC 
legislation which has been adopted before but entered into 
force after the accession of Greece had to be implemented 
formally before the end of 1985. Secondly, the same 
deadline applied to transitional provisions included in the 
Treaty of Accession (Law 1338/1983, article 4§ 2). 
Moreover, it extended the field covered by the previous 
provision by specifically referring to secondary EC 
legislation (Law 1338/1983, article 1§ 1) instead of simply 
providing for the formal implementation of Treaty 
provisions. Furthermore, it also provided the basis for the 
adoption of additional measures, like the creation of new 
institutions and the definition of administrative procedures 
and sanctions, necessary for the wider implementation 
process. 
The development of the legislative framework for the 
implementation of EC policy after 1983 has been 
characterised by the extension of the deadline set for the 
use of this delegation of legislative power. Indeed, a 
number of laws passed in the 1980s and 1990s have 
subsequently extended the deadline until the end of 1987 
(Law 1440/1984, art. 6), 1992 (Law 1775/1988, art. 7), 1995 
(Law 2076/1992, art. 31) and 2000 (Law 2367/1995, art. 19). 
Moreover, the scope of the delegation of legislative power 
has been extended in 1990 (Law 1880/1990, art. 2). 
The nature of the legal instruments used for the 
creation of the legislative framework for the formal 
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implementation of EC policy in Greece presents a number of 
important characteristics. First, it includes a wide 
variety of instruments covering extensive delegations of 
legislative power, others that are limited in time or 
purpose, framework-laws but also rules occupying the top 
position in the internal legal hierarchy (constitutional 
rules). Secondly, the extensive use of delegations of 
legislative power entails important political implications. 
Indeed, the use of this technique underlines the 
marginalisation of the Greek Parliament in the formal 
implementation of EC policy. The Parliament has the 
possibility to participate formally in this process only 
during the preparation of the laws that embody the 
delegations of legislative power. 
5.4.2. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION 
The establishment of the legislative framework for the 
formal implementation of EC policy in Greece has been 
affected by the wider process of institutional development 
of the country's politico-administrative machinery. The 
institutional dimension of the framework reflected two 
fundamental objectives, namely specificity and pragmatism. 
Firstly, the solutions had to be able to accommodate the 
particular characteristics of EC policy. Secondly, these 
solutions had to be compatible with the more general 
characteristics of Greek administration and in particular, 
the solutions adopted for the formulation of EC policy at 
the national level. The combination of these elements led 
to a number of specific outcomes. 
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The horizontal role of the Ministry of Co-ordination 
has initially been enhanced by the creation of the European 
Co-operation Committee. Its interministerial membership and 
the link to the Ministry of Co-ordination reflected both i) 
the specificity of the new policy area and ii) the 
subsequent need for inputs from various ministries. 
Moreover, pragmatism has been mirrored by the link to the 
co-ordinating ministry and the direct supervision of the 
Minister of Co-ordination. Nevertheless, the input of the 
European Co-operation Committee in this process was limited 
to the submission of opinions and suggestions. 
The attribution of power to the specialised EC units to 
formulate proposals for the formal implementation of EC 
policy resulted from an attempt to concentrate the handling 
of a significant part of EC affairs to these units. Yet, 
the limitation of this role to the mere submission of 
proposals constitutes an attempt to avoid total exclusion of 
other administrative actors from this process. Indeed, this 
attempt stems from the wider process of institutional 
development which was based on the need to combine 
arrangements reflecting the specific nature of EC policy and 
the widest possible diffusion of EC material within the 
administration. 
Furthermore, the establishment of interministerial 
committees for the adaptation of Greek legislation shortly 
after the Greek accession illustrated the increasing 
awareness of the nature of the issue. The same conclusion 
can be drawn from the fact that Law 992/1979 (articles 23- 
32) included detailed provisions relating to the 
organisation of the administration for the handling of the 
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Common Agricultural Policy. The Service for the Management 
of the Agricultural Product Markets took over the 
responsibility to implement CAP in Greece. Moreover, it was 
the only responsible service vis-a-vis the institutions of 
the EC thus accumulating a wide range of powers. 
The formal establishment of ENYEK at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 1986 ended the period of its informal 
operation within the Greek structure dealing with EC policy. 
Initially, it was responsible for the legal issues deriving 
from the wider implementation of EC law, or issues that are 
linked to the representation in courts of the member states, 
or other judicial or administrative authorities responsible 
for EC law, a set of responsibilities which made it the only 
ad hoc service dealing with the implementation of EC policy 
in Greece. The EC-specific nature of this service was also 
illustrated by the qualifications of its staff. Lawyers 
specialising in EC law with good knowledge of French and 
English were recruited. 
ENYEK's profile was significantly reduced in 1991 as a 
result of the conservative government's decision to 
attribute to the NSK the power to represent Greece in the 
ECJ and the courts of the member states (Law 1947/1991). 
This decision reflected a pre-electoral promise of Prime 
Minister Mitsotakis rather than the result of a functional 
pre-occupation. Indeed, ENYEK at the time had been seen as 
too close to Pangalos, a leading member of the opposition 
and former Deputy Minister responsible for European affairs, 
who had established it formally five years earlier (Passas 
and Makridimitris 1994, fn. 88). Yet, in 1994 the socialist 
government not only restored ENYEK's powers, but also 
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created a wider and more explicit legal basis (Law 
2197/1994). 
ENYEK is now responsible for a) issues emanating from 
the wider implementation of EC policy in Greece, b) the 
submission of opinions on the interpretation and 
implementation of EC law, c) the handling of issues and 
disputes emanating from the relations between Greece and EC 
institutions, d) the representation of Greece in the courts 
of the member states, e) assistance to the Permanent 
Representation on legal issues and f) the participation in 
working groups of the Council of Ministers and the 
Commission dealing with legal issues. More important though 
is the restoration of ENYEK's power to represent Greece in 
the ECJ. The plenipotentiary of the Greek government is 
appointed by the Minister of Foreign affairs or the Deputy 
Minister on an ad hoc basis. However, ENYEK and the NSK 
share the responsibility for the handling of issues relating 
to art. 177 of the Treaty of Rome. The reinforcement of 
ENYEK's role resulted in the recruitment of fourteen 
additional scientific staff. 
The institutional dimension of the framework for the 
formal implementation of EC policy is also characterised by 
a set of important elements. First, the horizontal role of 
the Ministry of Co-ordination was compatible with the basic 
organisational philosophy of the post-1976 laws. The 
importance of its role emanates from the need to create a 
veritable power centre that would enable the administration 
to implement formally EC policy. The framework is 
characterised by the need to combine the role of the EC 
units with the role of the vertical units within the Greek 
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administrative apparatus. This element, in turn, reflects 
the imperative of the combination of pragmatism and 
specificity. 
Secondly, the specific nature of EC policy had to be 
integrated in a wider system characterised by centralisation 
and the existence of sectoral units. Consequently, the need 
for a strong co-ordinating mechanism was evident. This need 
resulted in i) the creation of the aforementioned 
interministerial committees based in the Ministry of Co- 
ordination which would prepare the relevant legal texts and 
ii) the attribution to the Minister of Co-ordination of the 
power to sign the legal texts necessary for the formal 
implementation of EC policy. The fact that the relevant 
political post had a high political profile14 further 
reinforced the status of this mechanism. This could have 
important political implications in cases of 
interministerial tensions, in the light of the lack of 
active collective bodies, especially in the initial stages 
of EC membership. 
However, the establishment of this framework should not 
lead to the conclusion that it was going to function in a 
rigid manner. The use of general terms such as 'adaptation 
of Greek economy and administration' and 'adaptation to the 
Community regime' illustrate that the government was aware 
of the need for flexibility. This is further underlined by 
the vague references to the role of the EC units in the 
formal implementation of EC policy. This vagueness reflects 
14Law 400/1976 stipulated that the Ministry of Co-ordination occupied 
the top position in the ministerial hierarchy. Law 1558/1985 placed 
the Ministry of National Economy in the fifth position. 
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the belief that the system would eventually be led de facto 
to a modus operandi. This belief in the system's capacity 
to adjust itself to the new policy environment also resulted 
from a vague idea about the practical implications of EC 
membership. Despite the existence of multiple access points 
interest groups do not necessarily have significant 
influence. They are certainly not treated in a coherent 
manner (Passas 1993,251). 
Thirdly, inspite of the relative vagueness that 
characterised the provisions relating to the institutional 
dimension of the framework, one should note the specificity 
of the provisions relating to the Ministry of Agriculture 
and ENYEK. A number of factors explain the specificity and 
the detailed nature of these provisions. The fact that CAP 
is the most integrated policy of the EC based on a set of 
detailed provisions rendered the creation of a detailed 
framework for the formal implementation of EC policy not 
only easier but necessary as well. The importance of this 
policy for Greece further promoted the establishment of a 
specific framework. Finally, the institutionalisation of 
ENYEK in 1986 results from the end of the transitional 
period stipulated by the Treaty of Accession and the growing 
awareness that the end of this period would lead to an 
increase in the number of cases brought to the ECJ against 
Greece. 
Moreover, ENYEK's institutionalisation was symmetrical 
to the specificity of the relevant provisions of the Treaty 
(articles 169 and 170) and the resulting need for an easily 
identifiable national mechanism that would represent Greece 
in cases brought before the courts (European and national). 
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Furthermore, the same development can be interpreted as a 
result of the gradual shift towards a more pro-European 
attitude of the socia ist government. Indeed, the link 
between these arrangements and the political context is 
further enhanced by the decision of the conservative 
government to transfer ENYEK's powers to the NSK. This 
development is compatible with the growing role of the 
Ministry of Foreign affairs, the awkward division of labour 
between this ministry and the Ministry of Co- 
ordination/National Economy established by Law 1104/1980 
which is characterised by the distinction between the 
internal and the external sphere of competence and the 
subsequent interpretation of ENYEK's role as a part of the 
external dimension of EC policy-making. 
Much more important though is the fourth element, 
namely the fact that total confusion reigns within the Greek 
central administration over the distribution of power for 
the formal implementation of EC policy. Indeed, the rapid 
abandonment of the interministerial committees right after 
the accession in the beginning of the 1980s has not led to 
the establishment of a clear alternative mechanism. On the 
contrary, much seems to be left at the initiative of EC 
units or their technical counterparts. Another solution 
consists of the preparation of the relevant legal text 
either by the ministerial units of legal affairs or, more 
alarmingly, by the advisers of the ministers (Passas 1993, 
251). This pattern is extremely ineffective in the long 
term because these individuals leave the ministry in every 
ministerial re-shuffle frequently taking the relevant 
dossiers with them. Moreover, this practice is ineffective 
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in the short term as well because these individuals have not 
necessarily participated in the formulation process or the 
negotiations at EC-level. This means that functional logics 
are established and re-produced in a way which leads 
participants to the confinement to a single stage of the 
policy process without placing it into a wider context. 
The aforementioned functional gap means that formal 
implementation takes a rather passive form which largely 
depends on the efficacy of two learned officials of the 
Ministry of National Economy. Yet, significant problems 
persist because their calls for timely adoption of the legal 
measures in conjunction with the relevant ministries are 
ignored while the same applies to their recourse to the 
ministers whose circulars are equally ineffective. The 
extensive use of informal means like telephone calls does 
not enhance the authority of the messages. However, this is 
the only way one could have direct access to the relevant 
officials in other ministries. 
Officials in these ministries complain for the lack of 
specialised (legal) staff but even if this is a valid 
problem it does not explain the fact that very often the 
same ministries fail to notify to the European Commission 
(To Vima 1995c) the measures that they have adopted in the 
process of formal implementation. The operation of this 
anarchical framework clearly reflects the lack of a co- 
ordinator at this stage of the European policy process which 
could first detect problems and then provide the impetus for 
their resolution. Moreover, the already unclear lines of 
authority are further blurred by chronic problems like the 
mobility of ministerial advisers who are not members of the 
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administrative hierarchy, a factor that undermines the 
ability of the administration to learn by developing its 
proper memory. Furthermore, the use of the political 
players at the ministerial level for effective fixing 
largely depends on the civil servants involved in the 
process 
as a Greek official has put it. 
This has two direct implications. First, it frequently 
leads to violations of the deadlines for the formal 
implementation of EC policy which is an item of major 
importance in the agenda of the reunions-paquets. Secondly, 
it leads to the de facto adoption of the copy-out technique 
because of the lack of time fox: the preparation of accurate 
legal texts. The lack of time is by no means an excuse for 
this phenomenon, but results from an endemic use of longer 
transitional periods that Greek negotiators manage to get 
agreement for in the European negotiations. Typically, the 
administration then seems to forget these EC policies, 
instead of using the extended transitional periods for their 
effective implementation, until either the aforementioned 
officials of the Ministry of National Economy, one of whom 
also represents Greece in the EC's group of national co- 
ordinators for the single market project, or an official of 
the Permanent Representation flags out the deadline15. The 
15Draft presidential decrees are submitted to the administrative 
section of the State Council (Passas and Stephanou 1997,259) which 
checks their compatibility with EC law. This is a time-consuminq 
process but does not affect the ability to keep up with the deadlines. 
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lack of a high profile co-ordinator at this stage means that 
far too much depends on the unpredictable sensitivities of 
individuals. 
Moreover, one has to underline the symmetry that exists 
between the extent of participation of the Parliament and 
the Executive in the stages of formulation and formal 
implementation. The Parliament-Executive tandem is 
characterised by the inability of the Parliament to 
influence substantially the nature and the operation of the 
framework. Moreover, the Executive has a wide margin of 
manoeuvre resulting from the fact that the framework is 
based on. the delegation of legislative power from the 
Parliament, that takes various forms, the main one being 
specific (in terms of the subject that it covers) and quite 
extensive (in terms of time). In the case of the technical 
and EC units, symmetry is linked to the ambiguity resulting 
from a set of provisions whose objective was to set 
cmidelines for the division of labour within the ministries. zi - 
These guidelines were meant to be flexible in order to 
enable the administration to f ind its own modus operandi 
within the new policy environment. 
The attitude of the politico-administrative structures 
towards pressure groups in the process of formal 
implementation is a mixture of hostility and provision of 
opportunities. The administration does not provide any 
clear opportunities for the participation of pressure groups 
in this stage. These groups occasionally have access to 
ministerial advisers who in some cases prepare the draft 
legislative instruments necessary for the formal 
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implementation of policy. This mixture produces an uneven 
and unpredictable pattern. 
Finally, the fundamental organisation of the Greek 
administration has not been challenged by EC membership. 
Consequently, there are no administrations de mission 
dealing with the implementation of EC policy in Greece, 
ENYEK being an exception whose importance should not be 
over-estimated given that its role is limited to the 
judicial element of policy implementation. 
5.4.3. THE GREEK IMPLEMENTATION PROFILE 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the broad lines of the Greek 
implementation profile although it is impossible to have a 
clear picture of the problems that led to the use of art. 
169 procedures against Greece. 
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Figure 5.1: Number of letters and referrals of cases to the 
ECJ under art. 169 procedures regarding Greece, 1981-96 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 1986b, 32; 
1991a, 91; 1997a, 145. 
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A number of comments can be made on the basis of this set of 
data. Firstly, there is an overall increase in the number 
of issues raised by the European Commission through formal 
letters under art. 169. The pattern of this increase 
presents high points in 1986,1990,1993 and 1995. The 
first points can be attributed to the end of various 
transitional periods stipulated by the Treaty of Accession, 
most of which ended in 1985. The second point is linked to 
the political instability of 1989 and 1990 and the 
successive general elections which temporarily prevented the 
establishment of a routine pattern of governmental activity. 
Although the number of letters has fallen dramatically 
in 1991, an event that may be attributed to the activism of 
the new conservative government, it was clearly not a part 
of a wider pattern, because increases appeared again in 1993 
and 1995. They are more likely to be linked to the post-SEA 
increased legislative output relating to the single market, 
rather than a set of specific domestic political events. 
Secondly, the major increases of 1986 and 1990 are clearly 
reflected by the increased number of cases that reached the 
ECJ in 1988 and 1994 respectively. Nevertheless, one must 
also note the fact that if one leaves these increases aside, 
the pattern of the number of cases that reach the ECJ is 
rather stable. 
What are then the major areas of conflict, that is the 
policy areas where implementation problems have occurred in 
Greece? Most of these areas concern economic issues most 
notable of which are trade and agriculture (Tsinisizelis 
1996,224-8) but one could also add the environment 
(Commission of the European Communities 1991a, 278). 
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However, one must also note particular areas like the 
restrictive regulation of the right to buy land close to the 
borders, which is a political choice dictated by the 
country's specific existing security pre-occupations. The 
conflict between the right of EC citizens to buy land in 
these areas and the restrictive domestic legislation has 
been resolved through the relaxation of the latter. 
Furthermore, a look at the ECJ's judgments that have not 
been implemented (Commission of the European Communities 
1993a, 411; Commission des Communautes europeennes 1996, 
401-3) illustrates that problems exist in the free movement 
of services, the mutual recognition of diplomas and the 
environment. 
Finally, so far as the attitude of the Greek courts is 
concerned, they are widely thought to have accepted and used 
the concepts of supremacy and direct effect (Kerameus and 
Kremlis 1988; Frangakis 1994). The same comment applies to 
the use of the procedures of art. 177 (preliminary 
references) despite some initial ambivalence which is a 
typical characteristic of new member states. 
After having discussed the ways in which the British, 
French and Greek politico-administrative structures deal 
with the formulation and the formal implementation of EC 
policy, we shall now look at the theoretical insights that 
one can draw in relation to the wider implementation 
process. 
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Chapter 6 
COMPARATIVE FINDINGS AND POTENTIAL INSIGHTS 
THE UTILITY OF COMPARISONS IN PERSPECTIVE 
Our analysis so far has dealt with a number of issues. 
The nature of the EC as an implementation structure has been 
explored in a manner that has highlighted i) the extensive 
role of the member states in the implementation process, ii) 
the extent and iii) the intensity of the regulation of this 
role through iv) the action of supranational institutions. 
Nevertheless, this dissertation is about the extent to which 
national governments can change their implementation 
profile. 
Indeed, in Chapter 1 we have identified a number of 
reasons why the comparative method is a useful way to 
analyse this, because after all, the wider objective 
underpinning this dissertation is the identification of 
lessons that one can draw from this analysis in relation to 
the process of integration in Europe. Bearing in mind the 
conceptual link between formulation and implementation 
processes, we have examined in Chapters 3,4 and 5a number 
of characteristics of the institutional structures that deal 
with EC policy in the UK, France and Greece. The first 
ob3ective in Chapter 6 is to bring them together in order to 
outline the similarities and differences in a manner that 
will identify the extent to which national politico- 
administrative structures that deal with EC policy are 
fragmented or integrated. The second objective is to draw 
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insights regarding the implementation process that we shall 
then test on the basis of a case study. The use of the 
comparative method implies the need for a set of criteria 
which will form the basis of the comparison. 
6.2. THE CRITERIA FOR THE COMPARISON 
The choice of the criteria upon which this comparison 
must be based will have to be determined by the focus of 
this dissertation on the conceptual link between formulation 
and implementation that we have identified in Chapter 1. 
Indeed, given that we have construed implementation as the 
forging of links in a causal chain that commences with 
formulation, here we must try to identify the nature of 
various types of fragmentation and their impact upon the 
European policy process. The criteria that we have chosen 
reflect this research priority. The six criteria adopted 
here concern fragmentation along three functional lines, 
namely i) the relations between governments and parliaments, 
ii) the division of labour within national governments (the 
role of Ministers for European affairs, the distinction 
between the political and the administrative level, co- 
ordination at the administrative level and the intra- 
ministerial division of labour) and iii) the relations 
between national governments and pressure groups. 
The first criterion concerns the division of labour 
between national governments and national parliaments. 
Although the emphasis of this dissertation is on what the 
national governments can do in order to ameliorate their 
implementation profile, they have to operate in national 
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polities which are marked by the presence of parliamentary 
bodies with some legislative powers. To what extent can 
national parliaments then influence the national processes 
of formulation and formal implementation? 
Secondly, national governments, are not monolithic 
bodies. Various degrees of functional differentiation exist 
at this level. To what extent has EC policy constituted the 
basis for a separate ministerial post within the governments 
and what is the nature of its powers? Three solutions can 
be envisaged. EC policy can be managed at the political 
level as a part of i) domestic policy, ii) foreign policy or 
iii) as a specific policy area. The answer to this question 
is important because it determines, up to a certain extent, 
the form of the national institutional development. 
Thirdly, the functional differentiation on the basis of 
policy areas which marks every West European government 
creates the need for co-ordination. What is the answer of 
te British, French and Greek governments to this problem in 
relation to EC policy, especially in relation to the 
distinction between the political and the administrative 
levels? 
Fourthly, the conceptual link between policy 
formulation and implementation leads to the identification 
of another criterion. Have national governments created 
horizontal mechanisms that reflect this conceptual link 
between these two stages of the policy process? In 
particular, does the division of labour within the national 
administrations embody this conceptual link or not? 
Following the same chain of thought regarding the 
multi-faceted nature of national governments leads us to a 
208 
fifth criterion, namely the division of labour within 
national ministries. Given that ministries are not 
monolithic actors, the question of the division of labour 
and intra-ministerial co-ordination is also posed at this 
level. The salience of this issue is based on the very 
nature of EC policy which transcends the boundaries between 
the various ministries and between the specialised units 
within each ministry. The example of the most integrated 
policy, namely CAP is very illustrative. Although it is 
handled as a single policy area at EC level, it comprises a 
set of dimensions (finance, external trade, production) 
which at the national level are dealt with by various units. 
What are the national approaches to this issue? 
Finally, national politico-administrative structures in 
West European liberal systems have contacts with pressure 
groups which represent sectoral interests. What is the 
nature of their role in the national processes of policy 
formulation and formal implementation? In the following two 
sections we shall firstly identify the similarities (Section 
6.3) and then we shall discuss the differences (Section 6.4) 
between the three politico-administrative structures. 
6.3. EC POLICY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: CONCEPTUALISING 
NATIONAL SIMILARITIES 
THE LIMITED ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN 
FORMULATION AND FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION 
Do parliaments matter in the formulation process? The 
answer to this question must be negative. Following 
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Norton's typology (1984,1990) we will endeavour to classify 
the national parliaments in one of the following three 
categories: i) Policy-making; ii) policy influencing and 
iii) parliaments without any such powers. The classification 
of the British, French and Greek Parliaments in one of these 
categories will be based on a set of two criteria: i) The 
selection of the documents that come under scrutiny anU 
the quality of the parliamentary intervention. 
So far as the choice of the documents that come under 
scrutiny is concerned, the House of Commons and the %Greek 
Parliament constitute the two extremes of the continuum 
while the House of Lords and the French Par-liament occupy 
the intermediate position. The method employed in the frilouse 
of Commons derives from the politically contentious nature 
of EC policy and the British membership. Given that the 
initial sift leads to the exclusion of some documents from 
the subsequent phases of the scrutiny process, the choice is 
of high political importance. This is further underlined by 
the fact that the Select Committee's main role is to single 
out the documents of political or legal importance. 
Consequently, one is led to the conclusion that the sift is 
a part of the philosophy underpinning its very existence and 
functional orientation. --Lt 
is not surprising that, as a 
resu! L of this fact, the committee en bloc undertakes this 
task thus distinguishing it from its counterparts. The 
Select Committee in the House of Commons thus finds itself 
in a position where an increasing number of docui-nents have 
to be scrutinised. The enormous strain put on the committee 
is further enhanced by the vagueness of the criteria 
, 
210 
(political and legal importance) upon which it has to base 
its work. 
On the contrary, the double sift of documents in the 
House of Lords enables the Committee to focus on a smaller 
number of issues which are then analysed in more depth. 
This produces one of the committee', s most important 
features, namely the scrutiny of policy trends rather than 
specific pieces of draft legislation. The case of the two 
French assemblies is similar to the House of Lords. The 
similarity consists in the fact that the sift is not a 
political issue per se inspite of being the main prerogative 
of the delegations. The method employed in the Greek 
Parliament for the sift of documents clearly illustrates 
that this is not a political issue. This reflects the 
consensus on EC membership and the fundamentally different 
philosophy of the committee, the provision of more 
information on EC affairs being the reason behind its 
creation. 
The need to obtain the EC documents as soon as they 
emanate from the institutions of the EC has been felt by all 
three parliaments right from the beginning of the process of 
institutional development. Three factors have contributed 
to this fact. First, the unpredictable pace of decision- 
making at EC level led to the conclusion that the timely 
reception of the documents would help maximise the 
opportunities for a substantial contribution to the national 
process of policy formulation. Secondly, national 
parliaments were aware of the fact that the national 
dimension of the European policy process is also one of 
multiple interactions between numerous actors. 
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Consequently, early information was necessary for a prompt 
reaction to developments taking place at the national level. 
Thirdly, the pace of EC decision-making has been further 
accelerated after the entry into force of the Single 
European Act which has significantly broadened the field of 
application of QMV. This development further underlined the 
need for early information and prompt reaction by the 
national parliaments which felt the limitation of their 
margin for action resulting from the limitation of the 
policy areas where unanimity would be requiredl. 
This development was mirrored by the institutional 
development at the parliamentary level. Westminster and the 
Greek Parliament again constitute the two extremes of the 
continuum while the French Parliament occupies the 
intermediate position. If the use of a parliamentary 
reserve appears to constitute the most important 
constraint2, it is more helpful for the government than for 
the Commons. The time of the change in the government's 
attitude is crucial for the understanding of this argument. 
The relevant Resolution adopted in 1980, that is the 
beginning of the Thatcherite era, was consistent with her 
criticism of the EC and could also be used as an argument in 
the EC negotiation process. Moreover, the British 
government maintained a significant margin for action by 
stating that ministers can overcome this constraint when 
lPractically this meant that even if the national parliaments had the 
power to shape national policy, the governments could easily be 
outvoted in the Council of Ministers. 
2Norton (1995b, 107) rightly points to the fact that this 'constraint' 
is envied by some other national parliaments. 
212 
'special reasons' render it necessary. The political terms 
in which these reasons were defined and more importantly, 
the fact that the ministers assess the need for this kind of 
action further enhance the validity of this argument. 
In the case of the French Parliament, one should not 
over-estimate the importance of the 'constitutionalisation' 
of the scrutiny process. The same comment applies to the 
government's undertaking to place a parliamentary reserve 
whenever the scrutiny of a document has not been completed 
before it comes to the EC's Council of Ministers. Three 
factors back this view. On the one hand, this undertaking 
is based on a circular which is not legally binding for the 
government. On the other hand, this undertaking has been 
mitigated by two conditions based on the EC decision-making 
process which escapes the exclusive control of the French 
government. The final and most important factor of all is 
the constitutional constraint imposed on the Parliament. 
The creation of a framework in which the government's action 
would be significantly limited by the Parliament would 
clearly contradict the wider political logic of the French 
Constitution of 1958 which clearly favours the Executive. 
Finally, despite having recognised the need for prompt 
information, the absence of 'alert procedures' from the 
Greek Parliament is the mere result of the relevant 
comnittee's different orientation. The preceding analysis 
leads us to the conclusion that the British and French 
Parliaments can be classified as policy influencing while 
the Greek Parliament is unable to influence substantially 
the EC policy of the Greek government. 
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Westminster is clearly the most powerful of the 
parliaments examined here. The power derives from a number 
of political and constitutional factors. The contentious 
nature of EC policy (and more fundamentally EC membership) 
is the political factor which constitutes the power basis of 
Westminster in this policy area3. Furthermore, this factor 
is inextricably linked to the constitutional principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The current institutional 
arrangements for the scrutiny of this policy reflect both 
factors in the sense that the government is formally obliged 
to withhold agreement at EC level until the end of the 
scrutiny process. In the opposite case, the relevant 
minister must explain his action to the Parliament. 
Consequently, the pressure emanating from Westminster is of 
a negative character. This constitutes the reason why this 
system is classified in the second (policy influencing) 
rather than the first category (policy-making parliament). 
Westminster does not have the power to oblige the government 
to adopt specific policies but it can exert influence by 
placing an issue on the public agenda. Paradoxically, this 
system is more helpful for the government which can use it 
in order to enhance its negotiating position. Nevertheless, 
the validity of this argument is limited by the extension of 
the scope for QMV in the Council of Ministers. 
The importance of the political element also accounts 
for the classification of the French Parliament as a policy 
influencing legislature. However, here the salience of the 
political factor derives from the informal nature of the 
3The current robust majority of the Labour party will test the 
systemic impact of the mechanism operating in the House of Commons. 
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arrangements. Indeedr it was a part of the coalition of the 
Centre-Right which was in power between March 1993 and May 
1997 that led to the adoption of this system4. The 
constitutional element has acted here as a constraint both 
for the Parliament and the government given that it 
privileges the latter over the former. Thus the French 
Parliament is limited to placing items on the public agenda 
mainly through influential individuals like Seguin. 
Finally, both political and constitutional constraints 
account for the Greek Parliament's weakness in the national 
process of policy formulation. They result from a 
constitution dominated by the Executive and a political 
scene where the main actors agree on the issue of European 
integration and the participation of Greece therein thus 
removing any party political element. Consequently, 
although differences exist, the common element is the 
inability of national parliaments to make policy, hence the 
need to focus our attention to national governments. Let us 
now turn to formal implementation. 
The legislative dimension of the pattern of formal 
implementation is identical in these three member states and 
is characterised by the predominance of the governments in a 
way which largely excludes the national parliaments. 
Indeed, in all three countries the typical characteristic of 
this stage of implementation is the extensive use of 
delegations of legislative power to the national governments 
and the rather rare recourse to legislative instruments 
4Long parliamentary practice will be needed in order to draw a 
conclusion relating to the use of the same procedures under the 
current majority of the Left. 
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which require the active participation of the national 
parliaments. 
This empirical finding has a significant implication 
for the study of the implementation process in the EC. 
Indeed, it places firmly the focus of the researcher on the 
role of national Executives as the main participants in the 
stage of formal implementation. In other words, this 
finding means that explanations of failure (or even success) 
in implementation are unlikely to be based on the role of 
national parliaments precisely because the latter have 
delegated a large part of their power to the national 
governments thus facilitating the adoption of the relevant 
measures5. 
THE ROLE OF THE MINISTERS FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 
On the one hand, the three countries have created a 
post of Minister for European affairs. In none of the three 
cases, is this post of a senior political rank6. In more 
5A word of caution is necessary here. The preceding argument does not 
constitute a pledge for the total elimination of national parliaments 
from the factors that explain success and failure in this pressure. 
It is about the substantial limitation of these explanations only to 
the cases where a parliament must extend or renew the delegation or 
where it must be involved in the process of formal implementation 
because of constitutional constraints. 
6The fact that during the 1980s some French ministers for European 
affairs occupied a senior ministerial post was the result of their 
close personal relations to President Mitterrand, rather than a 
typical characteristic of the post (supra, Chapter 4). 
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general terms, the creation of this post results from the 
typical need for functional specialisation which is a 
permanent feature of modern governments. This is especially 
true for the Ministers of Foreign affairs, who are their 
immediate political supervisors. 
The creation of this post does not imply that EC policy 
is considered as an autonomous policy area. This is 
illustrated not only through the lack of a corresponding 
administrative basis but also through the close supervision 
exercised by the Ministers of Foreign affairs and their 
inability to influence the processes of formulation and 
formal implementation. Another factor that influences the 
status of the Ministers of European affairs is the salience 
of this policy area for domestic politics. The UK can be 
singled out as EC policy is a highly contentious issue in 
this member state. However, that leads to the reinforcement 
of the role of the Foreign Secretary, rather than the 
Minister for European affairs at the FCO. 
6.3.3. THE DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL WITHIN NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
The division of labour between these levels of analysis 
is of crucial importance for the co-ordination of policy. 
Its importance derives from the fact that both machineries 
can be 'short-circuited' in cases where the division of 
labour is unclear but also whenever excessive burden is 
placed on one of the two levels. In all three cases the 
division of labour appears to be clearly delineated between 
the political and the administrative level. This division 
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is based on two fundamental criteria: i) The criterion of 
the political importance and ii) that of the contentious 
nature of a given issue. Despite the fact that the two 
criteria seem to be very closely related there is one 
element that facilitates the distinction between them. 
While resolving political issues requires the participation 
of politicians as the only actors who have the legitimacy to 
take the relevant decision, contentious issues can be dealt 
with at the administrative level with or without the 
contribution of co-ordinating mechanisms like the priorities 
attached to industrial policy or the environment, or even 
the style of regulation of a market sector (e. g. through 
legislative measures or codes of practice). 
Yet, these issues have an inherent tendency to link the 
two levels of analysis when the administrative actors 
involved are unable to find a solution. All three countries 
follow the typical pattern of West European governmental 
systems whereby the administrators deal with the bulk of 
issues along the lines of (more or less) pre-defined 
orientations while politicians resolve issues that ascend to 
the political level whenever a compromise cannot be found at 
the administrative level. However, we shall see (infra, 
Sub-section 6.4.3) that the operation of this distinction is 
a different issue altogether. 
6.3.4. THE DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN TECHNICAL AND 
HORIZONTAL MINISTRIES 
The division of labour between the technical and the 
horizontal ministries reflects the degree of diffusion of EC 
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policy to the specialised (technical) ministries and 
determines the extent of the need for co-ordination. In 
other words, the more specialised ministries deal with EC 
policy, the greater the need for co-ordination. All three 
countries present a quite large degree of diffusion of EC 
policy to the technical ministries. In fact, there seems to 
be a correlation between the extent of diffusion of EC 
policy and the intensity of the EC's involvement in a given 
policy area. Consequently, a fairly large number of 
technical ministries deal with parts of EC policy given the 
expanding EC agenda. 
Yet, the view of the horizontal ministries is (in all 
three cases) very important for a number of reasons. They 
deal with the implications of EC policy on foreign policy 
and financial affairs, two areas that transcend the 
boundaries of responsibility between the various ministries. 
On the other hand, recent developments in the process of 
integration, namely EMU and the subsequent need for 
limitation of public expenditure but also the link between 
CFSP and the EC's external relations, have provided the 
impetus for greater involvement of the horizontal ministries 
in national processes of policy co-ordination. Finally, 
they (along with the ministries of Defence) are the only 
ministries that have a previous experience in international 
negotiations. However, the significance of this element is 
limited by the increasing participation of technical 
ministries in international (particularly European) 
negotiations. 
In all three cases, the tensions between these two 
groups of ministries constitute a typical phenomenon 
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characterising the national processes of policy formulation 
and co-ordination irrespective of the institutional nature 
of these processes. This being the general rule, the case 
of the UK differs in the sense that the accusations against 
the FCO do not emanate only from the administration, but 
from politicians as well, thereby reflecting once again the 
contentious nature of EC membership. 
6.3.5. THE DIVISION OF LABOUR WITHIN MINISTRIES 
In all three countries the development of the process 
of integration has led to the creation of specialised EC 
units in the vertical ministries, especially those which are 
most involved in the formulation of EC policy. Their mere 
existence tends to reproduce (at the in tra -ministerial 
level) the tensions between the horizontal and the technical 
ministries. On the one hand, the EC units are often by- 
passed by other specialised actors when dealing with EC 
policy. On the other hand, the latter accuse the former of 
impinging upon their affairs. Despite the lack of a clear- 
cut pattern characterising the role of EC units in relation 
to other specialised units, it seems that some degree of 
general validity can be found in the following three 
elements. Firstly, these units seem to be more active in 
the horizontal rather than the technical ministries. 
Secondly, their role is dominated by one function, namely 
the distribution of information to the vertical units, 
rather than the co-ordination of the ministerial position. 
Thirdly, the function of representation to the EC 
(negotiations and consultations) is occasionally performed 
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by these units. However, given that effective 
representation presupposes some form of co-ordination this 
also constitutes one of the sources of tension with the 
vertical units. 
6.3.6. FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION AS THE PREROGATIVE OF 
INDIVIDUAL MINISTRIES 
In all three countries that we have examined each 
ministry has the power to implement formally EC policy 
falling in its remit. Nevertheless, the importance of this 
similarity should not be over-emphasised. Indeed, the fact 
that most of the policies agreed upon at EC level have 
dimensions that transcend the boundaries between the various 
national ministries underlines the need for caution7- 
Regional policy for example combines aspects of economic 
policy, social policy, industrial policy and competition. 
The list of similar examples is endless. This, in turn, has 
two significant repercussions. On the one hand, it creates 
the possibility of inter-ministerial tensions. On the other 
hand, it highlights the need for effective co-ordination in 
this stage of the European policy process. Although the 
7Studies of policy formulation at EC level (Cram 1997,77-8; Cini 
1996,221-4) have underlined these difficulties even before the policy 
reaches the national level. This fact further underlines the validity 
of the views which highlight the need for co-ordination within the 
European Commission (Page 1997) and the crucial role of COREPER within 
the Council of Ministers (Hayes 1984; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, 
72-84). The expanding role of the European Parliament is likely to 
create the same problem for this institution. 
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formal arrangement is the same in all three countries, their 
responses to this problem are different. This aspect then 
leads us to the discussion of the differences between the 
three national settings. 
6.4. EC POLICY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: CONCEPTUALISING 
NATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
6.4.1. TWO LEVELS OF IMPORTANCE 
A distinction can. be drawn between differences of 
primary and secondary importance. This distinction is based 
on the direct or indirect impact that these differences can 
have upon the implementation process. While relations 
between pressure groups and national governments are 
important (infra, Sub-section 6.4.2) in the formulation 
process, they are less important in formal implementation 
because i) the choice between various legislative 
instruments is rather well defined within the national 
polities and ii) the regulation by the ECJ and the European 
Commission of this aspect of formal implementation is quite 
robust (supra, Chapter 2). In short, there is only a 
limited number of choices towards which a government can be 
led by a group. 
In the same vein, the role of political co-ordinators 
(infra, Sub-section 6.4.3) is of secondary importance 
because it pre-supposes the ineffectiveness of 
administrative co-ordinators or the lack thereof. This does 
not mean that the role of the former is not important. 
Rather, the argument here is that administrative co- 
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ordinators are of primary importance not only in the 
formulation stage (infrar Sub-section 6.4.4) but also in the 
stage of formal implementation (infra, Sub-section 6.4.5) 
because they are at the interface between various 
ministries, in a way that makes them a filter of what 
ascends to the political level and what remains within the 
administrative remit. In short, their impact on the 
fragmented or integrated European policy process is direct. 
6.4.2. THE DIFFERENTIATED TREATMENT OF PRESSURE GROUPS 
The relations between national politico-administrative 
structures and pressure groups differ between the three 
member states that we examine here. On one extreme of the 
continuum the UK is the case of the widest consultation 
which covers not only the formulation stage, where pressure 
groups are vital sources of information for the 
administration to such extent that the latter actually 
construes it as one of its strengths in European 
negotiations, also the stage of formal implementation where 
pressure groups have some input, especially in terms of the 
minimisation of the unnecessary regulatory burden imposed by 
a policy. Nevertheless, there is no symmetry between the 
two stages, mainly due to the regulation of formal 
implementation by the ECJ and the European Commission. 
Secondly, pressure groups in France have some access to 
the politico-administrative structures, during the 
formulation stage but their input in the stage of formal 
implementation is extremely limited. On the one hand, the 
French system seems to be seeking to balance the traditional 
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view of the state as the embodiment of the common interest 
with the sectoral approaches of groups, which can be either 
i) organised on the basis of sectors or ii) major market 
players ('national champions'). A major factor that 
influences the attitude of the French politico- 
administrative structures in the formulation stage is the 
fragmentation of many groups along the lines of 
organisations which are occasionally affiliated to political 
parties. That raises the cost of consultation in terms of 
time and risks bringing intra-sectoral conflicts into the 
administration. On the other hand, things in the stage of 
formal implementation are much clearer in the sense that the 
process is firmly in the hands of the relevant politico- 
administrative structures which seem to see no concrete 
reason to open a new round of consultation on what they see 
as their prerogative. 
Finally, the pattern of consultation of interest groups 
in Greece is variable and unpredictable in both stages. 
While the fragmentation of interests along party political 
lines is a major factor, the administration also seems to be 
rather reserved towards actors that i) it cannot control and 
ii) may challenge its 'monopoly' over a dossier during the 
formulation stage. The direct repercussion of this fact is 
the increasing attempts of major groups to have access to 
the political level mainly through ministerial advisers. 
The same pattern though is not re-produced in the stage of 
formal implementation where interest groups are simply 
ignored. 
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6.4.3. THE ROLE OF POLITICAL CO-ORDINATORS 
We have already highlighted (Sub-section 6.3.3) the 
fact that a certain division of labour between the political 
and the administrative level exists in all three member 
states examined here. Nevertheless, this distinction is 
useful when problems that occur at the administrative level 
can ascend to the political level where a solution can be 
found. This is not the case of Greece where tensions 
between ministries that reach the political level are 
resolved on the basis of an unpredictable pattern that 
consists of the personal relations between the political 
appointees and their proximity to the Prime Minister. This 
is the result of the lack of collective bodies that will 
deal with these issues arising from the formulation or 
implementation processes. Although the current government 
led by Simitis has certainly made the first step in the 
right direction by establishing such bodies, long practice 
will be needed, at least for the change of the political 
ethos that reflects the previous institutional gap. 
On the contrary, both the British and French systems 
are characterised by the existence of strong political co- 
ordinators in the form of collective bodies which meet 
regularly. These mechanisms include various Cabinet 
committees in the UK and a number of committees composed of 
ministers with or without the participation of senior 
officials in France. Nevertheless, one should not place too 
much emphasis upon this point because of the existence of 
co-ordinating bodies at the administrative level in both of 
these member states. Indeed, the lack of effective 
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political co-ordinators is more important in Greece because 
of the lack of effective co-ordination at the administrative 
level. This is the most important difference that we have 
identified between Greece on the one hand and the UK and 
France on the other. 
6.4.4. THE IMPORTANCE OF CO-ORDINATION AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LEVEL 
The lack of an effective mechanism for the co- 
ordination of policy formulation is a major characteristic 
of the Greek system. This means that tensions which occur 
in the daily operation of the structures that deal with EC 
policy are resolved in a piecemeal manner that tends to 
reproduce a sectoral ethos. However, the administration is 
sti L-L "" in need of guidance. This leads us to the third 
aspect, namely the extensive use of ministerial advisers. 
As they are not permanent members of the administration they 
tend to reproduce rather than resolve the problem of lack of 
co-ordination because they do not necessarily have a 
knowledge of previous issues and they are unable to provide 
a permanent impetus for problem- solving, let alone 
prospective thinking8. Thus, Greek officials 
8Although the comparison with the French ministerial cabinets is 
inevitable, it enhances our argument about the disruptive effect of 
ministerial advisers in Greece because, unlike the latter, the former 
have to operate much more eclectically in a context which is 
characterised by the existence of strong co-ordinating mechanisms 
which are answerable to a superior level of authority, that is the 
Prime minister. 
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do not always comprehend the implications of the 
agreements [they) reach in Europe 
as an official of the Greek Ministry of Foreign affairs 
said. 
This, in turn, has direct repercussions on the 
administrative level given that the absence of properly 
functioning political co-ordinating mechanisms means that 
there is no direct pressure put on the administration to 
prepare for the 'battle' of interministerial co-ordination. 
On the contrary, whenever co-ordination occurs, it is the 
result of an initiative taken by one actor, without a 
specific permanent pattern being followed in every case thus 
promoting fragmentation along the lines of specific sectors 
of EC policy. 
The lack of an administrative co-ordinator is also 
based on the formal but impractical distinction between 
external representation (attributed to the Ministry of 
Foreign affairs) and internal formulation of policy 
(attributed to the technical ministries). This distinction 
could be explained by the fact that unlike the former, the 
latter had no experience, or at best a limited one, in 
international negotiations. However, when the technical 
ministries acquired a degree of experience in these 
negotiations, the balance of power shifted to the detriment 
of the Ministry of Foreign affairs which now challenges the 
power of technical ministries in a manner that i) leads to 
the absence of Greek officials from committees of the 
Council of Ministers, or ii)'even the participation of 
2,21 -7 
insufficiently informed officials of the Permanent 
Representation. This in turn leads to the frequent use of 
reserves in the negotiations and more importantly, the 
inability of the Greek negotiators to influence the course 
of the negotiations. 
On the other hand, both the European Secretariat and 
the SGCI have become permanent features of the two politico- 
administrative systems. Processes for co-ordination in the 
formulation stage have also remained practically unchanged 
despite changes in the wider political context, especially 
in the case of France although one may detect between 1988 
and 1993 a slight move of the centre of the mechanism 
towards the President of the Republic who has taken up an 
important part of the responsibility for co-ordination in 
politically important issues9. The lack of formal 
arrangements has not proved to be a factor that affects the 
efficiency of the processes in a negative manner. The 
British system constitutes a very illustrative example. At 
the same time, the Greek system proves that the existence of 
formal arrangements for the co-ordination cannot guarantee a 
positive result. 
Both in the UK and France the co-ordinating mechanisms 
do not take the form of decision-making bodies which decide 
on a unilateral basis. On the contrary, meetings constitute 
the main form of co-ordinating mechanisms. Indeed, a senior 
official of the SGCI went as far as calling it 
an empty space where officials meet. 
9Nevertheless, much of this activity has been channeled through the 
SGCI. 
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This description could easily apply to the European 
Secretariat in the sense that both institutions provide the 
incentive and the means for meetings where co-ordination is 
achieved. The importance of the use of such mechanisms 
derives from the 'socialisation effect' that they produce. 
In other words, the constant participation of officials in 
these bodies leads to the creation of a kind of 'European 
conscience' (by the means of a spill-over effect) and above 
all, the certainty that individualism cannot prevail. This, 
in turn, further enhances the idea that EC policy is not an 
autonomous policy area but a part of domestic policy which 
should be constantly taken into account. This leads to a 
cultural point: We do talk to each other, here in 
Whitehall. Everybody is brought together 
as a DTI official told us. This view is echoed by an 
official of the European Secretariat who told us that 
problems where technical ministries try to freeze out 
other departments are unusual. 
The same spirit prevails in France where tensions may appear 
due to inter-personal problems only, although Europe is 
.C 
frequently seen as an external constraint by many 
technical ministries 
as a French official has put it. 
229 
Formally, the European Secretariat and the SGCI are 
parts of the two administrative machineries. However, their 
proximity to the hard core of the two Executives provides 
the basis for the mitigation of their administrative 
character and the reinforcement of their political side. 
Their proximity to the centre of the government provides 
them with the authority which is necessary for the 
accomplishment of their task. These actors provide the 
basis for liaison between the two levels, a function which 
constitutes the foundation of co-ordination. The power 
deriving from this link is of fundamental importance as it 
enables the two bodies to overcome the difficulties arising 
from the sectoral approaches of the other participants. 
In the ascendant phase of the policy process, this 
enables the administrative actors to seek the adoption of 
their sectoral position as the national position in the 
negotiations that take place in co-ordination meetings, 
while in the descendant phase ministers can be fairly sure 
that their guidelines will be transmitted properly to the 
administrative level, for example in the field of budgetary 
constraints used in the run up to the single currency. The 
same bodies act as filters between the two levels as they 
constitute the basis for the resolution of conflicts between 
various actors. This function is, by definition, part of 
the process of co-ordination given that it leads to the 
drastic limitation of the number of issues that end-up being 
dealt with at the political level. 
The distinction between the positive and negative fo=s 
of co-ordination, proposed by Metcalfe (1987,1988) is a 
useful instrument that sheds light on the role of the 
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European Secretariat, the SGCI and the problematic Greek 
system. Departing from a definition of co-ordination as 
the combination of several interrelated decisions and 
actions to serve a common purpose 
(Metcalfe 1988,5) 
which depicts this function as a property of a system, not 
the prerogative of one part of it, he defined negative co- 
ordination as the avoidance of conflicts and divergence of 
opinion between the various actors while he construed 
positive co-ordination as the attempt to achieve a coherent 
position through the establishment of a link between various 
ministerial positions and strategic objectives (Metcalfe 
1987,16-7 ). 
Metcalfe (1988,6-9) used a nine-level unidimensional 
and cumulative Guttman scale in order to compare the co- 
ordination capacities of twelve member states. This scale 
includes a single set of steps. Each step is a pre- 
condition for those that follow and it introduces additional 
elements that cannot be found in previous steps. Step 1 
(independent ministerial decision -making) is characterised 
by the completely independent action of the ministries 
without any kind of co-ordination. In step 2 (communication 
to other ministries) ministerial independence is mitigated 
by the obligation of communication through which some 
diffusion of information is achieved. Step 3 (consultation 
with other ministries) is characterised by consultation 
procedures employed by the various ministries in the process 
of policy formulation. In step 4 (avoiding divergence among 
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m-Lni-stri-es) negative co-ordination occurs through mechanisms 
aiming to avoid the pursuit of divergent and inconsistent 
lines in European negotiations. Step 5 (interministerial 
search for agreement) comprises mechanisms promoting 
consensus on common objectives and complementary policies. 
In step 6 (arbitration of interministerial differences) 
third party arbitration is used in order to resolve 
conflicts between the various actors. Step 7 (setting 
parameters for ministries) involves the setting of 
parameters by central authorities at the discretion of 
ministries while in step 8 (establishing governmental 
priorities) common priorities constitute the basis upon 
which interministerial differences are resolved and policy 
is formulated. Finally, in step 9 (overall governmental 
strategy) governments are totally unified policy formulating 
systems where basic choices are made at the top before being 
handed down to the lower levels through strong 
interministerial co-ordinating mechanisms. 
This capacity-orientated scale does not imply that co- 
ordination always takes this form. On the contrary, it 
outlines the capacities of the national systems of co- 
ordination. Metcalfe (1988,14) concludes that the member 
states can be classified in four groups: i) tightly 
organised systems, ii) loosely coupled systems, iii) small 
informal systems and iv) developing systems. He classified 
the British and French systems in the first and the Greek 
system in the second category. More specifically, the co- 
ordination capacities of the UK, France and Greece are 
1) 1) 1) 
dl- -0 d- 
classifiedlO in steps 8,6 and 4 respectively (Metcalfe 
1987,19-21). 
The findings of the present study only partially agree 
with Metcalfe's findings. Indeed, despite the fact that in 
Greece, as a rule, the focus is on negative co-ordination, 
the formal institutional capacities go beyond this stage. 
One cannot deny the formal existence of mechanisms where 
forms of positive co-ordination can be utilised, especially 
at the political level where a Committee for the Co- 
ordination of Government Policy in the Relations with the EU 
and the re-activated Ministerial Council can play a co- 
ordinating role. These mechanisms are employed very rarely 
for problem-solving in EC policy but given that this scale 
is capacity-orientated, one can draw the conclusion that the 
capabilities for some type of (political) positive co- 
ordination actually exist. This view is reinforced by the 
recent creation of collective political bodies by the 
government led by Simitis. Consequently, the Greek system 
appears to be closer to step 5. 
In the case of the French system, previous governments 
(under Mauroy, Fabius, Chirac, Balladur and Juppe) have set 
specific parameters in order to guide the action of the 
technical ministries and the co-ordinating bodies1l. The 
fact that this pattern has been observed over a number of 
years covering different governments illustrates that it is 
an inherent capacity of the system. The same comment 
'OHowever, Metcalfe did not explain these classifications, as he was 
presenting the conclusions of a wider project. 
IlInterestingly, the guidelines concerned budgetary constraints linked 
(directly or indirectly) to the process of economic integration. 
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applies in the case of the UK. Officials whom we 
interviewed were eager to stress i) the fact that their 
function relies heavily on governmental priorities and ii) 
the crucial link between European and domestic policy 
developments. Hence the establishment of clear governmental 
priorities (step 8) is a part of the capacities of both 
systems, in a manner that combines pivotal actors and 
authoritative decisions. In practice both systems are 
characterised by the frequent recourse to the governmental 
priorities either as a means of justification for a choice 
or as a problem-solving mechanism. 
6.4.5. THE REFLECTION OF FORMULATION PATTERNS UPON FORMAL 
IMPLEMENTATION 
We have already identified (supra, Sub-section 6.3.6) 
the power of individual ministries for the formal 
implementation of EC as a common characteristic of all three 
member states examined here. Yet, we have also underlined 
the fact that in most cases EC policy transcends the 
boundaries between various ministries thus producing the 
need for co-ordination in this part of the implementation 
process. This, then, is a major difference between Greece 
on the one hand and the UK and France on the other. 
The Greek system is a clear illustration of the 
disruptive effect that unco-ordinated formulation may have 
upon the process of formal implementation. The absence of 
Greek official from negotiations at EC level, or even the 
simple presence of an official of the Permanent 
Representation who does not necessarily possess in depth 
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knowledge of the previous stages of the European policy 
process means that the administration is frequently obliged 
to implement a policy whose philosophy, methods and 
objectives, are not fully understood. The same problem 
results from the frequent participation of ministerial 
advisers in the negotiations. As they are not permanent 
members of the administration, they actually re-produce the 
problem by undermining the capacity of the administration to 
develop its own methods of learning and a coherent 
administrative memory that will then be used in order to 
facilitate the wider implementation process. 
They certainly leave files concerning violations of EC 
law 
said ironically an official of the Ministry of National 
Economy. 
On the contrary, both the European Secretariat and the 
SGC-T have developed the capacity to monitor the process of 
formal implementation. While this function has always been 
a part of the European Secretariat's prerogatives, the 
French system has discovered the virtues of linking 
formulation and implementation processes during the second 
half of the 1980s, as a result of the problems that it had 
faced. Moreover, both institutions have developed methods 
which promote prospective (that is implementation- 
orientated) thinking in the previous stage of the European 
policy process. 
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6.5. THE WIDER SIGNIFICANCE OF FRAGMENTATION: IMPLEMENTATION 
AS A POLITICAL ISSUE 
6.5.1. SOURCES OF FRAGMENTATION 
The preceding analysis enables us to identify a number 
of sources of fragmentation within national institutional 
settings that deal with EC policy. First, fragmentation 
occurs as a result of the lack of mechanisms that would lead 
national administrations to take account of implementation 
during the formulation stage. Second, fragmentation is also 
produced by the lack of co-ordination at the administrative 
level during the formulation and formal implementation 
stages. Third, fragmentation occurs when the units which 
have formulated a policy at the national level, either have 
not negotiated at EC level, or are not the ones that 
implement it formally in the domestic context. Fourth, the 
lack of political co-ordinators means that fragmentation 
occurs when conflict at the administrative level ascends to 
the political level. 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that Greece is the 
only member state examined here whose politico- 
administrative structures embody all these sources of 
fragmentation. One could therefore hypothesise that the 
implementation process in Greece would be less effective 
than in the UK and France. Figure 6.112 constitutes a first 
crude indication of this chain of thought. 
12The period between 1985 and 1996 has been chosen because it excludes 
the transitional period for Greece while it incorporates the most 
recent available data relating to procedures under art. 169. 
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Figure 6.1: Referrals of cases to the ECJ under art. 169 
procedures regarding the UK, France and Greece, 1985-96 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 1991a, 91; 
1997a, 145. 
Although caution is necessary here because it is impossible 
to examine the quality of the problems that led to these 
referrals, two general comments can be made on this basis. 
First,, Greece has almost constantly a larger number of cases 
that reach the ECJ than the UK or France. The significance 
of this finding is highlighted by the fact that Greek 
negotiators frequently manage to get longer transitional 
periods for the implementation of EC policy, than most of 
their counterparts13. Consequently, it is the operation of 
the fragmented politico-administrative structures during 
these periods that poses the problem, not the lack of time. 
Secondly, one can also highlight the fact that the UK 
and France have been brought before the ECJ. Thus the 
J-) The liberalisation of telecommunications services and capital 
movement constitute two examples. 
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presence of integrated politico-administrative structures 
seems to be unable to guarantee the absence of problems in 
the implementation process. In the next section we shall 
try to identify the ways in which fragmentation can affect 
the wider implementation process at the macro-level that we 
defined in Chapter 1. 
6.5.2. THE DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS OF FRAGMENTATION UPON 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The effect of fragmentation of national politico- 
administrative structures upon the implementation process 
will be disruptivel4 for a number of reasons. First,, 
fragmentation is likely to undermine the stability of the 
implementation process by limiting the predictability of the 
behaviour of those involved in it. The importance of this 
element derives from the fact that different institutions 
have different agendas, priorities and methods of operation. 
Consequently, fragmented structures increase complexity thus 
reducing the likelihood of effective implementation. This 
is crucial for the detection of problems which is easier in 
integrated systems whose operation is similar to a chain off 
events. Locating the weak or ineffective link is thus 
easier. 
Second, the same chain of thought leads to another 
important factor, namely the likely increase in the number 
14Discussing the implementation of public policy in the German federal 
system, Mayntz (1980a, 10) has argued that the likelihood of a gap 
between objectives and reality is smaller when the same services 
formulate and implement a policy. 
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of decision points within the European policy process. 
Indeed, the more sets of actors involved, the more likely it 
is for a conflict to occur that will block the process. 
Moreover, package deals promoted by the co-ordinating 
mechanisms are less likely to occur because of the increased 
number of actors whose interests must be taken into account 
and the resulting limitation of the possibility to reach a 
sufficiently satisfactory solution. In other words, even if 
a solution is found, it is more likely to be sub-optimal. 
Third, fragmentation means that each stage of the 
process is viewed as a separate entity. Pressman and 
Wildavsky (1984,143) note that 
[t]he great problem... is to make the difficulties of 
implementation a part of the initial formulation of 
policy. Implementation must not be conceived as a 
process that takes place after, and independent of, the 
design of policy. Means and ends can be brought into 
somewhat closer correspondence only by making each 
partially dependent on the other. 
This underlines the role of the co-ordinating mechanisms 
which are uniquely placed to act in strategic terms15 as to 
the pursued outcome of the European policy process. 
Fragmented structures are also likely to suffer from a 
peculiar type of goal displacement, that is the pursuit of 
150ne must also underline the fact that the role of co-ordinating 
mechanisms should not be construed as an ever-present aspect of 
implementation. On the contrary, it is construed here as an important 
resource which can be effective when it is used selectively. 
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an unrealistic policy which will ignore certain realities 
although it may be close to an optimum. For example, 
adopting optimal norms for the assessment of air quality is 
one thing. Ensuring their use through the necessary 
instruments and specialised staff is another. 
Fourth, even if co-ordination is achieved in a 
fragmented framework, it is more likely to be more costly, 
at least in terms of time which is an important resource16. 
Thus it is likely to make the policy less appealing, more 
contentious (politically) or both. Clearly, we are not 
referring to the time which is naturally necessary for a 
policy to produce its effects. On the contrary, the 
emphasis here is on the excessive time-lag that can be 
avoided, or more importantly, the time which can be saved in 
a manner that may, for example, reduce conflict. Moreoverf 
as contexts change responses to implementation problems need 
to be given at the right time in order to be effective (Hood 
1976, f 25). For example, recruiting specialised staff will 
be an effective tool for problem-solving if it is used when 
shortages exist. 
Fifth,, integrated structures are more likely to be 
stake-sensitive17. This is an inherent element built into 
the implementation structure, that encourages prospective 
160'Toole and Montjoy (1984,499) rightly underline the link 
('tradeoff') between co-ordination and speed of action. This element 
is particularly relevant in the study of implementation in the context 
of the EC because of the deadlines included in the EC legislative 
measures. 
17Elmore's (1978) model of the implementation of social programmes as 
organisational development stresses the importance of this element. 
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thinking. In other words, integrated structures are more 
likely to feel that they have a stake in the policy which is 
going to be implemented if they have formulated it. The 
stake can be analysed not only in terms of the personal 
interest that the officials may have for a given policy (due 
to career development, ideology etc. ), but also in terms of 
the importance for the unit or institution, that is its 
credibility and profile within the national context. 
Sixth,, given that the detection of implementation 
problems is easier in integrated structures, their 
resolution (fixing) is likely to be easier, at least in the 
short term. This is so because irrespective of the 
complexity of a problem, the primary part of any problem- 
solving operation is the detection of the problem. How can 
officers of a local authority responsible for monitoring the 
quality of air use instruments that a central unit has not 
purchased? 
Seventh, to one extent or another EC policies introduce 
changes at the national level. The fragmentation of 
politico-administrative structures is likely to affect the 
effectiveness of these changes because of the limited co- 
ordination or the total lack thereof. In other words, as 
complexity increases along with the fragmentation of the 
structures, the constituent parts are increasingly 
'individualistic'. That undermines the implementability of 
changes because they have to be diluted in some way in order 
to accommodate at least some of the pre-occupations of the 
individual parts of the structures. 
Although we have identified seven important reasons why 
fragmentation matters in the implementation process caution 
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is necessary here. Discussing the role of the European 
Commission in the implementation process Peters rightly 
argued (1997,189) that the discourse on an implementation 
or a management deficit in the EC (Metcalfe 1992) appears to 
have an implicit basis on what Hood (1976) called 'perfect 
administration' where policies are converted into actions 
exactly as intended. In other words, the use of the term 
'deficit' implies that optimal implementation is achievable. 
Gunn (1978) has demonstrated that there are at least ten 
reasons why perfect implementation is not only unattainable 
but may well be unacceptable in a free society18. This 
would include perfect obedience which would not necessarily 
take account of the content of an order. Following the same 
vein we shall argue that our focus on the negative impact of 
fragmentation upon implementation does not mean that 
integrated structures actually secure faultless 
implementation. Other factors, e. g. culture, may be equally 
or even more important. 
Our focus results from the realisation of the fact that 
i) governments matter (supra, Chapter 1) and ii) they are 
multi-faceted rather than unitary actors in the European 
policy process. Nevertheless, this focus does not exclude 
the existence of other powerful explanations. The broad 
thrust of the argument is that implementation in the EC is 
political because it depends on a number of subjective 
18Some of the pre-conditions of perfect implementation such as the 
existence of a completely unitary administration, like a huge army 
characterised by a single line of authority according to Hood's 
accurate parallel (1976,6) and perfect obedience are not necessarily 
welcome in free societies. 
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judgments made primarily by governments and other actors as 
well. The use of fragmented or integrated structures is one 
of them. Moreover, this process is political because the 
operation of these structures over time may lead to changes. 
Drawing theoretical conclusions from the federal system of 
the USA Rein and Rabinovitz state that the Congress 
frequently tries to influence implementation by specifying 
which department will administer a new programme because 
different agencies have characteristically different 
approaches to programs in the same subject area 
(Rein and Rabinovitz 1977,26). 
Again, just like individuals, governments have the capacity 
to learn from past experiences. Subsequent action implies a 
set of choices regarding the tools (Mayntz 1980a, 5) that 
they possess. These choices are subjective. This is why 
implementation within the context of the EC is political. 
One reaches the same conclusion through the use of the 
concept of 'fixing' outlined in Chapter 1. The function of 
a fixer as the promoter of a given policy can only be 
understood as a resultant of a stake, the information and 
the power which is necessary in order to promote it. 
Therefore fixing is a political function that occurs in the 
implementation process. The study of implementation in the 
federal system of the USA led Bardach (1977,280) to assert 
that effective game-fixing strategies might emanate from the 
bureaucratic or the legislative side. The analysis of this 
concept in the context of the EC should be based on a wider 
political perspective which includes European and national 
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institutions along with interest groups with a stake in a 
given policy. 
Nevertheless, fixing is not a permanent feature of 
implementation and more importantly the demand for it varies 
depending on the context. We shall argue here that the 
demand for fixing is greater in fragmented politico- 
administrative structures because of the increased 
likelihood of problematic implementation. Although the 
sources of fixing are predictable (European Commission, ECJ, 
national political and administrative actors, target 
groups) , the same does not apply to the precise 
identification of their relative impact. That is likely to 
depend largely on the problems that produce the need for 
their participation. 
Although the preceding discussion of the various 
institutional settings has enabled us to formulate these 
general insights regarding the quality of macro- 
implementation, the exploration of their validity 
necessitates the recourse to a case study. The 
liberalisation of public procurement will be examined in 
Chapters 7 and 8 before we draw general conclusions (Chapter 
9). 
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Chapter 7 
THE EC'S PUBLIC PROCUREMENT POLICY: 
CONTENTr INSTITUTIONAL MAPPING 
AND FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION 
7.1. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT POLICY AS A CASE STUDY 
We have noted in Chapter 1 that a case study approach 
is necessary for the analysis of the implementation of EC 
policy by fragmented or integrated national politico- 
administrative structures. Chapter 7 serves this purpose in 
the sense that we shall commence the analysis of the 
insights that we have drawn in Chapter 6. This will cover 
the analysis of the implementation of the EC's public 
procurement policy which will span over to Chapter 8. 
Public procurement is a useful case study for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, we shall see that it is a regulatory 
policy (infra, Section 7.2), that is an example of the 
dominant type of policy used by the EC. Consequently, 
insights based on the examination of this policy may have a 
wider field of application. secondly, it is an important 
policy area not only in terms of its size, but also in terms 
of its potential for the European economy. 
Thirdly, procurement policy constitutes a cornerstone 
of the single market project. On the one hand, the general 
philosophy of the policy promotes liberalisation which is at 
Lhe heart of the single market. On the other hand, the 
scope of the policy has expanded in functional terms and 
from the point of view of the type of actors that it covers 
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(public and private) - Moreover, it places substantial 
emphasis on market players without neglecting the role of 
public institutions. Indeed, two of the most important, 
albeit asymmetrical, instruments used by the EC in the 
liberalisation process include i) the implicit belief that 
tenderers will take awarding entities to court if the latter 
violate the relevant provisions and ii) a horizontal 
supervisory role for the European Commission. Fourthly, the 
distinction between the levels of macro-implementation and 
micro-implementation discussed in Chapter 1 is fairly easy 
to establish. 
In the light of the fact that the EC's policy in this 
field is focused upon the regulation of the behaviour of 
awarding entities (public and private) the analysis of 
micro-implementation would require the examination of the 
award procedures used by them. This is a Herculean task in 
the sense that the said policy covers some 110,000 entities 
across the EC (European Commission 1996ar 5). Although only 
one part of them exists in the UK, France and Greece one 
cannot aspire to examine the behaviour of every single one 
of them and cover every single advertised contractl. After 
a "1,, focusing on the award of the advertised contracts would L 
necessarily be based on the dangerous assumption that all 
awarding entities have actually implemented a fundamental 
aspect of the policy, namely the obligation to advertise at 
EC-level every contract that falls in the remit of the 
relevant directives. In other words, this approach takes 
for granted that a fundamental objective of the policy has 
1The total number of invitations to tender in the UK, France and 
Greece reached 23792 in 1996 (Source: TED). 
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been achieved. Clearly, this is an unrealistic assumption, 
because this is not a perfect world. 
On the contrary, we shall endeavour to discuss macro- 
implementation, that is the tools that the national 
governments actually utilise in order to steer the behaviour 
of the awarding entities in the desired direction, that is 
the equal treatment of tenderers based in the EC, 
irrespective of their nationality. In the light of the 
approach to implementation analysis that we have outlined in 
Chapter 1, we shall first2 seek to create a map of the 
relevant national institutions, that is describe the 
division of labour relating to this policy area at the 
national level (Section 7.3). Which institutions deal with 
procurement policy? What kind of changes, if any, has the 
EC's policy in this field brought about to the national 
institutional structures? More generally, have they evolved 
an i so, how? 
Then, we shall seek to analyse the process of formal 
implementation, that is the form and the content of the 
implementing instruments, their timely or belated adoption 
and also the reasons that may explain the lack thereof 
(Section 7.4). What are the basic instruments used by the 
national governments in this process and to what effect? 
Have they evolved and if so, how and why? Furthermore, we 
shall attempt to identify the role of European institutions 
in this process. Administrative implementation will then be 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
2Analysis here will not include the stage of comitology because the 
directives were precise enough to eliminate the need for complementary 
action at the European level. 
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7.2. THE EC'S PUBLIC PROCUREMENT POLICY 
Theoretically public procurement can be approached from 
two different angles. Strictly speaking, it can be defined 
as the attempt of public authorities to satisfy their needs 
through the use of public money (micro-economic dimension). 
However, wider socio-economic objectives can be pursued by 
directing the choices made by public authorities as they 
attempt to achieve the traditional objectives (macro- 
economic dimension). These methods may concern segments of 
the society e. g. the unemployed, sectors of the economy e. g. 
information technology, specific firms ('national 
champions'), or territorial units e. g. regions. These 
methods contradict the free market which is at the heart of 
the process of economic integration in Europe, precisely 
because they entail the use of some sort of discriminatory 
measures. Yet, these are ideal types which are frequently 
combined in various policy mixes. 
This second approach to public procurement is known to 
Frodges and Schreiber 1991,28- every member state (Woolcock, ri 
9). Some of them (including Greece and the UK) have used in 
the past discriminatory measures in the field of public 
procurement in order to achieve wider socio-economic 
objectives (Commission of the European Communities 1989b). 
In the UK these methods consisted in i) a price advantage of 
5% given to tenderers if their tender had a positive effect 
on employment in Northern Ireland, ii) the purchase by 
British airline corporations of home-made aircraft material 
and iii) the purchase of British-made computers when there 
was no undue price differential (Turpin 1972,251-3). In 
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the case of Greece, a price advantage of i) up to 7% over 
the lowest tender was applied to enterprises established at 
a distance of more than 50 kilometres from Athens and ii) up 
to 10% in cases of companies established in the Greek 
islands. 
Public procurement is important not only because of its 
potential use, but also because of its quantitative 
dimension. Companies which are active in fields like high 
technology or even traditional heavy industries, may depend 
on public procurement for a very significant portion of 
their sales (Jeanrenaud 1984,152). Moreover, the 
importance of public procurement is also based on its 
overall volume. Indeed, it has been estimated (WS Atkins 
Management Consultants 1988,16-9) that between 10 and 20% 
of government expenditure (excluding public companies) 
concerns payments for the purchase of goods and services. 
Furthermore, the total volume of public procurement in the 
mid-1980s represented around 15% of the EC's GDP. These 
figures concerned mainly building and construction, 
equipment goods, services, energy, water, transport and 
communication which are areas of economic activity regulated 
by the EC's public procurement policy. More importantly, 
the aforementioned report (which covered only France, 
Germany,, Belgium, Italy and the UK) estimated that less than 
2% of public purchases came from foreign suppliers, thus 
illustrating a very low level of import penetration. The 
potential and actual importance of public procurement for 
the European economy and its importance for the 
establishment of a proper single market provided the impetus 
for the involvement of the EC in this policy area. 
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The philosophy of the Community's action in this sector 
of the economy is characterised by the predominance of the 
free-market model. The approach adopted at EC-level 
embodies the belief that 
many benefits ... will accrue from a genuine 
liberalization of this sector throughout the EC... First, 
the introduction of EC-wide competitive tendering ... will 
greatly increase the opportunities for industry ... to 
expand both on the Community and the home market. 
Expansion will enable economies of scale to be realized, 
thus reducing costs, while the spur of competition will 
stimulate efficiency. A considerable part of the 
resultant savings is likely to be put back into 
developing the businesses concerned through 
modernization of plant and infrastructure and research 
and development, leading to the creation of new jobs. 
Secondly, governments and the users of the services they 
provide will benefit from a wider choice of goods and 
services both in terms of quality and price. 
Substantial savings in government budgets will be 
possible and the general public's wants will be 
satisfied at lower cost 
(Commission of the European Communities 1987b, 1-2). 
Until the beginning of the 1970s the provisions of the 
Treaty (articles 7,30,52 and 59 in particular) were the 
only possible legal basis for the action of the EC. They 
incorporated basic principles of the EC like the prohibition 
of discrimination on the basis of nationality among citizens 
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of the member states, the free movement of goods, the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services 
enjoyed by individuals and companies. 
It is precisely the general character of these 
provisions that rendered them insufficient for the creation 
of a free market in public procurement. The adoption of the 
minimalist legal strategy would mean that the proper 
implementation of the policy would place substantial 
emphasis on the ability and the willingness of private 
actors - indeed, the target groups affected by the policy 
namely potential suppliers - to actively employ the concept 
of direct effect3 as the basic method leading to the 
liberalisation of the market. The rejection of a minimalist 
legal strategy reflected an indirect but unambiguous 
recognition of the inability of the market to regulate 
itself. 
Thus, at least a minimum of European legislation has 
been recognised as necessary in order to open the market. 
From an implementation perspective, the exclusive use of 
directives constitutes a clear political choice because it 
automatically creates a two-tier system whereby the member 
states are obliged to adopt national measures for the formal 
implementation. This in turn entails the involvement of an 
increased number of actors with different - and possibly 
conflicting interests - and the subsequent possible creation 
of tensions between them. The possible resulting extension 
of the time which is needed for the implementation of the 
3The ECJ has acknowledged the direct effect of these provisions 
(Rideau 1994,683-4). 
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policy also means that a window of opportunitY4 is created 
for the participants. In other words, they may try to 
protect interests that have not been taken into account 
'sufficiently' in the formulation process, by attempting to 
steer it in the direction that suits them. 
The philosophy of the EC's policy is based on three 
fundamental elements, namely selectivity, the principle of 
transparency and the equal treatment of tenderers. Firstly, 
the selective (non-exhaustive) character of the policy is 
the direct result of the unwillingness of the member states 
to abolish their national systems. This characteristic of 
the EC's policy is illustrated through the use of 
auantitative thresholds for the definition of its scope. In L- 
other words, the directives cover contracts whose value 
emials or exceeds the thresholds. ; L- 
Secondly, the basic means used for the liberalisation 
of the market is the principle of transparency. The 
awarding entities covered by the directives are obliged to 
advertise the contracts across the EC5 if their value equals 
or exceeds the threshold. The scope of this obligation 
covers a number of awarding entities whose definition is 
integrated into the directives. It is believed that the 
principle of transparency enables potential tenderers from 
4This concept has been defined by Kingdon (1995,165) as an 
opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or 
to direct attention to their special problems. 
5This is achieved through the publication of notices in a supplement 
of the official Journal of the European Communities and their 
electronic dissemination through the Tenders Electronic Daily data- 
base. In both cases the EC covers the cost of the publication. 
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other member states to submit tenders thus reinforcing the 
competition game. 
Thirdly, this principle is complemented by the 
obligation of awarding entities to treat European tenderers 
equally, irrespective of their nationality. Indeed, 
objective criteria aim at the radical limitation of 
discriminatory practices used by awarding entities thus 
enhancing competition between tenderers. Moreover, these 
criteria operate both at the level of the initial selection 
of viable and reliable companies and the award of contracts 
to them. Consequently, the EC's policy mix focuses mainly 
on the allocation of the contracts through the regulation of 
the behaviour of the awarding authorities. 
The very frequent use of EC funds by national 
authorities for public procurement (mainly works) 
automatically raises the issue of competitive tendering in 
the relevant award procedures. Indeed, it would be 
paradoxical to regulate the award procedures where national 
funds are used and to ignore EC funds. The Commission 
(1989a) has therefore instituted a system of monitoring the 
compatibility of national award practices where EC funds are 
used with the EC's public procurement policy. The system is 
based on a questionnaire which has to be completed by the 
national authorities which apply to the EC for financial 
assistance. It contains information about the type of the 
awarding authority, the purpose, value and duration of the 
contract, the award procedure, the publication of the tender 
notice, the technical capacity and commercial standing of 
the participants. On making the payments, the European 
Commission assumes that the contracting authority has 
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complied with the EC's public procurement rules. Payment is 
suspended if no references are given relating to the 
publication of notices in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities and no declaration is made to the 
effect that the proper procedures have been followed. The 
European Commission makes sample checks6 mainly in relation 
to qualitative selection criteria and award procedures. In 
cases of breaches of EC obligations, both suspension of 
payments and refunds are used in accordance with the 
specific rules of each Fund. 
The EC-wide regulation of public procurement commenced 
from the field of public works (early 1970s) and went on to 
cover supplies (late 1970s) and the provision of services 
6The increasing role of the European Commission in this policy area 
had direct repercussions on the part of its internal administrative 
structure that deals with this policy area. Responsibility has 11--feen 
diffused to the vertical units of DG III until 1984 when a specific 
division has been established although it did not deal exclusively 
with this policy area. It became focused on public procurement 
between 1985 and 1988 after its up-grading to a separate directorate 
composed of two divisions dealing with a) the formulation and b) the 
implementation of the EC's policy respectively. Additional Commission 
officials and national experts have been recruited thus producing an 
-increase of more than 40% 
in the staff dealing with this policy area. 
Although its internal structure remained unchanged, the directorate 
lost its autonomy in September 1990 after its integration into 
Directorate B dealing with horizontal instruments of the internal 
market. The same structure exists today after the attribution of the 
competence for the single market to DG XV (FernAndez Martin 1996,23- 
4). 
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(early 1990s). Directive 71/305 became a cornerstone of the 
EC's policy in this field as it contained i) a set of 
principles guiding the co-ordination of national award 
procedures, ii) a definition of the awarding authorities 
that it covered, iii) a definition of an open and a 
restricted award procedure, iv) a set of obligatory rules 
regarding the publicity of contracts, v) a set of objective 
qualitative selection criteria regarding the technical and 
financial capacity and reliability of the companies and most 
importantly, two mutually excluding award criteria, namely 
the lowest price and the most economically advantageous 
of f er. 
The definition of public supplies has moved from a 
rather general reference to the 'delivery of products' that 
included siting and installation operations to a more 
precise definition (Flamme and Flamme 1988,456) that covers 
the purchase, lease, rental and hire purchase with or 
without option to buy products. The regulation of public 
supplies' procedures at the level of the EC has been based 
on a strong element of commercial policy which has direct 
repercussions upon the unity of the single market in the 
sense that, unlike public works, supplies are frequent and 
repetitive, they concern a wide range of products and every 
public authority. 
The regulation of the provision of se-z-vices completed 
the regulatory framework of public procurement in the EC. 
The definition of services included in Directive 92/50 by 
the means of a negative phrase which excludes (among other 
aspects) supplies, works, arbitration and conciliation, 
employment, voice telephony and satellite services reflects 
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i) the very technical nature of the field and the 
willingness of the formulators to avoid 'loopholes' 
f acilitating inef f ective implementation andii)the 
difficulty of defining this activity. 
Moreover, the last extension of this policy, s scope led 
to the inclusion of utilities - in addition to public 
authorities7 - which are active in the fields of water, 
energy, transport and telecommunications. The initial 
exclusion of these companies from the EC's regulatory 
framework was mainly based on their legal status. Some of 
them are bodies governed by public law while others are 
governed by private law (Berlin 1991,14). Furthermore, 
their function in the market included commercial and 
industrial aspects which had to be taken into consideration. 
Although it took almost twenty years from the adoption of 
Directive 71/305 to the final inclusion of utilities in this 
regulatory framework, their initial exclusion has never 
escaped the attention of the EC for reasons which finally 
led to the adoption of Directives 90/531f 92/13 and 93/38. 
7public authorities falling in the scope of the directives are 
mentioned in more or less exhaustive lists (categorised by member 
state) attached to them. Although there is a clear pattern which has 
produced the continuous extension of the lists through their 
occasional modifications by decisions of the European commission (e. g. 
Decision 90/380), one is struck by the divergence that characterises 
the lists relating to different states. While some of the lists are 
very detailed, others use rather general expressions in order to 
include categories of authorities without mentioning specific names 
(Rees 1994,174). The pattern is not consistent along the lines of 
specific states. It differs from one directive to another. 
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These reasons are twofold. First, attention has shifted 
from the question whether they were governed by public or 
private law to the function that they perform thus leading 
to the indisputable recognition of the fact that they 
perform public functions by providing goods (water and 
energy) and services (transport and telecommunications) to 
the public and private sectors. Secondly, the Commission 
(1988a) found out that they operated in significant (in 
terms of size) but closed markets frequently as a result of 
the use of their 'exclusive or special rights' in a way that 
restricted competition. Defined as entities which are 
public authorities or undertakings or (in the opposite case) 
entities which operate on the basis of special or exclusive 
rights granted by a competent authority of a member state 
(art. 2§1 of Directive 90/531) utilities are covered by 
the EC's policy in this field only so far as their 
activities in the water . energy transport and 
telecommunications sectors are concerned8. 
However,, i) the fact that the directives do not contain 
clauses ensuring their effectiveness, ii) the inadequacy of 
the existing national and European legal arrangementsr 
especially in the light of the rapidity of the award 
procedures and iii) the unreliability of undertakings for 
the correction of certain infringements led to the 
establishment of a set of minimum review procedures in the 
field of public procurement, commonly known as 'Remedies 
Directives' (Flamme and Flamme 1990; Arrowsmith 1993b) which 
8This provision excludes their activities in other sectors where they 
are active players as a result of their diversification. Special 
thresholds apply to them for supply contracts. 
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concern both public authorities (Directive 89/665) and 
utilities (Directive 92/13). 
National rules must be available to any person having 
or having had an interest in obtaining a contract and must 
include a) interim measures for the suspension of award 
procedures or the implem-entation of any decision taken by 
award entities, lb) the setting aside of decisions taken 
unlawfully and c) the award of damages to persons harmed by 
an infringement. The effective implementation of t'iit: --, 
decisions taken by the bodies which are responsible for the 
review procedures must be ensured by the member states. 
These bodies need not be judicial in character but their 
decisions must be legally binding. The set of policy 
instruments is completed by the transitional periods which 
are Longer f or Greece, Plor-tugal and Spain. S)o f ar as Greece 
is concerned, her current three exemptions concern the 
utilities directives and will have expired by Decembec 199-97. 
The EC's gublic procurement po-"Lic-y is a regulatory 
poLicy par excellence for a number of reasons. it is based 
predominantly on the use of coercion. The objective is the 
establishment of an EC-wide free market. The achievement of 
tliits objeutive i: 5 bouglit through the use of coercion for i) 1- 
tile e-'L: L'rLin(atiOIl Of discri"Lillatory practices and' ii) the 
promotion of transparent and objective procedures stipulated 
in the directives. Hence, the theory incorporated into the 
policy can be summarised as follows: if the market is 
transparent and objective, then it will also be free. 
The development of the policy has led it beyond the 
limits of a mere framework for the co-ordination of national 
policies which was the initial objective. it isa 
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comprehensive legislative framework covering almost all 
aspects of this policy area9. The first sign of support for 
this view comes from the use of secondary legislation due to 
the ineffectiveness of art. 30 and other 'state-building' 
provisions (Page and Dimitrakoppulos 1997) of the Treaty. 
In more general terms, the content of these provisions is 
characterised by the constant reinforcement of two 
dimensions, namely i) scope and ii) density. The scope has 
been extended a) from works to supplies and then services 
and b) from the public to the private arena. Density has 
been reinforced by the regulation of an increasing number of 
policy dimensions, mainly publicity requirements, selection 
criteria and award criteria. The development of these 
directives and the changes introduced as a result of 
European or wider international negotiations has led to the 
need for legislative consolidation achieved through 
Directives 93/36( suppl ies ), 93/37 (works ) and 93/38 
(utilities). 
Important differences exist in the treatment of public 
authorities and utilities. The latter have to face a much 
weaker regulatory framework than public authorities (Cox and 
Sanderson 1994). Indeed, one could describe the part of the 
policy that concerns utilities as a safety net which is 
meant to deter them from adopting uncompetitive practices. 
In that sense the content of the policy is rather negative, 
unlike the part that concerns public authorities which is 
characterised by a more resolute drive towards competitive 
practices. 
9This regulatory framework does not cover the execution of the 
procurement contracts. 
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Coercion is used in order to allocate obligations and 
rights to the awarding entities. The content of the 
obligations is geared towards the constant limitation of the 
ability to use discretion and the drive towards transparent 
and objective procedures - This reflects the extent of 
change introduced by the policy, in the sense that change is 
quite extensive: Previously uncompetitive markets are sought 
to be liberalised. The increasing intensity of the policy 
which has been mentioned earlier is orientated primarily 
towards the allocation of the contracts and concerns the 
definition of their content only in a subsidiary manner. 
The efficacy of coercion presupposes the existence of 
credible sanctions regulated by Directives 89/665 and 92/13. 
Although the content of the policy does not necessarily 
lead to the adoption of a centralised or a decentralised 
procurement system - thus avoiding the re-allocation of 
regulatory power at the national level - it does place 
substantial emphasis on the role of market players, mainly 
the actual and potential tenderers. The willingness of the 
member states to entrust market players (rather than public 
institutions like the European Commission) with the task of 
monitoring the competition game is illustrated by the 
adoption of the Remedies Directives. This idea emanates 
from the general philosophy of the policy which is based on 
the strict economic dimension of public procurement and the 
subsequent substantial limitation of its scope. However, 
this choice is not without negative repercussions. Both the 
use of market forces in general and the specific use of the 
legal concept of direct effect by market players rely 
heavily on the willingness of the latter to 'bite the hand 
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that feeds them' (commission of the European Communities 
1990,25). Clearly, this rather natural danger of market 
failure (Woolcock 1991,128) is an inherent feature of the 
approach adopted by the EC. 
On a more normative note, one must also underline the 
direct repercussion of the Remedies Directives upon the 
institutional autonomy of the member states. Although this 
is not the policy's most developed dimension, the mere 
existence of these directives limits the institutional 
autonomy of the member states by prescribing minimum levels 
of legal protection for actual or potential tenderers, thus 
mitigating their ability to regulate the relations between 
market players on the one hand and public authorities and 
utilities on the other. This in turn illustrates the 
growing importance of the idea of effectiveness which is at 
the heart not only of the concept of implementation but also 
the priority attached to art. 5 of the Treaty. 
The premium that the policy has placed upon the market 
players and awarding entities (both of the public and the 
private sector) does not mean that they are they only parts 
of the implementation structure built into the policy. This 
structure also includes national and European public 
authorities such as ministries, courts and possibly 
parliaments. Regulating is one thing though, implementing 
the regulatory policy is another. The use of directives 
obliges us to commence the analysis of the implementation 
process from its formal phase after the presentation of the 
national institutions that deal with this policy. 
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7.3. INSTITUTIONAL MAPPING AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
THE UK: THE TREASURY AS THE EMBODIMENT OF CONTINUITY 
The implementation of the EC's procurement policy in 
the UK has not led to the creation of new administrative 
units. The only significant change concerns the recruitment 
of some additional staff to the services of the Treasury 
which has overall responsibility for this policy area. The 
remit of the Treasury covers the formulation, negotiation 
and (formal and administrative) implementation stages. 
Moreover, the partial responsibility of the Department of 
the Environment (alongside the three regional departments) 
for local authorities, has left the primacy of the Treasury 
intact. This responsibility follows organisational rather 
than functional lines. In other words, it covers all 
aspects of procurement policy (works, supplies and services) 
and the dividing lines concern sets of bodies (local 
government authorities) rather than aspects of the policy or 
stages of the policy process. 
Within the Treasury, this policy is dealt with by the 
Procurement Group which is headed by an under secretary and 
comprises the Central Unit on Purchasing (CUP) and the 
Procurement Policy Team whose Head also represents the UK to 
the ECs Advisory Committee for Public Contracts1O. 
1OThis is a consultative committee, initially created in the early 
1970s (Decision 71/306) in order to examine problems in the field of 
public works, in which Commission officials meet with national 
representatives in order to discuss issues regarding the EC's policy, 
including implementation problems. 
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Moreover, the group draws many of its staff (including three 
of its recent Heads) from outside the civil service. The 
intensity of the Treasury's lead in this policy area is 
illustrated by the fact that the CUP also advises central 
government departments on the use of best procurement 
practice. The Treasury's traditional leading role reflects 
a view of this policy as a predominantly economic issue 
focusing on procurement as a fundamental part of public 
expenditure. 
7.3.2. FRANCE: CONFIRMING THE ROLE OF CCM 
On the other hand, stability also characterises the 
French administrative structures which deal with procurement 
policy. The most prominent part of these structures is the 
Commission Centrale des Marches (CCM) that is the Central 
Committee for Procurement. This interministerial body has 
been created in the 1930s in order to resolve the problems 
that emanated from the dispersed methods used by various 
public bodies in the field of procurement (Dillemann 1987, 
96). The Code des March6s Publics (Public Procurement Code) 
which incorporates most of the French legislation regarding 
public procurement also constitutes the legal basis (art. 3- 
21) for this pivotal structure. CCM is placed under the 
authority of the Minister of Economy and Finance, and has 
the responsibility for the formulation and the 
implementation of policy. 
CCM is composed of three sections (administrative, 
technical and economic) and an international affairs unit. 
The establishment of the latter along with the recruitment 
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of additional staff absorbed by the existing administrative 
structures and the creation of a post at the SGCI at desk 
officer level were the only changes linked to the EC 
directives. Furthermore, other ministries are also 
responsible for some aspects of policy, like the Interior 
Ministry which deals with local authorities and the Ministry 
of Equipment, Housing, Transport and Tourism which deals 
with some public works and has also absorbed some of the new 
staff. However, the authority of the CCM is uncontested and 
unlike the aforementioned departments, covers every aspect 
of this policy area and the whole of the policy process. 
7.3.3. GREECE: THE POLITICS OF SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
OBJECTIVES 
Finally the organisation of the Greek administration in 
this policy area reflects the three strands covered by the 
directives, namely works (covered by the Ministry of the 
Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works), supplies 
(covered by the Ministry of Trade which since 1996 is part 
of the so-called Ministry of Developmentll) and services 
dealt with by the Ministry of National Economy. While the 
first two ministerial departments have a long experience in 
their respective parts of this policy area, the latter has 
been chosen to deal with services not only due to lack of 
another solution but also because of the long experience and 
the academic background of a particular official. 
"The ministry of Development also incorporates two previously 
individual ministries, namely the Ministry of Industry, Energy and 
Technology and the Ministry of Tourism. 
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Furthermore, it has to be noted that the constant transfer 
of the responsibility for public supplies from one ministry 
to another throughout the twentieth century (Zorbala 1992, 
151) constitutes an illustration of a certain lack of long- 
term perspective in this policy area, especially because the 
last transfers coincide with the first period of EC 
membershipl2. 
Each one of the aforementioned ministries deals with 
every aspect of the policy process within its particular 
remit despite the fact that utilities' procurement is dealt 
with by technical ministries13. The problems that 
characterised the implementation process in the field of 
supplies in the 1980s (infra, Sub-section 7.4.3 and Chapter 
8) led to the creation of a Community Af fairs Unit 
(Presidential Decree 397/1988) in the Ministry of Trade. 
Despite the existence of a separate Legal Affairs Unit, it 
had the responsibility mainly for problems relating to 
procedures under art. 169 of the Treaty. 
The establishment in 1988 of a Secretariat General for 
State Purchasing covering every aspect of public supplies 
including the European dimension reflects the effort made in 
order to modernise the existing legal framework. The need 
to end a cycle of EC-related problems has been a fundamental 
12The transfer of the responsibility for public supplies from the 
Ministry of Trade to the Ministry of National Economy in 1982 (where 
it remained until 1985) coincides with the initial phase of the 
process of formal implementation of the EC'S policy in Greece and is 
linked to some problems in this process (infra, Sub-section 7.4-3). 
DFor example, the Ministry of Transport and Communications is 
responsible for the Telecommunications Organisation of Greece. 
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incentive for this effort. Its abolition by the 
conservative government four years later (Presidential 
Decree 304/1992) constituted a symbolic gesture of its 
willingness to limit the role of the state in the economy 
while the end of a cycle of conflict with the European 
Commission is illustrated by the reinforcement of the role 
of the Community Affairs Unit in the formulation of policy, 
negotiation and formal implementation rather than the 
preparation of litigation. The return of the socialists to 
power in 1993 led to the establishment in 1995 (Law 
2286/1995) of a Directorate General for State Purchasing. 
Furthermore, the need for specialised managers who 
would manage co-financed public works projects led to the 
establishment (Law 2372/1996) of the Community Support 
Framework Management Unit, a semi-independent body which is 
supervised by the minister of National Economy. This body 
is staffed by officials from the private and the public 
sectors and has the responsibility for the assessment of the 
needs of the administration in terms of staff and has the 
power to recruit new staff from the private sector or second 
civil servants and to provide technical expertise in the 
management of projects in order to assist host public bodies 
to meet EC criteria and obligations for funding. Its 
establishment has been delayed by the strong opposition of 
the officials of the Ministry of National Economy and their 
union (Chaikalis 1995b) who argued that this would simply 
establish a new power centre blurring the existing lines of 
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authorityl4. Moreover, they argued that the recruitment of 
staff from the private sector did not constitute a guarantee 
for success. Far from that, they felt that the mentality 
and the methods of the private sector were simply 
inappropriate for this particular task. 
Further proposals regarding changes within the same 
ministry that would enable it to monitor the behaviour of 
awarding entities in the field of services contracts, have 
not been implemented. The same result followed a proposal 
of the Ministers of Development and Transport who argued in 
favour of the establishment of an independent administrative 
authority which would monitor the implementation of public 
procurement policy. This proposal has been rejected by the 
Ministry of the Environment, Spatial Planning and Public 
Works and also officials of the Ministry of Trade which is 
part of the Ministry of Development! Senior government 
officials took the same view (Lampsias 1997) because they, 
rightly, felt that the establishment of this authority in 
the Greek context would be construed as a transfer of 
political responsibility. 
Finally, the extensive use of EC funds for a number of 
important public works projects including the new 
underground of Athens, the new Athens Airport and a number 
of motorways has led to significant recent changes in the 
structure of the Ministry of the Environmentf Spatial 
Planning and Public Works. Aside from the creation of a 
Directorate General for Quality Control in Public Works in 
14Strong opposition also came from the construction companies 
(Chaikalis 1995a) which interpreted this development as an attempt to 
limit their 'freedom'. 
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the Secretariat General for Public Works (Presidential 
Decree 428/1995) as a result of the recent problems in the 
administrative implementation of the public works directives 
and the pressure exercised by the European Commission for 
better quality control in co-financed public works, the most 
significant change concerns the establishment of a 
Secretariat General for Co-financed Public Works 
(Presidential Decree 166/1996) which, uniquely, reports 
directly to the Minister. This fact underlines the 'hands- 
on' approach of Minister Laliotis and the importance 
attached to this new structure which has been created not 
only in order to formulate the policy of the ministry in 
this field but to implement and control policy as well and 
to collaborate with the institutions of the EC on issues 
falling in its remit. 
The political and economic significance of public works 
in Greece has also been reflected through the establishment 
of an interministerial committee comprising ministers and 
senior officials, entitled Committee of Major Works 
(Decision of the Prime minister no 3307). It is chaired by 
the Minister of the Environment, Spatial Planning and Public 
Works and it includes the Ministers of Developmentr 
Transport and Communications, the Under Secretaries of 
National Economy, one of the Under Secretaries for 
Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works, and three 
advisers to the Prime Minister. The committee monitors the 
development of all major public works and prepares the 
relevant work of the Ministerial Council. Let us now turn 
to formal implementation. 
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7.4. FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION 
THE UK: THE CHANGING FORM OF AUTHORITY 
Formal implementation in the UK has been characterised 
by the initial use of administrative circulars and 
guidelines by the administration which were partly replaced 
by subordinate legislation in the form of statutory 
instruments after the beginning of the 1990s. The choice of 
circulars and guidelines (issued by the Treasury, 'regional' 
and other ministerial departments) reflects the traditional 
lack of legislation covering this policy area before the EC 
directives, a period during which these issues were dealt 
with 
as a matter of administration 
as a British official has put it15. 
Moreover, the use of directives at EC-level in the 
stage of collective policy formulation certainly constitutes 
a valid argument in favour of the use of any form of 
national implementing measures not only because of its very 
definition found in art. 189 of the Treaty but because the 
content of the directives as well gives the member states 
the right to choose the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary for the formal implementation. This, 
in turn, constitutes a clear expression of the principle of 
15This action was based on a number of principles and procedures 
developed by the Treasury and Committees of the House of Commons like 
the Public Accounts Committee (Turpin 1989,62). 
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institutional autonomy in the wide sense of the term. 
However, a number of developments have led the British 
administration to abandon this practice. 
First and foremost, the long and consistent case law of 
the ECJ has rejected the. use of purely administrative 
measures for formal implementation (supra, Chapter 2; 
Labayle 1989,628). Indeed an important distinction has 
been drawn on the basis of ECJ's case law (Ferndndez Martin 
1996,103) between two situations i) where a directive's 
intended effect is limited to the internal sphere of the 
administration, without the creation of any effects on third 
parties and ii) where a directive is intended to produce 
benefits for third parties. The EC's public procurement 
directives clearly fall into the second category because 
their objective is the creation of opportunities for 
potential tenderers to bid for public contracts through a 
set of obligations imposed on the awarding entities, thus 
rendering the use of circulars and guidelines inappropriate 
for the formal implementation. The validity of the ECJ's 
view that circulars and guidelines are not suitable for the 
formal implementation of EC policy is also illustrated 
(infra,, Chapter 8) by the fact that in the case of the UK 
they enabled the continuing use of discriminatory practices 
in pursuit of other policies. Moreover, 
an administrative circular is simply an administrative 
device, it is not law, in the way a statutory instrument 
is 
as a Treasury official has put it. 
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Secondly, the very nature of circulars and guidelines 
as internal administrative instruments defeats the purpose 
of the EC's policy in this field, which presupposes a 
transparent market where informed players transform rights 
conferred upon them into business opportunities. This 
potential fails to be fulfilled when the relevant directives 
are not brought to the attention of these players through 
the appropriate implementing measures. However, one must 
also acknowledge the fact that, as a British official has 
put it r 
even the use of legislation cannot guarantee the wide 
diffusion of information. 
In other words, active market players have the way to get 
information about contracts. 
Thirdly, the extension of the remit of the EC's policy 
to utilities has certainly contributed to the switch to 
egislative measures. Private ownership of many utilities 
in the UK meant that circulars and guidelines could not be 
used precisely because these companies are not parts of the 
British administration. Thus legislation was needed. 
Finally, one must also underline the link between the shift 
to legislative measures on the one hand, the completion and 
more importantly the reinforcement of the normative force of 
the EC's policy in this area on the other, as illustrated by 
the extension to services and the finishing touches given 
through the consolidation directives. One must underline 
here the significant role played by the Treasury in this 
process. Indeed, it used its authority and nodality in 
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order to implement change in a framework which is 
characterised by the absence of any substantive challenges 
to the views that it takes in the European policy process. 
This means that this combination of authority and nodality 
reduces the number of decision points involved in the 
implementation process in a way which reinforces 
effectiveness. 
The form of legislation which has been chosen 
0 
(statutory instruments) reflects the dominant position of 
the British Executive in the implementation process. The 
limitation of the participation of Westminster is embodied 
in the European Communities Act 1972 whose section 2S2 
constitutes the necessary enabling basis for the adoption of 
the legislative instruments (supra, Chapter 3) thus 
justifying the use of the term16 
legislation without legislature 
(Miers and Page 1990,104). 
The answer to the question whether the formal 
implementation was timely or not, is directly linked to the 
content of the implementing measures. Although the broad 
picture of this stage of the policy process in the UK is one 
16Miers and Page (1990,110) regard section 2S2 of the European 
Communities Act 1972 as the provision that contains the most extensive 
delegation of law-making power. The fact that these legislative 
instruments had to be laid in the House does not alter the validity of 
this point, especially in the light of the fact that in this case the 
statutory instruments in question had immediate effect subject only to 
annulment through a negative resolution of the Parliament. 
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of timely and accurate formal implementation, one must 
underline the case which opposed the Treasury and BT in 
relation to the formal implementation of the first two 
directives covering the formerly excluded sectors. The 
significance of this case is also based on the fact that it 
coincides with the shift from the administrative circulars 
and guidelines to legislative instruments and also the 
extension of the EC's regulatory framework to utilities. 
Indeed, the change from administrative circulars and 
guidelines to statutory instruments for the formal 
implementation of policy in the UK has been marked by a 
challenge relating to their content emanating from a private 
company which is covered by the utilities directives. The 
case opposed BT to the Treasury on the way in which art. 8§ 
1 and S2 of Directive 90/531 had to be implemented. This 
provision - which exemplifies the much wider margin for 
manoeuvre left at the discretion of utilities - stipulates 
that the directive will not apply to contracts awarded by 
utilities for purchases intended exclusively to enable them 
to provide telecommunications services where other entities 
are free to offer the same services in the same geographical 
area and under substantially the same conditions. These 
contracts concern activities described in art. 2S2 (d) of 
Directive 90/531 namely the provision or operation of public 
telecommunications networks or the provision of one or more 
public telecommunications services. Art. 8S2 further 
stipulates that the contracting entities shall notify the 
Commission at its request of any services they regard as 
covered by the aforementioned exclusion, thus enabling it to 
publish periodically a comprehensive list of these services. 
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The Treasury, in formally implementing Directives 
90/531 and 92/13 through the Utilities Supply and Works 
Contracts Regulations 1992, took the view that it had the 
responsibility to define the services which fall outside the 
remit of the said directive and so it did in Schedule 2 
which was linked to Regulation 7S1. Furthermore, the 
Treasury implemented the procedural aspect of the provision 
in a way (Regulation 7§ 2) which obliged utilities to 
notify to it the services provided by them that they 
consider as services which fall into the remit of the 
exemption, instead of sending the relevant list directly to 
the Commission. BT thus brought to the High Court an action 
against the Treasury for annulment of Schedule 2. The High 
Court's Queen's Bench Division, Divisional Court, in turn, 
submitted to the ECJ a reference for a preliminary ruling 
(case C-392/93) relating to the interpretation of Directive 
90/53117. Basically the questions concerned i) the division 
of power between the UK government (in this case the 
Treasury) and the utilities as to who must identify the 
services falling under the exemption and then submit them to 
the Commission at its request and ii) whether the UK 
government must compensate BT if the ECJ found that the 
relevant national provision implements incorrectly art. 8 of 
Directive 90/531. 
The Treasury's approach according to which the 
directive does not preclude the member states from using 
their authority in order to define the services which are 
covered by the exemption was based on the view - also shared 
17This reference for a preliminary ruling was based on art. 177 of the 
Treaty. 
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by the French, German and the Italian governments - that in 
this way they specify the content of the provision, thus 
enabling the exercise of judicial review which would 
otherwise be impossible. Moreover, the Treasury (supported 
by the German government) considered that this form of 
implementation might be necessary in case of a conflict of 
view with utilities, thus jeopardising legal certainty. 
The ECJ dismissed the view of the Treasury, following 
the opinion of the Advocate General, thus accepting that the 
power to determine which telecommunications services are to 
be excluded is vested in the utilities, not the national 
governments. Nevertheless, it did not go as f ar as 
accepting that the UK government had to compensate BT. It 
based its view on the fact in this particular case, one of 
the three conditions for state liability in case of 
incorrect implementation had not been fulfilled because the 
interpretation of the directive that the Treasury adopted 
was not manifestly contrary to the wording of the directive 
or to the objective pursued by it. Finally, this judgment 
of the ECJ rightly underlined the failure of the European 
Commission to spot this problem when the Treasury 
communicated the implementing text to it thereby fulfilling 
the national obligation incorporated into the directives 
which is designed to facilitate the Commission's monitoring 
function (supra, Chapter 2). 
The case delayed the adoption of the Utilities 
Contracts Regulations 1996 which i) implements through 
Regulation 7S1 and §2 the necessary changes thus bringing 
the British legislation in line with the judgment and ii) 
f urther implements Directive 93/38. The shift to 
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legislative measures did not mean the abolition of the use 
of circulars and guidelines. On the contrary, they are 
still used by the Treasury or other departments not only for 
the administrative implementation of the EC's public 
procurement policy but in order to remind awarding 
authorities of their EC obligations in case of domestic 
changes in other aspects of procurement policy18 as well. 
7.4.2. FRANCE: BUSINESS AS USUAL? 
The process of formal implementation in France is 
equally one of accurate and in most cases timely formal 
implementation based on the use of formal and informal 
authority. Before discussing the case of late 
implementation, it is worth noting that the French pattern 
is characterised by the incorporation of the directives into 
the Code des Marches Publics through the extensive use of 
decrees followed by arr6tes ministeriels, that is 
ministerial decisions, and ministerial instructions which 
are prepared by the CCM, published in the Journal Officiel 
de la Republique Frangaise (Official Journal of the French 
Republic) and integrated into the Code whose Livre V (Book 
V) created in 1989 concerns the EC's public procurement 
policy, thus ensuring widespread publicity. 
18joint circular 5/96-11/96 issued recently (United Kingdom. 
Department of the Environment/Welsh office 1996) relating to 
compulsory competitive tendering constitutes an example of this 
practice. 
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While the extensive use of decrees19 confirms the 
preponderance of the French government one must also 
underline the repercussions of the extension of the EC 
policy's agenda upon the choice of the national implementing 
measures. Indeed, the modification of the French penal code 
through the creation of the crime of favoritism and also the 
regulation of utilities, which fall in the remit of the 
French Parliament by virtue of art. 34 of the Constitution 
of 1958, necessarily brought the latter into the process of 
formal implementation. Nevertheless, the participation of 
the Parliament did not produce spectacular results. It 
certainly seemed to be a matter of constitutional procedural 
necessity. 
The process of formal implementation in France has been 
marked by the absence for almost four years of implementing 
measures for Directive 92/50 (services). When the deadline 
for the entry into force expired (July 1993) the European 
Commission used the procedure of art. 169 of the Treaty in 
order to bring a case to the ECJ (case C-234/95). The 
French government did not deny that it had not implemented 
formally the said directive, despite the formal notice that 
the European Commission had sent in August 1993. In the 
absence of a reply, it proceeded to the stage of the 
reasoned opinion (September 1994) where the French 
19Drago (1975,864) interpreted the initial use of rather succinct 
texts which were interpreted by extremely detailed ministerial 
instructions as an attempt by the government to keep its hands free 
through the formal implementation of the essential minimum required. 
There is no evidence that this technique has affected the wider 
implementation process. 
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government unsuccessfully argued that the relevant decrees 
were under preparation. Given that when the case reached 
the ECJ France had not yet implemented the directive, the 
judgment could only be one of condemnation. 
The clear acknowledgment of a senior French official 
who told us that 
no one has an interest in being the first to transpose. 
One must be pragmatic in implementation 
certainly provides a valid explanation along with the delay 
caused by the general election of 1993, although CCM 
officials claimed to have instructed the administration to 
implement the directive in practice. The situation relating 
to Directive 92/50 has been described as 'alarming' 
(Commission of the European Communities 1995,25; Commission 
des Communautes europeennes 1996,57). The countries which 
contributed to this situation included, significantly, 
Germany and Greece. The French authorities finally 
implemented this directive in January 1997 (Loi nO 97-50). 
7.4.3. GREECE: AUTHORITY AND CONFLICT IN CONTEXT 
The process of formal implementation in Greece has been 
characterised by three fundamental elements. First, the 
Greek accession in January 1981 meant that the EC's policy 
had already developed its basic characteristics thus 
producing the need for Greece to adapt to an existing 
situation rather than influence its shape. Secondly, the 
first four years of Greek membership were marked by the 
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socialist government's reluctance to implement some of the 
fundamental aspects of the Treaty of Accession. The 
memorandum that it submitted in spring 1982 reflected the 
need for longer transitional periods, especially in the 
field of public supplies. Thirdly, the intensity of 
protectionist policies which had been implemented in the 
past (Zorbala 1992) meant that not only was there a need to 
implement EC policy formally by integrating the relevant 
rules into Greek law, but an important effort had to be made 
in order to modify or abolish a large number of legislative 
instruments which incorporated these policies. This has 
been partly achieved through the Treaty of Accession 
(Zorbala 1992,217-8). 
The difficulties associated with the task of formal 
implementation of the EC's procurement policy in Greece is 
exemplified by the adoption of Law 936/1979. It has been 
adopted in the short period between the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Accession (May 1979) and its ratification by the 
Greek Parliament (July 1979). Art. 6S6 facilitated the 
implementation of discriminatory practices against imported 
products in the field of supplies, along the lines of a 
protectionist policy dating from 195520. Having already 
missed this opportunity to commence the process of formal 
implementation even before her accession, Greece followed 
the same pattern throughout the 1980s. The problems that 
have been observed also concerned services contracts and the 
20Zorbala (1992,206-7) notes that Law 3215/1955 instituted a general 
preferential scheme which was characterised by the addition of a 
number of taxes and levies to imports, in a manner that clearly 
protected domestic products. 
279 
system of remedies. Throughout the 1980s, laws have been 
used extensively, followed by presidential decrees which 
specified some of the provisions of laws, frequently based 
on the delegations of legislative power to implement EC 
policy. 
The process of formal implementation in the field of 
supplies has been characterised by the conflict between the 
EC policy and the overt policy of the so-called 
'Hellenisation'21 of supplies implemented by the socialist 
government between 1981 and 1986. The conflict took the 
form of the non-implementation of the EC's policy (that is 
the lack of any national implementing measures) and the use 
of existing legislation for the protection of the domestic 
market22. This has attracted the attention of the European 
Commission which initiated the procedure of art. 169 of the 
Treaty (case C-84/86). Nevertheless, it exercised 
discretion by not bringing the case to the ECJ because the 
dialogue that it opened with the Greek administration 
illustrated that the latter was about to commence the 
process of formal implementation. The initial result took 
the form of Law 1797/1988 which did not constitute a 
satisfactory solution because it abolished the distinction 
between domestic and international competitions only 
indirectly while it did not abolish the system for the 
protection of regional/provincial industries at all (Zorbala 
2'The term referred to the preference for Greek products. 
22The second aspect concerns the administrative implementation of 
policy. Therefore, it shall be analysed in Chapter 8. However, it is 
mentioned here because it has been facilitated by the formal non- 
implementation of EC policy. 
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1992,208). It has been followed and completed by 
Presidential Decree 105/1989 which implemented correctly 
Directive 77/62. This measure has been followed by 
Presidential Decree 173/1990 containing discriminatory 
provisions (e. g. art. 19 S 2) subsequently abolished by 
Presidential Decree 137/1991. The process has been 
completed by Law 2286/1995 which has abolished every 
remaining discriminatory provision expressis verbis. It was 
only because the European Commission has used every ounce of 
its good will that Greece has avoided an embarrassing 
judgment of the ECJ. 
Formal implementation in the field of public works has 
been characterised by problems regarding the specificity and 
accuracy of the Greek legislation (Law 1418/1984). The 
Commission's view (Spathopoulos 1990,109-10) was that i) 
the mere introduction of the principle of non-discrimination 
between Greek and EC tenderers was insufficient for the 
liberalisation of the market, ii) the use of administrative 
circulars for the follow up of legislation was contestable 
and iii) a number of important provisions, including those 
regarding the selection criteria, had either been ignored or 
implemented incorrectly. The problem has been resolved in 
1991 with the adoption of Presidential Decree 265/1991 whose 
content was almost identical to EC legislation. The use of 
the copy-out technique certainly enabled Greece to avoid a 
condemnation in the ECJ for non-implementation but created a 
number of problems in the stage of administrative 
implementation (infra, Chapter 8). 
The formal implementation of Directive 92/50 (services) 
differed in a number of ways. The fundamental 
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characteristic of the process in this case is the challenge 
to the responsibility of the Ministry of National Economy 
for this area. Given that no implementing measures have 
been adopted, the European Commission initiated the 
procedure of art. 169 (case C-311/95). The initial action 
(formal notice of August 1993 and the reasoned opinion of 
May 1994) had no result thus leading to a condemning 
judgment issued by the ECJ. In the proceedings before the 
ECJ, the Greek government, despite not disputing that it 
failed to implement formally the said directive, argued that 
its initial steps in the implementation process included the 
setting-up in November 1994 of an interministerial committee 
at official level which would prepare the necessary 
legislative instrument. Moreover, the ministry of the 
Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works had already 
issued a circular and a draft Presidential Decree for the 
provisional implementation of Directive 92/50. The activism 
of this ministerial department is at the heart of the 
problem of non-implementation. 
Indeed, officials of the Ministry of National Economy 
which is formally responsible for this part of procurement 
policy prefer the adoption of a single text because the 
directive covers many different forms of services. On the 
contrary, officials of the Ministry of the Environment, 
Spatial Planning and Public Works prefer the adoption of two 
legislative instruments, one of which must cover the 
regulation of plans and studies prepared for public works 
projects while the other must cover the remaining forms of 
services. Essentially, the position of the latter is one 
which tends to maintain the status quo which contains many 
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discriminatory clauses that protect domestic planning and 
research firms from European competition23. The problem is 
based on the 
radical change which is necessary. This means that it 
is a matter of interests 
as one of its officials has put it. This power game is 
directly linked to the high profile of the Ministry of the 
Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works which is 
based on the use of important EC and national funds and its 
subsequent role as a major mechanism for economic 
development. A forthcoming judgment of the ECJ based on the 
revised art. 171 of the Treaty may provide the incentive for 
the final resolution of the problem. 
One must certainly underline here the diffused nature 
of nodality and authority in a form which represents the 
opposite of the mix that we observed in the UK (supra, Sub- 
section 7.4.1). Indeed, unlike the case of the UK where 
only one actor (Treasury) had to accumulate the relevant 
information (need for change) and then take the necessary 
measures (choice of statutory instruments)f the Greek case 
illustrates the negative effect of the existence of diffused 
forms of authority and nodality, in a manner that increases 
the number of decision points involved in the implementation 
process. In short, instead of an authoritative decision of 
the main body responsible for this aspect of public 
23The unwillingness of the interested organisations to accept the 
opening of the profession to European competition was a major factor 
behind the condemnation of Greece by the ECJ (Spathopoulos 1990,110). 
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procurement (ministry of National Economy), the Ministry of 
the Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works used this 
window of opportunity in order to promote its sectoral logic 
thus undermining the effectiveness of the process through 
the additional decision point that it created. 
The implementation of Directive 89/665 (remedies) has 
been marked by a legal dispute regarding the issue whether 
Greek legislation is adequate or not. The European 
Commission underlined the lack of measures implementing the 
directive in the field of public supplies despite accepting 
that the Greek legislation contained sufficient provisions 
in the field of public works (Presidential Decree 23/1993). 
Indeed, an official of the Ministry of National Economy 
observed that 
the Ministry of the Environment, Spatial Planning and 
Public Works pushed through the necessary legislation in 
a manner that completely ignored the Ministry of Trade 
and the need for a global solution. In the proceedings 
before the ECJ (case C-236/95) the Greek government admitted 
not having adopted the necessary measures. Nevertheless, it 
argued i) that the existing system of remedies offered some 
legal protection to tenderers and ii) that the recent case 
law of the State Council (especially its judgments24 in 
cases 355/1995,470/1995,471/1995f 473/1995 and 559/1995) 
made explicit reference to the said directive. Moreover, 
the Greek government used domestic formal and procedural 
241 am indebted to Mr. I. Kymionis of the AthenS Bar for providing 
copies of these judgments. 
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difficulties as an argument but it did not avoid a 
condemnation in line with the ECJ's case law on the issue. 
The committee composed of two members of the State Council 
and a member of the Court of Appeal which had already 
started work on a draft legislative text while the case was 
open, has completed its work in August 1997. The new text 
will introduce significant changes to the Greek system of 
remedies (Marinos 1997). Clearly, this was an issue that 
could have been resolved in less than a year, if the right 
alert procedures had been established and used by a co- 
ordinating mechanism. 
Finally, if the derogations which have been granted to 
Greece in the field of utilities (until July and December 
1997 for Directives 92/13 and 90/531 respectively) were 
aimed at the proper, albeit belated, formal implementation 
of policy, no legislative measures have been produced so 
far. Although the administrative implementation of policy 
(infra, Chapter 8) regarding utilities is rather different, 
one must underline the fact that the functional logics that 
we have identified (Chapter 5) as part of the Greek 
politico-administrative structures are evident here. 
Indeed, the Greek negotiators who have managed to insert 
these longer transitional periods in the EC's directives 
have achieved a narrowly defined objective which was not 
part of a wider concrete plan regarding the use of these 
periods e. g. for the preparation of a better implementing 
text. Let us now turn to the administrative stage, some 
outcomes and the overall patterns of implementation. 
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Chapter 8 
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION, OUTCOMES AND 
A DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENTIATED PATTERNS 
8.1. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION 
8.1.1. THE UK: THE CONFIRMATION OF NODALITY 
Administrative implementation of EC public procurement 
policy in the UK reflects the wider transition to a free 
market where market players compete for public contracts 
through the fundamental changes brought about by the 
Conservative party af ter 1979. The process of 
administrative implementation during the 1970s has been 
characterised by the use of preferential schemes dating from 
the immediate post-war period (Turpin 1989,77). Their aim 
was the allocation of contracts to firms based in specific 
developing regions. While the General Preference Scheme led 
government departments to award contracts to firms based in 
these areas when factors such as price, quality and delivery 
were equal, the Special Preference Scheme gave the 
opportunity to firms of the said areas to obtain 25% of the 
order if no additional cost occurred and if other 
considerations were equal. Both schemes were running 
counter to the very philosophy of the EC's policy not 
because of their discriminatory nature per se but because of 
the fact that their emphasis was put on the allocation of 
contracts to British regions thus discriminating against EC 
firms. The same can be said of the attempts of British 
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governments during the 1970s (and even the 1960s) to enhance 
the domestic computer industry through a preferential policy 
which meant that large computers were purchased from a 
British company through single tenderl, subject to 
satisfactory price and delivery. This policy has been 
abandoned in the end of the 1970s not only as a result of 
the change of government but also because the exemption 
granted by the EC2 had expired (Turpin 1989,76). 
Although some reforms had already been adopted in the 
late 1960s by the Labour government which had decided to 
contract-out cleaning services in central government 
departments (Turpin 1989,72) the first signs of change date 
from 1972 when the Conservative government led by Heath 
introduced the Local Government Act 1972 which established 
compulsory competitive tendering procedures for local 
authorities in cases of some purchases of goods or the 
execution of works (art. 135 S 3). The Department of the 
Environment, contrary to its previous practicef arranged to 
issue weekly press releases which included information about 
notices which had already been sent to the Official Journal 
of the European Communities for publication. These notices 
were published in the specialised press 'in order to enable 
'This method involves the direct negotiations between the relevant 
user and one supplier chosen on the basis of pre-defined criteria. 
The selection that precedes these negotiations has a restrictive 
effect upon competition. Various degrees of this restriction can be 
envisaged. 
2This exemption could only have been based on art. 92 S3 of the 
Treaty covering competition policy, thus having a limited impact at 
least in terms of time. 
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interested UK contractors to be informed of forthcoming 
competitions. 
During the 1980s, the implementation process has been 
underpinned by the clear preference for competitive 
procedures, the limitation of public expenditure and the 
predominance of the Treasury. The role of the Treasury here 
goes far beyond the mere formal implementation and the 
actions taken in order to bring developments in EC public 
procurement policy to the attention of awarding entities. 
It was after the Treasury's intervention through guidance 
that some authorities abolished the requirement - previously 
imposed on prospective contractors - to provide information 
about the composition of their workforce and an indication 
of plans to use their own or local workforce for the 
execution of works contracts. Moreover, the Treasury 
collected data on the award of works contracts before 
submitting them to the Commission and offered guidance on a 
number of instances such as like the case where local 
protesters attempted to use the EC's procurement po icy in 
order to oppose the plans relating to Ipswich airport. This 
guidance included not only the detailed explanation of EC 
policy, but more importantly day-to-day advice to awarding 
authorities. 
It is important that advice takes account of a) policy 
requirements and b) the EC procurement rules, 
particularly detailed things like technical 
specifications 
as one Treasury official has put it. 
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This effort to implement EC policy takes rather diverse 
forms which reflect the pivotal role of the Treasury in the 
implementation process. Its authority is used in order to 
convince interested parties as to the procedures that have 
to be followed in the purchasing process, like the case of a 
university professor who was exerting pressure on his 
university's purchasing officer to purchase an important 
piece of equipment necessary for his work, without taking 
account of the EC's directives. It was only when the 
officer asked for and obtained an official letter from the 
Treasury detailing the procedure that had to be followed and 
thereby confirming the view of the purchasing officer, that 
the professor's pressure ceased. 
Other., more general forms of action include the 
publication of basic guidance notes addressing particular 
issues which some awarding authorities face as a result of 
lack of experience, and significant practical problems such 
as the change in the cost of a purchase between the initial 
and the final estimate, and the handling of the issue of 
advertisement. More importantly, it constitutes the UK's 
privileged contact point for the European Commission with 
which contact is maintained on a day-to-day basis, 
frequently as a means of resolving problems in the 
implementation stage resulting from the actions of awarding 
entities, although the officials of the Treasury were eager 
to stress that they determine autonomously the issues that 
they raise. This contact with European Commission officials 
is facilitated by the previous participation of Treasury 
officials in discussions and negotiations at EC-level. The 
role of the Treasury as a nodal contact point concerns also 
289 
tenderers who occasionally 'air' their complaints with this 
department. The role of the Treasury in this case takes the 
form of an informal legal adviser, given that its officials 
draw attention to the rights conferred upon tenderers by the 
directives and the relevant implementing instruments, 
leaving them to decide as to how to pursue a given issue. 
We shall return to this point at a later stage. 
Apart from these procedural aspects, the role of the 
Treasury is inextricably linked to significant policy 
developments at the domestic level, channeled through this 
ministerial department. This is more evident in the case of 
policies which have a horizontal economic dimension. 
Indeed, the traditional primacy of the principle of 'value 
for money' in public procurement policy in the UK is 
channeled through the Treasury. This emphasis leads to the 
primacy of the criterion of the most economically 
advantageous offer. The Treasury here implements policy by 
specifying which award criterion should be preferred by 
awarding authorities. The Treasury defined this concept as 
the optimum combination of the whole life cost and 
quality to meet the customer's requirement 
(United Kingdom 1995,6). 
It further sought to promote flexibility by i) acknowledging 
that there is no single organisational model for effective 
procurement and identified key factors characterising 
effective procurement activity including, inter alia, 
central co-ordination of activities ensuring sharing of 
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expertise, and a pro-active approach3 and ii) by organising 
courses (Williams and Smellie 185,28) for purchasing 
officers4 in order to facilitate the implementation of the 
'value for money' principle. 
A significant domestic development that affected the 
implementation process concerns the privatisation of central 
purchasing agencies. This, in turn, is directly linked to 
the concept of 'untying'. It meant the abolition of the 
obligation to procure products through central agencies. 
This meant in practice that alternative arrangements could 
be made by departments for their procurement needs, e. g. 
through contracts with commercial suppliers (Turpin 1989, 
3). Previously, the use of central purchasing agencies5 
meant that they had assumed responsibility for meeting the 
purchasers' international obligations, in line with the 
Treasury's guidance. The abandonment of this traditional 
feature of the UK procurement policy, which commenced in 
1982 when ministerial departments were formally untied from 
HMSO,, had direct repercussions on the implementation of EC 
policy in this field. 
3Market testing (the recourse to the market in order to determine the 
best choice for a particular need) is one of the basic elements of the 
Treasury's approach which exemplifies pro-activeness. 
4This activity has become an important feature of the Treasury's 
action (United Kingdom 1995,31). 
5Five 'horizontal' purchasing agencies (Gohon 1991,116) were being 
used until then for the procurement of stationery (Emso), computers 
and telecommunications material (CCTA), land and buildings (PSA), fuel 
and electrical equipment (CS) and information services (COI). 
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It enabled central government to seek competitive 
procurement methods thus reinforcing the drive towards 
effective implementation of EC policy. Untying meant that 
responsibility for effective implementation of EC policy 
went back to the relevant users (departments) thus 
reinforcing the role of the Treasury as the latter has an 
unchallenged lead in this field within Whitehall. Moreover, 
the privatisation of central purchasing agencies meant that 
they are obliged to behave as proper market players by 
becoming more competitive and by aiming at the generation of 
profit. In these cases guidance from the Treasury, issued 
after consultation with the European Commission, emphasised 
the right of private bodies to aavertise contracts in TED 
and the OJEC when acting as a purchasing agent for one or 
more departments while also underlining the need for the 
latter to ensure that the private body has a contractual 
responsibility to act in conformity with EC policy. 
The role of the Treasury in the implementation process, 
just like every part of public administration for that 
matter, is conditioned by the action of the target groups, 
that is potential and actual tenderers. What is then the 
role of the tenderers in the implementation process in the 
UK? one must draw a distinction between i) their 
willingness to submit offers and ii) their willingness to 
protect their rights during or after the award procedure. 
On the one hand, the market of local government procurement 
in the UK constitutes an important 'test case'. Indeed, the 
British policy on compulsory competitive tendering - 
enhanced in 1980 through the Local Government, Planning and 
Land Act 1980 and subsequently extended to cover more 
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aspects of public procurement (Local Government Act 1988; 
Local Government Act 1992) means that local authorities in 
the UK are obliged to put out for tender procurement 
contracts, even when they have the in-house expertise to 
cover their needs and the value of the contract is not equal 
or higher than the thresholds included in the directives. 
It is only after this stage that the EC policy comes into 
play, meaning that in-house units must be treated as any 
other tenderer. Despite the size of UK local government 
authorities, evidence shows (Paddon 1993,168-72) that very 
little interest has been generated in the form of 'foreign 
tenders', What has actually happened is a wave of joint 
ventures and acquisitions of British companies, two 
strategies used by French, German, Dutch and Italian 
companies, especially in the 1980s. Significantly, Paddon 
(1993,172-3) underlined the fact that 
[i]t is in these services that the pursuit of Europe- 
wide development and acquisition strategies by a number 
of EC-based multinational service companies, with 
particular targeting of the UK public sector, is most 
evident, 
even before the inclusion of the services sector into the 
EC's regulatory framework. The same trend has been observed 
by an official of the Treasury who also observed that 
in many cases foreign companies have set up their UK 
subsidiaries and what happens is that it is the UK 
subsidiary which responds. 
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On the other hand, the willingness of firms to contact 
the Treasury and the European Commission in order to pursue 
a case when they believe that their interests have been 
damaged seems to be more readily used than the formal legal 
procedures. The existence of limited case law6 has been 
noted not only by academics (Birkinshaw 1990,303) but also 
by the administration itself and the Confederation of 
British Industry (United Kingdom. Department of Trade and 
Industry 1994, § 104). British officials attribute this 
phenomenon to the fact that although companies actually 
bring to the attention of public authorities the 
irregularities that they face, 
it is not a part of the business ethos 
to pursue alleged violations further. 
Finally, the Private Finance Initiative (Clark 1996a, 
CS87) which aims to attract private capital to public works 
and services has been streamlined through the Treasury which 
provided both a 'carrot' (relaxation of rules relating to 
free-standing projects and the provision of services to the 
public sector) and a 'stick' (the refusal to authorise 
expenditure for projects which have not been PFI-tested) to 
6A recent case (Arrowsmith 1996) in the Queen's Bench Division, where 
Portsmouth City Council has been found to have failed to advertise a 
contract whose initial value did not exceed the threshold, although 
both the value and the time length had subsequently been altered 
in a 
substantial manner and the subsequent use of proceedings in the Court 
of Appeal (Kunzlik 1997) by some of the aggrieved tenderers are not 
considered as sufficient evidence of a change in that respect. 
294 
public bodies. The issue of the right of public authorities 
to use the competitive negotiated procedure7 has been 
settled (Clark 1997, CS28) by Treasury guidance which i) 
stipulated that the onus for the proof of the need to use it 
rests with the relevant public authority and ii) suggested 
ways to go about it. 
Implementation in cases of utilities is complicated by 
private ownership. The Treasury comes into the process in 
cases where the suppliers - to whom utilities have an 
obligation to implement the statutory instruments - raise 
issues of incorrect implementation. However, private 
ownership means that some of these companies are more likely 
to use competitive procedures anyway in order to minimise 
costs and that constitutes the basis of their objections - 
for being subjected to supranational regulation just like 
public utilities - that they expressed successfully during 
the preparation of the directives (Cox and Sanderson 1994). 
The pivotal role of the Treasury in the implementation 
process does not prevent the emergence of cases of conflict. 
Currently there is a number of cases regarding the 
implementation of EC public procurement policy in the UK 
(Single Market News 1997a) including violations of Directive 
92/50 the most important of which is the one involving the 
Audit Commission which is alleged to have not advertised 
contracts with external auditors appointed in 1992 and 1993 
7This is an important issue in the sense that public authorities need 
a margin for negotiation in order to maximise the contribution of 
private funds. At the same time though, this needs to be managed in a 
way that does not constitute a violation of the directives which place 
emphasis on open procedures. 
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worth 14 and 18 million pounds respectively, that is way 
above the thresholds of the directives. 
8.1.2. FRANCE: NODALITY AND AUTHORITY IN COMPETITION 
The role of the Treasury in the UK is echoed by the 
role of the CCM in the process of administrative 
implementation in France. The action of this institution, 
whose economic section took the initiative to open the 
debate in France on the implementation of the basic 
principles of the Treaty of Rome in public procurement as 
early as 1960, takes a number of forms (Dillemann 1987). 
First, it constitutes an important contact point not only 
for individual tenderers but more importantly, for every 
part of the administration which deals with procurement. 
Using its experience from the negotiations at the European 
level and the rich background knowledge incorporated into a 
number of reports that its sections have produced, the CCM 
is an interministerial body which provides a sense of 
continuity in terms of the guidance given to other parts of 
the administration. 
Continuity is reflected through the definition of the 
concept of 'awarding authority' and its concrete application 
on a day-to-day basis8,, the choice of the correct award 
procedure, the concept of the concession contract which is 
becoming increasingly important in the light of the 
budgetary limitations in the run-up to the establishment of 
the single currency and also the necessary distinctions 
8This function is more important in the case of the so-called soci6t6s 
d'6conomie mixte (semi-private companies). 
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between services and works contracts. Furthermore, CCM 
officials provide answers to questions regarding the extent 
to which a company whose status has changed (from the public 
to the private sector) is covered by the directives, and 
other issues such as the definition of what constitutes a 
single works project and what can be considered as part of 
such a project. This function is especially important in 
cases where a principle has to be established. This is when 
recourse to the CCM is necessary 
in the eyes of a French official. 
The studies produced by the CCM (especially the 
previously autonomous prices' section) have enabled the 
administration to specify the content of the most frequently 
used award criterion, namely 'the most interesting offer', a 
typical characteristic of the Public Procurement Code which 
means that a number of elements has to be taken into account 
during the award procedure9. The initial vagueness of this 
criterion underlines the significance of the role of the CCM 
in the precise definition of its content on the basis of a 
number of elements including the price, the cost of use, the 
technical value and the time scale for the execution of the 
contract These criteria have subsequently been integrated 
into the Code (e. g. art. 97 bis, 299 ter). Clearly, 'the 
most interesting offer' is the French equivalent of 'the 
most advantageous offer'. 
9Nevertheless, the mythical dimension of the lowest price remains 
present (Gohon 1991,106). 
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The high profile that the CCM has developed over the 
years enables its officials to have direct access to the 
Minister of Economy and Finance and more importantly, to the 
members of his cabinet in order to resolve problems relating 
to day-to-day implementation. This channel works both ways. 
Indeed, the current effort to reform the Code in order to 
further enhance transparency and simplicity in the 
preparation and the execution of the contracts links 
directly CCM with the political sphere within the same 
ministry and in co-operation with trade and industry 
organisations (large construction companies, small and 
medium-sized suppliers etc. ). which are an important driving 
force behind this effort. 
The CCM maintains close institutionalised contacts with 
these organisations, primarily through its economic and 
technical sections. This, in turn, constitutes a 
fundamental part of this body's ethos. Indeed, extensive 
consultation procedures also concern the wider public 
administration. In the mid-1980s between 2000 and 3000 
members of the wider public sector and professional 
organisations (like civil engineers) were associated to the 
work of this body (Dillemann 1987,100). 
This contact is important because it enables the CCM to 
take account of many views in the administrative 
implementation of EC policy. This action includes the 
standardisation of documents used by the administration in 
award procedures, thus facilitating comparisons and the 
detection of irregularities, and more importantly the 
standardisation of norms and specifications which are 
necessary for the definition of works, supplies and services 
298 
and the award of the relevant contracts. The importance of 
this aspect of the implementation process is illustrated by 
the frequent complaints of French firms for the treatment of 
their offers in other European countries. Although the 
principle of mutual recognitionlO resolves the problem in 
legal terms, the question of the comparability of offers can 
only be resolved through the creation of comparable 
standards which will then constitute the basis for the 
assessment of these offers. 
The establishment of comparable norms is a function 
performed by the technical section of the CCM in 
collaboration with other parts of the administration and 
covers whole groups of functions and supplies. This 
function underlines the importance of the role performed by 
horizontal bodies like CCM which are in a position to 
develop solutions to problems faced by other parts of the 
implementation structure. Finally, the CCM also performs 
the role of an educator not only by preparing guides for the 
attention of the awarding authorities relating to each phase 
of the award procedure, but also by organising training 
schemes (through -the Cellule fo=ation, that is training 
office, of its secretariat) which are meant to diffuse 
expertise on various aspects of public purchasing including 
cost limitation, negotiation techniques. 
10Briefly, the principle of mutual recognition established by the ECJ 
(case 120/78) means that products which are legally produced and 
marketed in one member state (for example, in compliance with its 
rules regarding public health) must be able to circulate freely within 
the EC irrespective of differences regarding national regulations. 
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This need is limited in the case of utilities which - 
despite a traditional disorder (Delvolv6 1970) that 
characterised the regulation of their purchasing activity - 
are more used to various commercial techniques aiming at the 
limitation of costs through the use of competitive 
procedures although they traditionally have a wider margin 
for manoeuvre when choosing an award procedure. The 
question of implementation here is of great importance 
because normally they are not covered by the Code (Valadou 
1992,376) . However,, the control that the state exercises 
over them, restricts their freedom to choose the award 
procedure, as a result of the extension of the EC policy's 
scope through the use of the functional criterion (supra, 
Chapter 7). It is an established view of the CCM that they 
also come under the provisions of the Code when they act as 
purchasing agents for other authorities. Furthermore, it is 
an established principle of public purchasing in France that 
the officer responsible for the award must at any time be 
able to prove that each choice rests on objective criteria 
and considerations. 
The limits of the role of CCM are also illustrated 
through the formal and informal means employed by tenderers 
and trade organisations during the implementation process. 
The very notion of precontentieux, that is pre-judicial 
review (Gaudemet 1994) is very familiar to French lawyers 
and it constitutes an important instrument for the 
preservation of a free market, through the use of three 
methods namely administrative review, conciliation and 
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transactionll. Its existence has not limited the 
development of important case law that the CCM follows 
closely. 
The increasing French case law on public procurement 
(Martin 1994a, 1994b, 1996) cannot hide a certain timidity 
of French companies in the implementation process. This 
timidity is reflected through their unwillingness to attack 
their clients in court (Br6chons-Moulenes 1990,164) by way 
of the traditional legal procedures, despite the 
reinforcement of other relevant institutional structures 
like the Competition Council, an independent administrative 
authority which has already dealt with procurement cases 
relating to collusion between tenderers (Bazex 1994,104). 
French civil servants underlined a correlation between the 
size of the company and its willingness to pursue a 
politique jurisprudentielle, that is a policy of judicial 
review. This means that significant market players are more 
able and willing than small and medium-sized companies to 
afford the high cost of litigation. The fact that the large 
companies are also those which use an active acquisition 
policy in order to obtain a part of the market in other 
member states further underlines the significance of this 
point. French officials have highlighted this development 
as a major characteristic of the implementation process in 
France. 
IlThe essence of these procedures is based on the fact that time and 
money is saved through the regulated review procedures linking the 
administration and the tenderers, without necessary recourse to 
traditional judicial review procedures. 
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Furthermore, one should not over-estimate the 
importance of the aforementioned timidity, mainly for three 
reasons. On the one hand, the formal implementation of the 
Remedies Directives has produced an important innovation in 
French law, the so-called r6fere precontractuel (Valadou 
1993,331) that is the recourse to rapid judicial review 
before the conclusion of a contract. More specifically this 
procedure enables the state and certain persons to bring 
before the courts an action relating to the breach of 
obligations for publicity and the competitive procedures, 
during selection or award procedures but in any case prior 
to the conclusion of a contract. The use of this procedure 
is becoming increasingly popular with companies (Cartron 
1997) although the CCM considers that the success rate is 
limited. Indeed 59% of the ref6r6s introduced between 1992 
and the beginning of 1997 have been rejected, half of them 
for substantive reasons (Republique Frangaise. Commission 
Centrale des March6s 1997). 
The legal concept of the so-called acte detachable 
(Fernandez Martin 1996,231-3) that is a detachable act, 
established by the French Conseil d'Iýtat means that instead 
of treating the administrative actions during the award 
procedure and the subsequent contract as a whole that cannot 
be divided into separate parts, the two are considered as 
separable. Hence any interested party may attack in court 
as unlawful the validity of the acts preceding the 
conclusion of the contract, including the decision to award 
it thereby extending their mechanisms for protection without 
necessarily affecting the contract and legal certaInty. 
Thus, an awarding authority may have to pay compensation for 
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unlawful award of a contract although the latter may still 
remain valid, thereby preserving the rights of the company 
that won it. 
The fact that informal and formal measures for the 
protection of the interests of companies complement rather 
than exclude each other is illustrated by a case brought to 
the Conseil d'Eýtat (Maljean-Dubois 1997) by two trade 
organisations, namely the Fed6ration nationale des travaux 
publics (National Federation f or Public Works) and the 
Federation nationale du b&timent (National Federation of 
Building Constructors) in 1994. The case concerned an 
interministerial circular of December 1993 which attempted 
to implement a decision reached by the Comit6 
interministeriel pour la ville (Interministerial Committee 
for Urban Affairs) in July 1994. The objective was the 
insertion to contract notices of a clause relating to the 
local impact of the execution of public works upon 
unemployment and the development of professional skills. 
Although it is not clear from the text of the circular 
whether this would become an additional award criterion, in 
direct conflict with the very philosophy of EC policy, 
especially in the light of the fact that the same text made 
direct reference to EC obligations and the need to avoid the 
use of these elements for the choice of inappropriate 
tendersl2, the two organisations contacted informally the 
Minister of Economy and Finance. It was only when they 
considered the lack of a response as an illustration that 
12These aspects clearly diluted any substantial potential impact of 
the circular. 
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their view has been rejected, that they took the case to the 
Conseil d'Etat demanding the annulment of the said texts. 
Although their demand has been rejected because the 
I Conseil dI Etat considered that the circular was devoid of 
any regulatory effect as it constituted a simple declaration 
of intentions, this example is important because it shows 
the complementary nature of legal and informal/political 
means of implementation and the willingness of the market 
players to use both of them. Furthermore, the fact that the 
conservative French government has followed-up these 
developments with a much more strong-worded circular even 
before the election of a socialist government in a French 
context of high unemployment means that the issue is far 
from over. 
Finally, the European Commission is another instrument 
that is being used in France in a rather extensive manner in 
conjunction with purely domestic mechanisms including the 
CCM. Currently the European Commission is pursuing a number 
of cases involving France (Single Market News 1995b, 1996c). 
The one with the highest profile concerns the construction 
of the Grand Stade de France in the Parisian suburb of 
Saint-Denis. The case has already gone through the first 
two stages of art. 169 procedure. Moreover, in a decision 
issued in July 1996 the Administrative Tribunal of Paris has 
annulled the decision of the Prime Minister to award the 
contract. The European Commission challenges the French 
government which holds the view that this is a concession 
contract. On the contrary, European Commission officials 
believe that although the objective of the awarding 
authority was indeed a concession contract containing the 
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essential requirements for the exploitation of the stadium, 
it is a works contract that has been actually concluded13 
because both the final offer that has been chosen and the 
contract that has been signed have effectively led to the 
disappearance of the risk for the winning tenderer. 
The Commission also holds the view that the principle 
of equal treatment has been violated because the winning 
tenderer has been allowed to modify substantially its offer 
during the consultation procedure. It also accuses France 
of breaching art. 59 of the Treaty and Directives 92/50 
(services) and 93/37 (works) by allocating additional 
important works projects to the winning tenderer without any 
competitive procedure and also by reserving a part of the 
related services and works contracts for local companies. 
The officials of CCM argue that the whole issue emanates 
from the unclear definition of concession contracts which 
has been included into the directives and that the 
appropriate procedures have been followed. Given that the 
stadium is very close to its completion, it is clear that if 
the Commission is proven to be right in its allegations, the 
final decision can involve only a financial element. 
13Essentially, the difference between the two types of contract is 
based on the fact that the cost of concessions contracts is taken up 
either exclusively or partially by the constructor who then exploits 
the work commercially. Clearly, unlike the former, the latter is best 
suited by a negotiated procedure. Nevertheless, given that it 
necessarily entails a limitation of competition, the use of this 
procedure is allowed only in very limited cases specified by the 
directives. 
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GREECE: AUTHORITY AND TREASURE IN PRACTICE 
Administrative implementation in Greece presents rather 
different characteristics. One must distinguish between i) 
supplies ii) works and iii) services contracts. Supplies 
contracts were the first point of tension between the Greek 
administration and the European Commission. The policy of 
'Hellenisation' meant the use by the administration of a 
number of discriminatory clauses in domestic law, which 
enabled it to protect the domestic market from European 
imports. This policy used by the socialist government 
between 1982 and 1985 simply reproduced a pattern which was 
well entrenched in domestic economic affairs since the 
1950s. The deliberate nature of the policy of Hellenisation 
is illustrated not only by the transfer of the 
responsibility for this policy area from the Ministry of 
Trade to the Ministry of National Economy but also the 
appointment of an economist and advocate of Keynesian 
policies (Lazaris) as Minister of Co-ordination in the first 
socialist government. 
The transitional period stipulated in the Treaty of 
Accession has been used for prolonging the protection of the 
domestic producers instead of the gradual implementation of 
the EC's policy. This effort was backed by a campaign 
aiming to convince domestic consumers to 'buy Greek'. This 
period is also characterised by the use of a political 
approach employed by the European Commission. The fact that 
the transitional period had a solid legal basis (Treaty of 
Accession) meant that there was not much the Commission 
could do until 1985. It initiated the infringement 
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procedure of art. 169 of the Treaty as a token sign of 
vigilance (case C-84/86) but even in that case it did not 
take the Greek government to the ECJ. On the contrary, it 
used this procedure in order to exert pressure on the Greek 
administration during the implementation process. This 
approach had three important repercussions which also 
concern the other parts of procurement policy. 
First,, it led to the slow and gradual shift to 
effective implementation of EC policy. This shift has been 
facilitated by the continuous contact with Community reality 
and the change in the attitude of the socialist government 
vis-a-vis the integration process as illustrated by the 
appointment of pro-European politicians (like Pangalos, 
Vasso Papandreou and Simitis) to key ministerial posts, 
including the Ministry of National Economy. Secondly, the 
increasing contacts with the European Commission have led to 
the creation of an impression of this institution as a 
scapegoat. Indeed, the European Commission was seen by 
Greek civil servants as a useful mechanism for blame 
avoidance whenever they were faced with pressure or protests 
from domestic suppliers. Thirdly, the increasing number of 
infringement procedures initiated on the basis of art. 169 
(Commission of the European Communities 1990,45) gave a 
semi-institutionalised form to the contacts with the 
European Commission. The so-called reunions-paquets (supra, 
Chapter 2) which bring together European and Greek officials 
twice a year produced significant results in various forms. 
Some infringements are being corrected, Commission officials 
are informed of recent changes in legislation and case law 
while they also highlight outstanding complaints which have 
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been brought to their attention by tenderers. These 
informal procedures have not eliminated every problem as 
case C-79/94 illustrates. 
This case concerned a three-year framework agreement 
concluded in July 1991 by the Ministry of Industry, Energy 
and Technology and six textile manufacturers for the supply 
of dressing materials for hospitals. The agreement could be 
extended in the future in order to cover the needs of other 
institutions for these materials, exclusively supplied by 
the six manufacturers. In the dialogue that followed 
between the Greek administration and the European 
Commission, the former i) admitted that it had not 
advertised the contract but argued that ii) canceling the 
contract unilaterally would expose the Greek state to claims 
for damages from the manufacturers. iii) The ministry in 
question had already abolished a clause stipulating that the 
manufacturers were to use only domestic primary products. 
iv) It also stated its intention to organise a competition 
before the end of 1993 thus fulfilling EC obligations. 
Concrete action did not follow, so the case reached the ECJ 
where a condemnation was inevitable because the mere promise 
to fulfil EC obligations in the future was clearly 
insufficient, despite the attempt of the Greek government i) 
to demonstrate that Directive 77/62 was not applicable 
because the value of each contract did not exceed the 
threshold and ii) to use of the argument that in the past no 
foreign tenders have been submitted in similar competitions 
thus reducing the notice to a mere formality. 
The field of public works is characterised by an 
extensive political and administrative activity followed by 
308 
formal measures. Indeed, the first characteristic of the 
implementation process here is the very extensive use (until 
the beginning of the 1990s) of the criterion of the lowest 
price for the award of contracts. This meant practically 
that the emphasis had been placed on ways which would enable 
the constructors to limit the cost in the construction 
process. This in turn, had direct repercussions on the 
quality of the works many of which had structural problems, 
while the quality of the materials used was very poor 
(Chaikalis 1996c, 1997a). Nevertheless, the artificially 
low prices (Kosmidis 1997 ) did not mean that the 
constructors were unable to make a profit. On the contrary, 
they used their legal right (Koutoupa 1995, CS98) to claim 
the difference between the initial offer and the final cost 
of the work after its completion, thus falsifying the 
competition game on a post hoc basis. 
This problem was directly linked to that of incomplete 
or insufficient plans upon which these works were based. 
The problem stemmed from the fact that the administration 
was not in a position to assess the quality of the proposed 
plans,, mainly because of the lack of specialised staff. 
Furthermore, the system of control of public works was 
deficient because it was based on post hoc examinations thus 
presenting the administration with a fait accompli every 
time there was a problem. Moreover, the fact that many 
awarding authorities 
were unaware of a visible and reliable source of 
information 
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was a major problem even when their officials actively 
sought to use the right selection and award procedures, as 
an official of the Ministry of the Environment, Spatial 
Planning and Public Works has put it. The European 
Commission and a group of determined ministers were the 
catalysts that commenced the process of change. 
The involvement of the European Commission is based on 
the fact that most of these public works are co-financed by 
the Greek state and the EC through the Structural Funds. 
The conditional nature of the provision of European funding 
(supra,, Chapter 7) gave a de facto role to the European 
Commission. Although the EC's public procurement policy 
does not cover the execution of public contracts, the role 
of the European Commission was mainly informal and based on 
this phase. It constituted an important source of pressure 
in favour of the establishment of the Community Support 
Framework Management Unit (Stamboglis 1996). Moreover, 
constant threats emanating from the Head of DG XVI 
(Chaikalis 1996a) and Commissioner Millan, who was 
responsible for this area, that the flow of funding would 
stop14 if the necessary measures were not taken helped 
create the necessary political impetus at the national 
level. 
The first sign of the new political impetus for a 
radical solution was the formal letter of three ministers of 
the new socialist government after the general election of 
1993 to the European Commission. This letter embodied a 
14This has actually happened in 1993 in the case of the Evinos' dam 
(Charalambidou 1997c) due to the incorrect award procedure followed by 
the conservative government. 
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clear political undertaking for the adoption of all the 
necessary measures, legislative, administrative or other 
which were to be channeled through the Ministry of the 
Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works, under the 
supervision of the Joint Steering Committee composed of 
officials of the said ministry, the Ministry of National 
Economy and the European Commission. The most significant 
legislative measure was the limitation of the right of 
constructors to re-assess the cost of a works project on a 
post hoc basis. The total cannot exceed a 10% (instead of 
50%) supplement to the initial assessment. This measure has 
obliged constructors to submit realistic offers while 
enabling them to re-assess the total cost within a 
reasonable margin. Moreover, the result of the re- 
assessment is not automatically accepted by the 
administration but is subject to its own evaluation. The 
procedures for the preparation and submission of plans have 
been codified and simplified while a register of public 
works designers (including those who are responsible for the 
evaluation of the environmental impact of public works) will 
be established in the Ministry of the Environment, Spatial 
Planning and Public Works. 
The focus of the mechanism for control shifted to 
control during rather than after the works. The mechanisms 
for control of the co-financed works have been extended to 
include private companies which are hired through 
competitive procedures. The competitive procedures for the 
award of contracts have been extended to below the threshold 
of the directives and a contract has been signed with a 
prestigious academic research centre (Centre for 
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International and European Economic Law, University of 
Thessaloniki) which now can provide legal advice to any 
public body that is covered by the directives, 
despite opposition from the Ministry of the Environment, 
Spatial Planning and Public Works resulting from its 
power game with the Ministry of National Economy 
as an official of the latter has put it. New administrative 
units have been established within the Ministry of the 
Environment, Spatial Planning and Public Works (supra, 
Chapter 7) in order to monitor the implementation process. 
Fines have also been imposed on companies which do not 
fulfil their contractual obligations (Chaikalis 1997a) while 
a number of award procedures have already been suspended 
because incorrect procedures have been followed (Chaikalis 
1996c). Model notices have been established in order to 
oblige awarding authorities to use comparable documents 
before the award procedures. Major public works are now 
covered by insurance schemes adopted by the constructors and 
this is mirrored by the expansion of this part of the 
insurance market (Chaikalis 1996b). Specialised staff has 
been recruited in order to enhance existing organisational 
structures, especially at the regional level, while 
maintaining direct links with the central administration. 
major effort to codify the dispersed existing legislation is 
already under way. 
Nevertheless, a number of cases involving Greece are 
being examined by the European Commission while others have 
been resolved (Single Market News 1995a). Most notable of 
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the unresolved cases is the one concerning Thessaloniki, s 
underground. The conservative government's decision in the 
beginning of the 1990s to build an underground in the second 
largest Greek city has led to an international competition 
where two international consortia have prevailed as the 
major competitors for this large concession contract (worth 
around E300 million). The negotiations with the first 
consortium (led by a Greek constructor) reached an impasse 
in November 1996 because junior partners of the consortium 
went into liquidation. This meant that the first consortium 
was no longer a credible tenderer thus leading the socialist 
government to commence negotiations with the second 
consortium (led by the French company Bouygues). 
In response to this action, the first consortium 
informed the European Commission whose officials found out 
that a number of problems existed in the award procedure (To 
Vima 1997g) including i) the shift from a concession 
contract to a works contract and ii) the submission by 
Bouygues of an offer which did not correspond to the 
specifications included in the advertised notice. Thus DG 
XV has threatened to withdraw the assent regarding EC 
funding. Yet, this is only the tip of the iceberg. The 
explanation of the problem seems to be linked (Marinos 1997) 
to a new decision of the government to scrap the whole 
project in favour of a tram network. In other words, the 
European Commission is being used as a scapegoat by 
'transferring' to it the blame for the decision not to fund 
the project which therefore cannot go ahead. 
Furthermore, a lot seems to depend on the 
professionalism and the personal sensitivities of purchasing 
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officers within awarding entities. We were actually 
interviewing a senior official of the Ministry of National 
Economy when a purchasing officer from an awarding authority 
interrupted the interview in order to ask about the award 
procedure that he had to follow in relation to a specific 
contract. He had to have recourse to this ministry - which 
did not have the responsibility for this aspect of public 
procurement - as he was unable to find someone who could 
answer his query in the other ministries that he contacted. 
In services contracts and until the adoption of the 
relevant legislative measures, the implementation process 
relies on i) the willingness of interested parties to use 
the concept of direct effect in order to oblige the 
administration to use the proper award procedures, ii) the 
possible action of the European Commission under the revised 
art. 171 of the Treaty for non-implementation of a judgment 
of the ECJ and iii) the professionalism and personal 
sensitivities of purchasing officers. Although the use of 
the second instrument is likely to lead to the imposition of 
a heavy fine on Greece, thus constituting a rather 
significant incentive for implementation, the first 
possibility does not seem to be very likely, if the previous 
attitude of suppliers is anything to go by (Spathopoulos 
1990,126) despite the fact that the State Council has used 
the theory of detachable act (Spathopoulos 1990,121; 
Koutoupa-Rengakos 1993,395). 
Finally, Greek utilities have already started 
implementing the relevant directives despite the lack of 
formal implementing measures. This is mainly due to the 
fact that public ownership means that they fall in the remit 
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of the national legislative measures implementing the much 
more stringent directives relating to the public sector and 
also the professionalism of key officials (mainly lawyers) 
within these companies who are vigilant and follow the 
development of EC legislation in this field. Their attempts 
to enhance competition take the form of the choice of the 
most competitive available procedure during which 
we try not to exclude anyone 
as one of them has put it. Complaints of tenderers are more 
frequently addressed to the Ministry of Development rather 
than the utilities themselves. Therefore, the political 
level seems to act as some sort of review mechanism. 
8.2. SOME POLICY OUTCOMES: A RATHER SHORT STORY 
The policy outcomes can be approached from two rather 
complementary perspectives, i) the view of the potential and 
actual tenderers and ii) the quantitative dimension. The 
last option can be easily excluded because of strong doubts 
as to the validity of the data that can be found in TED. 
Indeed,, quantitative analysis offers a number of interesting 
data sets, like the number of the advertised contracts, the 
type of contract (works, supplies, services) and procedure 
that has been followed, the type of the awarding entity, and 
also some opportunities for cross-category searches. 
However,, this method does not answer the questions regarding 
the impact of fragmented or integrated structures upon the 
implementation process. Moreover, it does not provide 
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answers relating to the other parts of the implementation 
structure, such as the European Commission, courts or even 
tenderers (actual and potential). 
The argument against this method can be taken a step 
further. The set of data found in TED15 is unreliable for 
this kind of study because, as the European Commission 
acknowledged (1996a, 7-11), some member states have not 
adopted national implementing measures, other problems 
relate to the quality and the content of the implementing 
measures, as a result of which certain contracting 
authorities have endeavoured to evade the implementation of 
the directives. Clearly, there are contracts which are not 
advertised. Why and how this actually happens and the role 
of the various parts of the implementation structure, 
especially after f ormal implementation, is what this study 
set out to analyse and this objective cannot be achieved 
through this method. On the contrary, the brief analysis of 
the view of the market players offers some interesting 
f indings. 
A recent survey of opinion conducted in 1995 for the 
European Commission as to the perceived impact on public 
procurement of the drive towards the single market showed 
(Single Market News 1996a) that most respondents (71%) in 
the industrial sector found that there was no impact while 
only 9% had found a positive impact. These figures, which 
concern the whole of the EC, were echoed by the responses in 
the services sector (73% and 9% respectively). These 
results reflect the same pessimism that leads companies to 
15Furthermore, data were available on-line only for 1993,1994,1995 
and 1996. 
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avoid legal challenges and makes them prefer mergers and 
acquisitions rather than the submission of tenders. 
The increased business opportunities that the EC's 
policy in this field has created in the three countries is 
illustrated by the responses to a survey (European 
Commission. Directorate General XV 1996,215) where more 
than 60% of all respondents acknowledged that the 
information provided by TED and the OJEC was adequate for 
their business purposes. The sevenfold increase in the 
number of tender notices advertised in Greece between 1987 
and 1995 (European Commission. Directorate General XV 1996f 
125) reflect the pressures for more transparent procedures 
embodied in the EC's policy although it is difficult to draw 
a direct causal link between the two events. France and the 
UK presented predictable (due to the quality of 
implementation) increas es ofabout300%and400 
respectively. Indeed the overall picture of implementation 
of comparable quality in the UK and France is illustrated by 
similar trends in all of the aforementioned categories of 
data. 
The overall picture reflects not only the growing 
opportunities created for firms as a result of the 
implementation of the EC's public procurement policy in 
these three countries, but also the dynamic nature of the 
implementation process. The fact that some national 
implementing measures have just been adopted while others 
are being prepared during 1997 means that this is a trend 
that should continue to appear in the foreseeable future. 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that although 
according to the aforementioned survey procurement 
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expenditure as part of each country's GDP has fallen between 
1987 and 1994 by about 1% in France, 2% in the UK and 50% in 
Greece, more notices are being published (European 
Commission. Directorate General xv 1996,19). That is 
evidence of the market's increasing transparency (which is a 
fundamental objective of the EC's policy in this field). 
Thus decreasing expenditure does not seem to affect business 
opportunities. Let us now turn to the discussion of the 
wider implementation patterns. 
8.3. IMPLEMENTATION PATTERNS: EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENTIATED 
USE OF THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT 
In the light of the fact that we have set out to 
examine the use of the tools of government for the 
improvement of national implementation profiles, we shall 
endeavour to depict and explain the implementation patterns 
by answering the following questions: i) What are the tools 
used for the implementation of this policy by these member 
states and why? ii) Have there been changes over time, and 
if so, how can we interpret them? iii) Does the 
implementation process in these member states reveal links 
to fundamental characteristics of their respective systems 
of policy formulation? In short, does fragmentation matter? 
A distinction can be made between effective (UK and 
France) and problematic (Greece) implementationl6. This is 
16Effective implementation is construed as a rather orderly follow-up 
from formulation in a way which produces outcomes which are close to 
the desired objectives. In problematic implementation disruptions 
occur, thus disorientating the process from the desired outcomes. 
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. reflected through 
the use of different tools. In the first 
case, smoothness characterises both the formal and the 
administrative stages of implementation. The use of 
authority for the adoption of the implementing measures was 
generally prompt while their form and content came to 
reflect both the spirit of EC policy (expansion of the 
agenda) and the wider developments in the European policy 
process (case law of the ECJ). National case law is very 
limited in the UK but rather significant in France, although 
in the latter case the initial impact of the new procedures 
is rather limited. Thus one can argue that the French and 
British case law reflects fundamental attitudes (business 
ethos) of the market players rather than failure of the 
respective administrations. Moreover, the ECJ has not yet 
issued any condemning judgments for substantive reasons 
(that is in relation to administrative implementation) 
against the UK or France in this policy area. This is 
something that officials of the Treasury and CCM were eager 
to underline, in a manner that illustrates that they 
consider it as a part of the stake involved in their daily 
functions. 
At the institutional level it is clear that the UK and 
France present a high degree of similarity in the philosophy 
which underpins the organisation of the services dealing 
with EC procurement policy given that overall responsibility 
has been attributed to high profile departments in the 
central administration. Consequently, the use of 
organisation has been limited to the absolute minimum. The 
same departments also deal with economic policy thus 
reflecting a view of procurement policy as a spending 
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activity. This, in turnf constitutes an important sign of 
compatibility with the neo-liberal philosophy of EC public 
procurement policy which places special emphasis on savings 
through the reinforcement of competition resulting from the 
liberalisation of the market. The influence of this 
approach on the implementation process is illustrated 
through the extensive use of the 'most advantageous offer, 
as the basic award criterion in both countries. 
The integrated nature of the relevant institutional 
structures automatically puts them in a pivotal position 
where they are able to answer the queries emanating from the 
wider public sector during the implementation process. The 
significance of this function is reinforced by the kind of 
questions that they receive. They concern the 
interpretation of fundamental concepts, the definition of 
rights and obligations and the compatibility of domestic 
actions with EC policy. In other words, they perform the 
role of the domestic interpreter of the European policy that 
they have helped shape. 
They also constitute the privileged partners of the 
European Commission both in terms of standardised procedures 
(e. g. the collection of statistics) and more importantly for 
the consultation which is necessary in cases of tensions 
between a tenderer and an awarding authority. This function 
is mirrored by their role as 'advisers' to tenderers who 
sometimes are not prepared to go as far as contacting the 
European Commission. 
The fact that their competence for the whole of this 
policy area is a traditional aspect of their domestic 
prerogatives has two important implications. a) Their 
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status within the administration is unchallenged by other 
participants, thus enabling them to avoid costly tensions 
during the implementation process, through the limitation of 
the number and the power attached to the decision points. 
This aspect is reinforced in the case of CCM by its 
interministerial nature which enables it to synthesise 
various views through its specialised sections. b) Their 
knowledge of the evolution of this policy encompasses 
domestic developments which are filtered through the 
European aspects of the policy area. This means that up to 
a large extent, these units act as domestic gatekeepers of 
EC policy. This constitutes a significant illustration of 
the principle of institutional autonomy which largely 
characterises the implementation process in the UK and 
France. 
The quality of implementation in the UK and France is 
also the result of the significant use of nodality. This is 
reflected through the role of the Treasury and the CCM and 
is the direct result of their traditional role in this 
policy area. Nodality here takes the form of a number of 
actions that facilitate implementation, the most important 
of which is the constant translation of EC policy into 
practice, not only in terms of formal implementationf but 
more importantly in terms of its continuous interpretation 
produced at the request of the wider public sector (target 
group). In other words, nodality concerns not only the role 
of these two bodies as effectors but also as detectors. It 
is reinforced by authority resulting from the fact that 
responsibility for this policy area is a traditional 
prerogative of these bodies. Put simply, there is no 
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challenge to their authority. Therefore, institutional 
stability over time leads to the constant use of nodality 
which in turn reinforces authority. 
On the contrary, the problematic nature of the 
implementation process in Greece is illustrated through i) 
the belated adoption of national implementing measures 
(despite the existence of transitional periods), ii) their 
occasionally unsatisfactory content or even iii) the total 
lack thereof and iv) the incorrect use of fundamental 
concepts such as 'the lowest price' and 'framework 
agreement'. Nevertheless, some of these problems are being 
resolved through a variety of mechanisms which are 
characterised by the extensive use of treasure and 
organisation. The use of treasure emanates from the 
participation of the European Commission in the 
implementation process as an institution which manages EC 
funds. That constitutes its power base which also 
legitimises i) the functional spill-overs from the execution 
of the contracts (which is not covered by the EC's policy) 
to their allocation and ii) the substantial violations of 
the principle of institutional autonomy. 
Fragmentation in institutional terms is a major source 
of the implementation problems in the case of Greece. The 
fragmentation of administrative responsibility for this 
policy area is evident in a number of ways. a) The constant 
transfer of responsibility from one ministry to another has 
not enabled the administration to develop the kind of 
coherent memory that is necessary for successful 
implementation. The case of a senior legal adviser in the 
Greek Ministry of Trade who was unaware of the fact that the 
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first directives on the liberalisation of supplies (70/32 
and 77/62) dated from the 1970s rather than 1988 illustrates 
that the absence of a minimum of administrative memory 
undermines the ability of the administration to implement 
effectively. Thus the official in question advised the 
awarding entities on the basis of her experience which was 
limited to the 1990s. 
b) Even when stability exists, like the present 
conjuncture, responsibility for public procurement policy is 
fragmented and allocated to three different ministerial 
departments. This enables the development of sectoral 
logics rather than a global coherent approach, even when 
successful attempts are being made to resolve problems 
within each sector. The effects of this polyarchy are self- 
reproducing because they deter the Greek administration from 
developing the spirit of co-operation which is necessary for 
effective implementation. 
The need to handle this functional pressure leads to 
organisational changes at the intra-ministerial level which 
is matched by the recruitment of new staff in the quest for 
efficacy. Success, in turn, has a fundamental repercussion, 
namely the reinforcement of the authority of the body in 
question (Ministry of the Environment, Spatial Planning and 
Public Works) in the wider domestic context where public 
procurement policy is dealt with. This is illustrated by 
its ability to block the formal implementation process in 
the field of services. Finally, political authority has 
been used quite extensively immediately after the Greek 
accession in order to implement the protectionist policies 
of the first socialist government. 
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Have these 'mixes' evolved over time or not? One must 
answer the question in the affirmative for the UK and 
France, and in the negative for Greece. Institutional 
stability and continuity in terms of the content of domestic 
policy are the key factors that explain the existence of the 
same mix in the UK and France. Precisely because these 
countries (mainly France) did not have to change radically 
their domestic policy which was dealt with by a clearly 
identifiable and well established power centre within each 
national administration, the mix has basically remained 
unaltered. The situation in the UK is slightly different 
from the French case only in terms of the limited problems 
that existed during the last part of the 1970s when 
discriminatory measures had been implemented. However, one 
should not over-estimate the importance of this point 
because a) it was limited in time, b) had been resolved 
right after the adoption of Directive 77/62 and c) it is 
only a matter of degree because it highlights the 
significance of authority which emanated from the newly 
elected Conservative government. 
On the contrary, the case of Greece is characterised by 
the initial predominance of domestic political authority 
highlighted by the deliberate implementation of 
discriminatory measures during the best part of the 1980s. 
This has been matched by fragmentation in terms of 
responsibility at the administrative level. The limited 
institutional change during this period has been succeeded 
by the significant changes (within the same fragmented 
framework) which resulted from the participation of an 
active fixer, namely, the European Commission. The radical 
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change in policy terms has been implemented mainly through 
the use of formal politico-administrative authority (cases 
brought to the ECJ and 'hands-on' approach of ministers) and 
the extensive use of treasure both as a penalty and as an 
incentive. 
Indeed, while the Commission has stopped the flow of 
funding in some cases (penalty), the administration could 
also perceive this flow as an incentive for change through 
the use of award procedures which are compatible not only 
with the letter but also the spirit of the policy. This has 
been a major factor that changed the quality of the 
implementation process albeit in a way that has been 
channeled through the political sphere (involvement of 
ministers in conjunction with the Commission) . Th -L Is 
underlines the salience of the concept of stake. In both of 
the aforementioned uses of treasure, the stakes for the 
Greek politico-administrative structures were high as the 
flow of funding constituted the basis for the assessment of 
the effectiveness of ministers and the ability of the 
administration to handle intensive complex and demanding 
projects which by nature require co-ordination. This 
characteristic of the implementation process in Greece also 
reveals a significant element regarding the role of the 
European Commission. 
Asymmetry characterises the role of this body in the 
three domestic contexts. This characteristic concerns not 
only the intensity of the role of the Commission, but also 
the content of its activity, that is the tools that it has 
used. On the one hand, it is much more intensive in the 
Greek context which is characterised by weak administrative 
a 
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structures and fragmented responsibility. The role of the 
Commission seems to fill the gaps of Political authority 
through the use of functional spill-overs from one policy to 
another and from regulated to un-regulated stages of the 
European policy process. It is precisely the use of 
managerial authority that legitimises not only these spill- 
overs but also the intensity of its action in the 
implementation stage, where treasure is used extensively. 
This intensity constitutes a sign of the priority attached 
to the concept of efficacy in the implementation process. 
On the other hand, the role of the European Commission 
in implementation in the UK and France differs markedly, 
given the extensive use of formal authority. Not only is it 
less intensive but it is also characterised by the constant 
endeavour to safeguard legality either by providing advice 
to the relevant administrations or, more importantly, by 
taking formal legal action in the ECJ. The integrated 
nature of the politico-administrative structures in these 
countries simply seems to leave no functional gaps that the 
Commission could fill although it is in these cases that the 
info=al channels for the administrative solution of 
problems are most frequently used. 
Finally, the ECJ is another fixer which participates in 
the implementation process albeit in a subsidiary and 
secondary manner. This role is illustrated not only in 
relation to the choice of national implementing measures or 
the lack thereof but also on a post hoc basis in cases of 
conflict between national authorities and the Commission. 
Indeed, this is the most prominent characteristic of the 
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role of the ECJ which reflects its dependent position in the 
EC's implementation structure. 
Can one then take this argument a step further by 
arguing that the characteristics of the implementation 
process in these three member states reflect fundamental 
elements of their politico-administrative structures? This 
cniestion must be answered in the affirmative for a number of : L- 
reasons. First, the UK and France have instituted strong 
co-ordinating mechanisms at the formulation stage which have 
led to the creation of an ethos of collaboration and sharing 
of information and experience. Even when problems exist, 
these mechanisms are capable of finding solutions which may 
not please every sector of the administration, but are bound 
to be followed by them. This in turn leads to a sense of 
respect for the prerogatives of other ministerial 
departments and the certainty that even at the last minute, 
co-ordinated solutions can be found. This is reflected upon 
the behaviour of the administration in the implementation 
stage where officials follow the line of authority which is 
clearly visible and deal with translation of policy into 
practice rather than interministerial disputes. This is 
certainly facilitated by the existing division of 
responsibility and the visibility of the main actors. 
On the contrary, implementation in Greece is much more 
untidy in a way that reflects fragmentation which is based 
on temporary solutions without clear long term objectives 
and the personalised nature of the function of co-ordination 
within a context which is underpinned by shortages of 
specialised staff. These weaknesses are highlighted by the 
fundamental change in policy terms that Greece had to 
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implement (shift from protectionist practices to free 
competition). The lack of a problem-solving mechanism which 
would enable the administration to define clear lines of 
authority and policy direction leads to the development of 
sub-sectoral or even personal logics thereby promoting 
fragmentation rather than integration and efficacy. 
Precisely because of the lack of mechanisms like the 
European Secretariat and the SGCI where disputes or other 
problems can be forwarded, gaps in terms of authority are 
inevitably created. These gaps highlight the significant 
role of fixers, mainly the European Commission or other 
fixers like ministers and companies. It is now time to look 
at the general conclusions that one can draw from this 
dissertation. 
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Chapter 9 
CONCLUSIONS: CONCEPTUALISING IMPLEMENTATION IN THE EC 
9.1. WHY FRAGMENTATION MATTERS 
In this dissertation we have sought to explore the ways 
in which national governments can ameliorate their 
implementation profile. Firstly, we have defined a macro- 
implementation level of analysis that includes not only the 
formal implementation of EC policy, that is the 
incorporation of EC legislation into the national legal 
orders, but also a number of measures that national 
governments can take in order to steer the wider 
implementation process (Chapter 1). Secondly, we have 
identified the basic characteristics of the EC as an 
implementation structure, that is its nature as a loosely 
coupled system of government where the national governments 
have an important role as the main implementing agencies, 
along with the identification of the regulatory limits of 
this role and the action that the European Commission and 
the ECJ can play in the same process. 
Thirdly , we have identified the fundamental 
characteristics of the British, French and Greek politico- 
administrative structures which deal with EC policy 
(Chapters 3-5). On the basis of this analysis we have 
linked theoretically the fragmented or integrated nature of 
the national politico-administrative structures with the 
wider implementation process (Chapter 6). Fourthly, we went 
on to examine these insights on the basis of a case study 
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which concerned the implementation of the EC's public 
procurement policy (Chapters 7-8). Here the objective is 
threefold. First, we shall attempt to draw conclusions on 
the basis of the case study (Section 9-1). Then we shall 
explore the concept of European implementation style in 
order to link systematically the comparative findings with 
the characteristics of the EC (Section 9.2). Finally, we 
will endeavour to draw wider conclusions regarding the 
process of European integration (Section 9.3). 
In Chapter 6 we have identified seven reasons why 
fragmentation may affect the implementation process. The 
analysis that followed in Chapters 7 and 8 confirmed this 
link. First, we argued that fragmentation affects the 
predictability of behaviour of the actors and therefore, the 
stability of the process. Indeed, the adoption of two 
contradictory laws within the space of a few months in 1979, 
when the accession of Greece was imminent, illustrates that 
the same actors may adopt incoherent or even contradictory 
courses of action in a manner that undermines the ability of 
other participants to act in a coherent manner when they are 
parts of a fragmented framework. What was a purchasing 
officer of a Greek awarding entity supposed to do in this 
case? Was he expected to implement the Treaty of Accession 
- stipulating that suppliers from the EC would have to be 
treated equally - or the law that followed it which 
included 
discriminatory clauses? Clearly, too much would depend on 
his intellect and his personal views. In other words, we 
argue here that fragmentation affects implementation by 
obscuring or even destroying the clear line that must exist 
in the process of 'forging links in a causal chain'. The 
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validity of this point is further underlined by the lack of 
administrative and political co-ordinating mechanisms which 
would resolve the problem directly or indirectly. 
Second, we have argued that fragmentation increases the 
number of decision points thereby undermining effective 
implementation. The objections raised by the Greek Ministry 
of Trade in relation to the creation of an independent 
administrative authority that would monitor the award of 
public contracts, despite the fact that the proposal 
emanated from the Ministry of Development which was about to 
absorb the former ministry demonstrates that fragmentation 
affects implementation by allowing the growing number of 
decision points to think in terms of their own sectoral or 
even bureaucratic rationality. 
Third, we argued that fragmentation tends to produce 
different functional logics based on the various stages of 
the policy process. The problems that Greece faced with the 
unsuccessful use of the longer transitional periods that 
Greek negotiators managed to insert in the directives 
clearly demonstrate that the achievement of the objectives 
set in one stage need to be parts of a wider logic 
underpinning the whole process, if they are to be effective. 
Otherwise the administration is unable to develop the sort 
of administrative memory which is necessary for effective 
implementation. 
Fourth, we argued that even if co-ordination is 
achieved within fragmented politico-administrative 
structures, it is likely to be more costly, at least in 
terms of time. It took seven years and a condemnation by 
the ECJ for the Greek authorities to implement Directive 
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89/665 formally, while the issue was simply a matter of 
bringing together a small number of judges who were familiar 
with the directive and the Greek legislation on judicial 
review. This did not happen as a result of the lack of a 
co-ordinating mechanism. Moreover, we argue here that the 
longer time which is necessary for co-ordination increases 
reliance on the sensitivities and the professionalism of the 
individuals involved. 
Fifth, we argued that integrated structures are more 
stake-sensitive than fragmented on es. CCM placed 
substantial emphasis on the fact that the ECJ had never 
issued a condemning judgment against France for reasons 
regarding substantive, that is administrative, 
implementation. Although this may very well mean that 
implementation problems may have not been discovered, it 
also constitutes an additional incentive for the relevant 
structures to think and act prospectively, in order to 
maintain what seems to be construed as an aspect that 
defines the profile of CCM within the French administration. 
Moreover, the stake may also be externally induced. Indeed, 
the case of the Greek Ministry of the Environment, Spatial 
Planning and Public Works, whose officials have the 
additional incentive to be seen as effective users of EC 
funds employed in a number of public works, is another 
example of the same point. The same comment can also be 
made about the relevant minister, whose action has a 
substantial impact upon the use of EC funds in Greece. 
Sixth, we argued that the detection of problems is 
easier in integrated politico-administrative structures. 
Again, the Greek Ministry of the Environment, Spatial 
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Planning and Public Works constitutes an example in the 
sense that its officials were able to detect problems in the 
various notices used by awarding entities, before adopting 
uniform model notices for various categories of works 
projects. The validity of this point is also underlined by 
the important role performed by the CCM in relation to 
technical norms used for the definition of a works project 
and the comparability of alternative offers. 
Finally, we have argued that the implementation of 
changes is more difficult in a fragmented politico- 
administrative structure. Change underlines the need for 
adaptation which in turn necessitates a certain ability to 
learn. Fragmented structures find it more difficult to 
learn because each actor is confined to limited (sectorally 
defined) sources of input. This is illustrated by the Greek 
Ministry of the Environment, Spatial Planning and Public 
Works which used its relative success after the beginning of 
the 1990s in the implementation of the works directives as a 
power basis in order to promote sectoral interests in a 
manner that impeded another part of the structure (Ministry 
of National Economy) to implement formally Directive 92/50. 
The lack of a strong co-ordinator at both levels of analysis 
(political and administrative) meant the perpetuation of the 
conflict, possibly until the stakes are raised by a fine 
under art. 171 of the Treaty. What conclusions can we draw 
about the use of the tools of goverment identified by Hood, 
within the context discussed here? First, we shall examine 
the actions of the Greek government which faced a number of 
problems in the implementation process and then we shall 
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discuss what else it could do in order to ameliorate the 
country's implementation profile. 
On the one hand, there is a number of useful lessons 
that could be drawn on the basis of the Greek government's 
action in the field of public works. The first lesson 
concerns the fact that the issue of effective implementation 
has been placed at the top of the ministry's political 
agenda as a symbolic gesture that demonstrated a political 
commitment to 'change the tide'. That has sent a clear 
message to the administration. Indeed, the use of political 
authority through a number of symbolic and pragmatic 
measures has been construed by the administration at least 
as a sign of awareness that something was wrong. This has 
increased the sensitivity of crucial parts of the 
administration who were subsequently much less inclined to 
take decisions without due consideration. 
Secondly, treasure has also been used through the 
imposition of fines against constructors for problems 
regarding the quality of public works. This, in turn, has 
been based on the changes made to the system of quality 
control, f rom a pos t hoc basis, to control during 
construction. That necessitated the recourse to 
organisation through the recruitment of staf f who could 
perform these functions. Indeed, organisation has been used 
as a part of a wider effort that has been co-ordinated by 
the Ministry of National Economy. The objective of this 
effort was to identify and resolve staffing problems 
resulting from the inability of the administration to handle 
demanding multi-faceted projects. Nevertheless, this effort 
is under way and long practice will be needed before one can 
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safely argue that the structural dimension of the problem 
has been resolved. 
Thirdly, formal authority has been used in order to 
push a number of legislative measures through the Greek 
Parliament. The objective was the limitation of the right 
of constructors to re-assess the cost of a works project on 
a post hoc basis and the imposition of the obligation to 
insure these works. These measures have certainly led to 
the limitation of the constructors' ability to bend the law. 
The use of nodality by the Greek government has been 
limited by the nature of the problems that the politico- 
administrative structure faced. In other words, we argue 
here that there is no pre-defined perfect mix of the tools 
of government. Clearly, the content of this mix depends on 
the nature of the problems that they are meant to resolve. 
On the other hand, another important aspect that must be 
underlined, concerns the wider Greek politico-administrative 
structure. Indeed, Greece still lacks the effective 
administrative co-ordinators which would enable it to 
resolve the problems that occur, as in every multi- 
organisational environment. The use of authority for the 
establishment of this actor is likely to lead to a gradual 
change of ethos. The British and French cases are 
illustrative of this potential function of co-ordinators. 
Arguably, it is inconceivable for parts of the British or 
French administrations to act unilaterally because the 
operation of these structures has created a Isocialisation 
effect' which raises awareness that most issues have more 
than one facets, thus requiring co-ordination. A strong co- 
ordinating mechanism i) would 'remind' the respective actors 
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of the interministerial position previously agreed upon; ii) 
would authoritatively resolve the issue by choosing the 
'appropriate' solution or iii) would facilitate the adoption 
of a solution at the purely political levell. The situation 
at the political level in Greece has begun to change 
recently through the formal creation of sectoral co- 
ordinating bodies, but this is insufficient in the light of 
the number and the quality of the problems that exist at the 
administrative level. 
On the other side of the coin, the cases of the UK and 
France illustrate that increased predictability, unity in 
terms of the interpretation of the policy on a day-to-day 
basis, transparency in terms of the relations with other 
parts of the implementation structure and more importantly 
continuity in all these actions characterise the operation 
of integrated politico-administrative structures. These 
characteristics, which are produced by the existence of a 
stable and unchallenged institutional structure, lead to the 
use of nodality backed by authority thus reducing the number 
of decision points. This increases the likelihood of 
effective implementation. 
Contrary to the Greek case, it is clear that strictly 
speaking we have found no hard evidence illustrating a 
clear-cut direct role in macro-implementation of the strong 
horizontal co-ordinating mechanisms that we have identified 
in the UK and France. In other words, the implementation of 
public procurement policy has not been characterised by the 
10ne could add, in a rather cynical manner, than the second option 
could easily include a conscious implementation of an alternative 
policy that could conflict with the policy of the EC. 
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existence of cases where problems have ascended to the 
European Secretariat or the SGCI. However, this is largely 
due to the fact that public procurement policy is dealt with 
by strong sectoral co-ordinators (the Treasury and CCM) 
which thus reduce the need for co-ordination at a higher 
level. In more general terms we can conclude that 
implementation in the EC largely depends on the integrated 
or fragmented nature of the domestic politico-administrative 
structures. Could one then move to a wider discussion of 
implementation in the EC in order to outline a European 
29 implementation style . 
9.2. IS THERE A EUROPEAN IMPLEMENTATION STYLE? 
Defined in rather flexible terms, this concept covers 
the patterns which are routinely observed in the 
implementation process within the EC, in a manner that links 
them systematically to the characteristics of this 
particular implementation structure. It is thus influenced 
by the wider concept of policy style proposed by Richardson, 
Gustafsson and Jordan (1982) although it is substantially 
less refined. We shall argue here that a number of factors 
point to the direction of a European implementation style. 
If we return to the cases of the UK and France, we may look 
at two significant exceptions relating to the efficacy of 
their integrated politico-administrative structures, namely 
i) the existence of regional preferential schemes and ii) 
2Following Freeman (1985,477) we argue that empirical data from other 
types of policy and also micro-implementation are necessary for a more 
refined definition of this concept. 
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the preference for a specific computer manufacturer during 
the 1970s in the UK and the initial unwillingness of the 
French authorities to implement the provisions covering 
public services contracts (Directive 92/50). One should 
draw a distinction between the two cases. 
The case of the UK helps refine our view of 
implementation as a political process. Indeed, while it was 
the Conservative government that negotiated the terms of the 
British accession (formulation), it was a Labour government 
that implemented the preferential schemes thus illustrating 
the disruptive effect that political changes can have upon 
the implementation process. In short, implementation in the 
EC is political because it is influenced by changes in the 
political priorities of major domestic actors. At the end 
of the day, shifting majorities constitute a characteristic 
built in the liberal systems that constitute the EC. In 
other words, this is an inherent source of fragmentation 
within the EC. 
The case of France constitutes a useful basis for the 
refinement of the same idea. First, it was a socialist 
government that negotiated Directive 92/50 in the beginning 
of the 1990s and the same government had the opportunity to 
commence the implementation process by at least implementing 
it formally. Not only did this not happen, but after the 
election of March 1993 the in-coming government of the Right 
followed exactly the same pattern. The reason why this 
happened is linked to the wider context within which 
implementation takes place. Indeed, the unwillingness of a 
major competitor, namely the Federal Republic of Germany, to 
open its own market led the French authorities to violate a 
338 
policy decision that they helped formulate. Thus, 
implementation in the EC is Political because it is 
influenced by the behavior of other European competitors. 
In other words, implementation must be co-ordinated within 
each domestic context but also between domestic contexts, on 
an EC-wide scale. That is the prerogative of other parts of 
the implementation structure (European Commission and ECJ) 
whose objective is to give a maximum degree of uniformity in 
implementation. 
Although the bargaining that takes place in the 
formulation stage means that every negotiator has to make 
some sort of concession, thus altering his initial position, 
member states with co-ordinated views are more likely to 
'lead' than be led, thus significantly reducing the need for 
changes in their own position. That means that the national 
policies of these actors are frequently projected upon the 
EC3 thus facilitating implementation at their own domestic 
level. This is one aspect of what can be called systemic 
repercussion of formulation upon implementation through the 
definition of the extent of policy change, which also 
illustrates a part of the concealed influence exercised by 
the co-ordinating mechanisms4. 
Can the examination of the theory incorporated in this 
policy, which is a significant analytical parameter that we 
identified in Chapter 1. shed light to the nature of the 
European implementation style? Given that the EC's public 
31ndeed, this seems to be a common objective of all national 
governments, at least in regulatory policies (H6ritier 1996,150-1). 
41n this sense the UK is not, contrary to George's view (1994; 1995) 
such an 'awkward partner' after all. 
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procurement policy embodies basic characteristics of the 
single market project (competition, reliance on the target 
groups for a large part of implementation) could one draw 
wider conclusions for the European implementation style? 
our analysis does not reveal any significant misconceptions 
as to the validity of the theory that has been incorporated 
into the EC's public procurement policy. The fact that the 
information found in notices advertised by awarding entities 
seems to be satisfactory (supra, Chapter 8) and above all 
the increasing number of notices that have been published 
despite the decreasing procurement expenditure underline the 
validity of the theory which linked transparency with 
competition. 
Nevertheless, a weakness in the implicit assumptions 
upon which this theory is based, has been revealed. This 
assumption places substantial emphasis on the role of the 
target group and the subsequent use of direct effect in the 
implementation process. The rather limited national case 
law5 underlines the psychological factor that influences the 
behaviour of market players. In other words, this 
dissertation provides an illustration of the limits of the 
concept of direct effect. Its utility in the implementation 
process is limited by the time and the financial resources 
that have to be spent. More important though is the 
51nterestingly, the French courts that presented problems in the 
acceptance of the concept of direct effect (supra, Chapter 4) were 
those with the most extensive case law. On the contrary, the British 
and Greek courts, where such problems did not exist, dealt with a 
rather limited number of cases. This illustrates the dependent nature 
of the action of national courts in the implementation process. 
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criterion that underpins the aforementioned psychological 
constraint that tenderers may sometimes face. The substance 
behind this fear lay in the perceived capacity of the 
awarding entities to 'take revenge' against tenderers who 
have previously challenged award decisions. That implies 
their capacity to award future contracts based on subjective 
criteria, an action that goes against the spirit and the 
letter of the EC's policy in this field. 
Although this cannot be an entirely water-proof 
conclusion6, it has three immediate implications for the 
concept of European implementation style. First, it is a 
useful illustration of another dimension of change. it 
shows that the establishment of useful policy instruments by 
public institutions at the European level does not 
necessarily coincide with an immediate change in the 
attitudes of their potential users. In short, this gap 
underlines the limits of the action of public institutions. 
Secondly, it highlights the utility of informal channels to 
European and national fixers. Thirdly, it leads us to ask 
whether there were alternative approaches that could have 
been followed by the EC. The availability of other 
alternatives was limited to a stronger role for the European 
Commission which could be given the right to suspend an 
award procedure until the validity of the complaints has 
been established. Although this possibility has been 
discussed during the formulation process that led to the 
6Such conclusions would require the analysis of every single case 
where tenderers have avoided litigation because of these fears and an 
accurate assessment of their honesty. 
impossible. 
This exercise is siMply 
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adoption of Directive 89/665, the national governments did 
not want a stronger role for the Commission (Woolcock 1991, 
132-3) because it would set a dangerous precedent of 
'unwelcome' reinforcement of the European regulators. Yet, 
it is doubtful whether such a role would automatically 
reduce the likelihood of problems, not only because it would 
necessitate action from tenderers who would still be easy to 
identify, but also because it would suffer from practical 
problems, like the need to be able to intervene in every 
single award procedure. Clearly, this is impossible. 
Thus one is led to the conclusion that there are 
inherent problems in the nature of the activity pursued here 
(regulation). Indeed, Majone has rightly argued that the 
regulatory activity is characterised by a limited influence 
of budgetary constraints upon the activity of the regulator. 
On the contrary, 
the real costs of most regulatory programmes are borne 
directly by the firms and the individuals who have to 
comply with them 
(Majone 1994,87). 
The cost here is construed in its wide sense, thus including 
the change in the behaviour of European tenderers, who are 
meant to benefit from this policy. More generally, this 
chain of thought leads us to identify excessive reliance on 
the concept of direct effect as a factor which may explain 
some implementation problems in a context that is 
characterised by the increasing use of regulatory policies 
(Majone 1996a, 54; McGowan and Wallace 1996,565). In a 
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less ambitious vein, it certainly underlines the validity of 
the methodological imperative that we have followed here, 
namely that implementation analysis in the EC has to take 
account of the type of the policy which is being 
implemented. Nevertheless, the same finding underlines the 
need to take account of developments in other policy areas 
whose repercussions spill-over to our field of research. 
The extensive use by major market players of opportunities 
created by competition policy and the free movement of 
capital (for mergers and acquisitions of companies 
respectively) within the EC highlight this point while they 
also place in a wider context the previous analysis relating 
to the impact of direct effect. 
Moreover, another structural weakness embodied in the 
policy concerns the fact that it does not cover the 
execution of the public contracts whose award it is meant to 
regulate. Problems in the Greek and the French context 
illustrate that this is a factor that fragments artificially 
the policy process thus undermining cohesion in 
implementation. The execution stage has been left outside 
the remit of the directives presumably because it has no 
impact upon the common objective, that is the establishment 
of a free market. This question illustrates not only 
difficulties relating to the tractability of the problem but 
also a rather incomplete understanding of the field in 
question primarily influenced by the constant attempts of 
the member states to preserve a wide margin for manoeuvre. 
After having established some of the factors that 
underline the political nature of implementation in the EC, 
it is now time to attempt to link them to the nature of the 
343 
EC as an implementation structure, in order to further 
examine the nature of the European implementation style. 
The lack of external implementing services is the first 
major characteristic that has to be discussed. In a sense, 
it is the source of many of the problems that we have 
identified in the implementation process because it 
constitutes a vehicle for the participation of national 
politico-administrative structures. Its importance derives 
from the fact that these structures operate, up to a certain 
extent, under the direct guidance of political actors whose 
primary focus seems to be the achievement of narrowly 
defined 'national' interests. However, they also 
participate in the formulation stage. In other words, 
contrary to what some national politicians would like us to 
believe, national governments are not the passive recipients 
of 'mandates' emanating from the EC. They shape policies 
along with a number of other important actors like the 
European Commission and Parliament. How can we explain this 
apparent contradiction regarding problematic implementation? 
The distance between 'Brussels' and the national 
capitals is the main factor that contributes to this 
phenomenon. Distance here is construed in terms of the 
latitude that the national structures have in the 
implementation process. Clearly, the principle of 
institutional autonomy that we identified (supra, Chapter 2) 
as a major determinant of the nature of the EC as a loosely 
coupled implementation structure, is at the heart of this 
phenomenon. It seems to have been largely preserved at the 
level of the structures, but less so at the level of the 
functions. That means that commonly agreed policies at EC- 
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level, are processed by a number of structures which act as 
filters constantly refining their content. The degree and 
the direction of this refinement largely depend on the 
integrated or fragmented nature of these structures. 
Moreover, this distance alters the balance between the 
collective (formulation) and the individual (implementation) 
level of action in favour of the latter. In other words, it 
creates a window of opportunity for the national structures 
which sometimes try to orientate implementation in a 
direction that serves their own particular interests. The 
misuse of the lowest price as the award criterion in Greece 
is an illustration of this phenomenon, because it was the 
direct product of the need to tighten-up public expenditure 
as a result of the country's problematic public finances and 
the pre-election pledges of the conservative party. 
These operations confront the national structures with 
European institutions and mainly the European Commission in 
a context which is characterised by the initial use of 
negotiation. Indeed, the implementation process 
occasionally takes the form of negotiation because of the 
distance that exists between Brussels and the national 
contexts and the formal inability of the European Commission 
to fix implementation directly. This is an indirect but 
very clear sign that the European Commission acknowledges 
the privileged knowledge of the field that the national 
politico-administrative structures actually possess. Yet, 
the use of the term 'negotiation' should not be construed as 
evidence of a balanced relationship. The European 
Commission possesses a number of tools that enable it to 
pursue its own objectives, although their efficacy is 
345 
variable. it is the efficacy of these tools that defines 
more accurately this relationship. Hence negotiation varies 
from simple exchange to penalties. Exchange covers national 
contexts characterised by a limited policy change, while 
penalties are used in cases of overt conflict. 
Irrespective of the form of interaction, the role of 
the European Commission in the implementation process also 
takes the form of a scapegoat in the EC's politics of blame 
7 avoidance . This phenomenon is more evident in the 
implementation process in fragmented politico-administrative 
structures. Indeed, this is so because tensions are 
stronger there, although the same phenomenon appears in 
other national contexts as well. In practice, this is a 
mechanism which enables the national actors to implement 
changes without taking the blame for them. Distance is used 
here in order to 'explain' or interpret policy changes that 
have to be implemented, that is 'we have to do it because 
they told as so'. The main idea behind this practice is 
that not only are 'they' beyond 'our' individual control, 
but 'they' also possess the means (penalties) to make 
ineffective implementation too costly thus enhancing de 
facto the obligation to implement their wishes. 
Hence, the role of the European Commission and national 
public institutions can also be construed as a resou-rce. 
This is illustrated by the tendency of some national 
officials to avoid dealing with problems in implementation 
until they reach a point of conflict whose resolution can be 
7We borrowed the term from Weaver (1986) who used it in order to 
depict one of the main motivations behind the behaviour of policy- 
makers, mainly in the USA. 
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based on blame avoidance. Nevertheless, these practices 
also cover procedural or formal changes e. g. the switch from 
administrative circulars to statutory instruments in the UK. 
There is though a wider significant implication for the 
European Commission, namely the need to f ind flexible 
responses to implementation problems. This functional need 
has resulted in the extensive use of informal mechanisms 
which avoid the rigid and confrontational aspects that 
characterise formal procedures like art. 169 of the Treaty. 
The flexible responses utilised by the European Commission 
illustrate the entrepreneurial spirit used in the linkages 
between policy areas for the achievement of the cardinal 
objective, that is efficacy. This spirit is exemplified by 
the use of the spill-over effect from the management of EC 
funds for the liberalisation of public procurement and also 
the action that it took in order to fill the functional gap 
created by the artificial fragmentation of the policy which 
left the execution of public contracts outside the remit of 
the directives. 
The penalties are of crucial importance here because 
they help identify what is at stake in the implementation 
process. This is more useful when it is quantifiable, as 
was the case of the provision of EC funding for public works 
in Greece. It may also take other forms and can be 
construed in terms of prestige, principles, or even 
political capital, for example by reinforcing or undermining 
the status of a minister in a given national context. It is 
important not only for national politico-administrative 
actors but also for the European Commission which attaches 
special emphasis to the concept of uniformity not only for 
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political reasons, that is its need to be seen to act in an 
even-handed manner, but also for normative reasons deriving 
from the concept of Community of law. 
The potential use of penalties exerts direct influence 
upon the ability of the national actors to learn how to 
implement EC policy. Indeed, implementation is also a 
learning process which potentially leads to the adoption of 
practices that have either been tested in other contexts, or 
have been authoritatively proposed by the European 
Commission. Again, the switch to statutory instruments in 
the UK provides a clear example, similar to the extensive 
refinements in the use of the lowest price as the main award 
criterion in Greece. However, the typical characteristics 
of each national institutional setting clearly affect the 
efficacy of the learning process. The mobility of officials 
on the basis of partisan criteria in Greece - despite a 
recently observed mitigating trend (Passas and Stephanou 
1997,255) - and the lack of specialised staff certainly 
undermine the ability of the structures to learn, a function 
that presupposes a strong memory and ability to understand. 
The ability of the implementing politico-administrative 
structures to learn then becomes a crucial aspect in the 
European Commission's search for uniformity. Uniform 
implementation is an objective mainly because of the 
regulatory type of policy discussed here. Although other 
normative aspects like equality are also important, 
uniformity in cases of regulatory policy is important 
because free-riding automatically creates a cost for the 
other market players. This has two important implications 
for the analysis of macro-implementation in the EC. First, 
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it can be construed as a competitive process. Indeed, 
national actors monitor and assess the quality of 
implementation in other member states (another form of 
learning), hence the occasional variation in an otherwise 
undifferentiated implementation pattern (Directive 92/50 in 
France). 
Thus., implementation in other member states is used as 
a resource. This resource is utilised both actively and 
passively. It is used actively by the member states when 
they shape their own behaviour during implementation as 
illustrated by the implementation of Directive 92/50 in 
France, while its passive use takes place at the European 
level where they formulate policy collectively. The latter 
use is more evident in the distribution of power between the 
European and the national institutions. In turn, this 
aspect of the policy process illustrates what we shall call 
systemic implementation deficit of the EC defined as the set 
of problems which emerge in implementation as a result of 
the choices made previously on the basis of other 
priorities. The extent to which national governments are 
willing to accept8 a stronger role for the European 
Commission is an example of these choices. In the same 
vein, we would also underline the lack of any sign of proper 
use of the temporary derogations agreed upon in the 
81n other words, we argue here - largely following Gunn (1978) and 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984,198-206) and also the discussion by Chayes and 
Handler Chayes (1993,197-8) of the acceptable level of compliance 
with international treaties - that perfect implementation 
in the EC is 
unattainable, at least because of other over-riding priorities which 
are linked to the nature of the EC. 
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formulation stage and more importantly, the absence of any 
coherent strategy on behalf of the European Commission in 
the management of these cases. They certainly seem to be a 
vehicle which enables member states to buy time for the 
maintenance of an existing policy rather than the 
preparation for the implementation of change. Moreover, it 
is argued here that the action of the French authorities in 
the case of Directive 92/50 and the behaviour of the Greek 
government between 1981 and 1985 have also highlighted the 
function of implementation as an agenda-setting mechanism. 
Indeed, in both cases the issue of uniformity has been 
firmly placed on the political agenda at EC-level. 
The need for uniformity raises the stakes for the 
European Commission whose credibility largely depends on the 
uniformity of its action. This underlines not only the 
importance of its monitoring function,, but it also 
highlights the systemic repercussions that the use of direct 
effect may have. Market players occupy a pivotal position 
resulting from their constant interactions with implementing 
authorities. Although this does not necessarily enable them 
to have a clear and accurate horizontal view of the 
implementation process, it certainly makes them a privileged 
source of information for the European Commission and the 
sectoral national macro-implementers like the Treasury and 
CCM. 
In this discussion of the European implementation style 
we have so far identified the basic features of the role of 
the European Commission as the dominant fixer. Howeverr the 
European Commission does not have a monopoly over fixing 
within the EC. Indeed, the ECJ and national actors 
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participate in the same activity albeit in a less intensive 
manner. On the one hand, the action of the ECJ is subject 
to a number of factors that escape its direct control. 
These factors are the national courts and their willingness 
to submit preliminary references for the interpretation of 
EC law and the action of target groups. This largely 
depends on the number of cases that reach national courts 
which in turn, is dependent upon the quality of 
implementation and also the willingness and the ability of 
private actors to use legal procedures for the protection of 
their interests. 
On the other hand, the role of national actors in 
fixing depends on the interplay between the aforementioned 
factors and their inability to have an accurate horizontal 
view of implementation in the EC as a whole. The very weak 
position of the national Parliaments means that fixing at 
the political level emanates from the government, while the 
administrative and the private spheres are less important 
sources of this activity. On a more general note, it can be 
argued that fixing at the national level can only be partial 
and linked to the particular characteristics of a given 
national politico-administrative structure, thus leaving the 
European Commission and the ECJ as the only potential gate- 
keepers of uniformity in the EC. Moreover, there is ample 
evidence that the role of fixers is much stronger and 
visible in cases where implementation is problematic, 
although the precise choice of the tool that the fixer will 
use depends on the nature of the problem. The repercussion 
upon the principle of institutional autonomy is that its 
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normative intensity is preserved only in integrated 
politico-administrative settings. 
We shall therefore argue that the nature of the EC 
actually favours variable implementation through i) the 
reliance on idiosyncratic national politico-administrative 
structures and the subsequent distance between the two 
levels of government where implementation takes place; ii) 
the partial subordination of these structures to national 
developments; iii) the spirit of competition which is 
embedded in a growing number of EC policies; iv) the more or 
less obligatory reliance on private actors whose motivation 
and definition of what is at stake is not necessarily 
consistent with the objectives of EC policy and v) the 
imperfect information and variable margin for manoeuvre 
possessed by the European fixers. 
Using the broad concept of European implementation 
style we have identified a number of linkages between the 
nature of the EC as an implementation structure and the 
political characteristics of implementation. This is based 
on various forms of fragmentation, mainly that of the 
national politico-administrative structures. What are the 
lessons that one can draw from this study in relation to the 
wider process of European integration? 
9.3. LESSONS FOR THE INTEGRATION PROCESS: A MACRO- 
IMPLEMENTATION PERSPECTIVE 
We have noted in Chapter 1 that the emphasis placed in 
this dissertation upon the action of national governments 
can be misleading in the sense that it may give the 
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impression that we have come to adopt an 
intergovernmentalist perspective on European integration. 
In this sense, placing these conclusions into the wider 
political context within which the integration process takes 
place can be even more mis eading. Indeed, recently the 
French government led by Balladur proposed measures to 
harmonise at EC-level penalties for breaches of EC law 
(Buchan 1994) and argued in favour of the insertion to 
European legislative texts of a clause specifying these 
penalties. More recently, Major not only threatened to 
implement merely 'symbolically' the directive on the 48-hour 
working week but he went even further, by threatening to 
block the IGC that would reform the Maastricht Treaty if the 
changes which he wanted were not adopted (Southey and Peston 
1996; White 1996). The first example demonstrates the 
significance attached by national governments to the concept 
of efficacy. The second example illustrates the limits that 
national governments can place on the concept of efficacy 
during the implementation process and the level of political 
salience that an issue regarding implementation can reach. 
Is then implementation the domain where national 
governments can find so strong ammunition in their attempts 
to shape political realities according to their own 
individual wishes? The last example mentioned above 
certainly seems to support this view, as the leader of a 
member state was prepared to raise the stakes in such a 
radical manner which, from a pro-integrationist perspective, 
amounted to blackmail. 
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Discussing the policy-making process from the 
perspective of integration theories, Webb (1983,30) argued 
that 
governments will be far less likely to agree common 
policies and rule-making while there are doubts over the 
extent to which these will be observed uniformly 
throughout the Community area. 
Although the recent developments (SEA and TEU) which led to 
the reinforcement of the role of the European Parliament 
mainly and the European Commission necessarily mean that 
more players may follow the same chain of thought, one 
begins to conceptualise the systemic repercussions of 
implementation upon the wider integration process in terms 
of the legitimacy that it is capable of attaching to it. 
Interestingly, Haas (1975,64) and Moravcsik (1993,512), 
two proponents of the neo-functionalist and the 
intergovernmentalist perspectives (respectively) converged 
on the same idea. What could then produce this effect and 
above all how can we link implementation with legitimacy? 
The argument presented here is rather simple. 
Irrespective of the theoretical perspective that one adopts 
in order to explain the emergence and development of 
European integration as a political phenomenon, it is clear 
that the belief that the EC can be an effective problem- 
solving arena is common ground. Implementation 
systematically links legitimacy to integration because the 
effectiveness of policies (a possible result of 
implementation) is one source of legitimacy, along with 
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tradition and participation9. In different terms, the EC 
needs to be effective in order to be legitimate. On the 
contrary, it risks being watered down or even abandoned if 
it does not produce at least some of the expected results. 
This argument is reinforced by the dominant policy 
type, that is regulation, which is used within the EC for 
the liberalisation of the market, an important but certainly 
not the only dimension of economic integration. The pursuit 
of policies which are dominated by the spirit of competition 
means that the main focus is on the establishment of a level 
playing field. Systematic distortion of competition may 
produce increased pressures for the re-nationalisation of 
policy, thus initiating a process which may lead to the 
limitation or abandonment of the whole endeavour. The 
precise definition of this point is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. However, it is certainly the result of a 
political assessment which will be influenced by the 
possible existence of alternative solutions to the problems 
that produced this edifice in the first place. The 
discussion of the impact of implementation upon the 
legitimacy of the EC should not be limited to the central 
role of the governments. 
9Tradition and participation are elements that can be found in the EC. 
Indeed, while tradition affects both structures and processes, e. g. 
through the observance of rules based on the concept of Rechtsstaat 
(state of law), participation is another source of legitimacy 
illustrated not only through the direct election of MEPS, but also 
through the participation of representatives of the member states in 
the European policy process. 
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The wider public could have an interest in the 
implementation of unpopular policies (e. g. the prohibition 
of state subsidies to national airlines and the subsequent 
need for redundancies) to the extent that their 
effectiveness enables the emergence and identification of 
the positive outcomes that they may have (e. g. lower fares). 
In this sense, differentiated patterns of implementation may 
not be such a bad thing after all as effectiveness enhances 
the visibility of the intended result by transforming it 
from a theoretical concept into practical reality. Thus, 
those actors who promote the causes of ineffectiveness are 
more likely to be challenged as the stakes for those who 
suffer the negative consequences (regular travelers and tax- 
payers in our example) are easier to identify. 
Consequently, one can argue that the link between 
implementation and legitimacy goes through a wider number of 
actors. Furthermore, although it could be argued that 
ineffective implementation is one way of avoiding hostility 
against the EC (given that the latter is thought to be the 
source of unpopular policies) one may ask what is the reason 
for their formulation in the first place? That is the 
essence of the link that we have established between 
implementation and legitimacy. 
If we cannot define the point where integration 
suffering from ineffective implementation risks being 
abandoned, we may at least attempt to assess the relative 
importance of the actors that we have identified as the main 
participants in the implementation process. This discussion 
will be based on the predominant theoretical perspectives on 
integration, namely intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism 
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and federalism. One of the most important assumptions of 
early versions of intergovernmentalism was the view of the 
state as a unitary actor. Intergovernmentalists initially 
saw the state as a single decision-making unit which was in 
a position to make rational decisions of the basis of more 
or less specific conceptions of its own interests, the 
national government being the central actor in this process. 
This study has illustrated that these assumptions are 
largely inaccurate. Indeed, on the one hand national 
governments are not single actors but multi-faceted complex 
organisations whose action is, at least up to a certain 
extent, subject to internal tensions. 
If this f inding is clearly exhibited by the 
implementation process in Greece, it is not less evident in 
the UK or France. The existence and the importance attached 
to co-ordinating mechanisms constitutes a direct 
acknowledgment of the tensions that exist within national 
governments. Secondly, governments are subject to change. 
Change concerns not only the direction of theiraction, but 
also its precise content during implementation. Although 
governments are themselves sources of change thus being 
capable of influencing, at least partly, the environment 
where they operate largely shapes their behaviour. This is 
very evident in the regulatory policy that we have 
discussed, because by its very objective (competition) it 
requires uniformity which in turn is subject to the 
behaviour of a number of actors. The content of their 
action is largely shaped with reference to the wider 
environment. The argument that 
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[o]nly where the actions Of supranational leaders 
systematically bias outcomes away from the long-term 
self-interest of Member States can we speak of serious 
challenge to an intergovernmentalist view (Emphasis in 
original) 
(Moravcsik 1993,514) 
is largely arbitrary because it seems to take for granted 
that there is a single definition of this interest. This 
study has illustrated that this is not the case. On the 
contrary, changes occur, at least up to a certain extent, in 
a manner which underlines the reactive rather than pro- 
active action of the national governments. 
The conclusion of this dissertation also undermines 
another important dimension of liberal intergovernmentalism 
which construes national governments as users of EC 
institutions (Moravcsik 1993,515). Although we have 
demonstrated that this is an accurate view of the relations 
between these actors, we have also underlined the fact that 
there is another, equally important, side to it. National 
governments are increasingly subject to the action of EC 
institutions whose role is underpinned by an entrepreneurial 
spirit that largely escapes the control of individual 
actors. Sandholtz (1996,408) captured this reality in even 
more specific terms by stating that these institutions 
produce 
changes [to] the discourse surrounding conduct... This 
discourse clarifies the meaning of the rules and 
provides reasons for later rounds of behaviour and 
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subsequent discourses about the rules. Continued 
violation of the rules undermines the legitimacy of the 
system that brings... a variety of benefits. (Emphasis 
added) 
In more general terms, implementation constitutes the 
domain, par excellence, where the national governments 
illustrate the socialisation effects produced by European 
integration. In a wider view of the relations between 
national governments and non-state actors, one must 
underline the expansion of the tools possessed by the latter 
in their day-to-day interactions with the former. The 
rather limited use of the concept of direct effect cannot 
mitigate the validity of this view because what matters here 
is the ability of non-state actors to shape their behaviour 
on the basis of their own priorities and the (formal and 
informal) opportunities that they have to pursue their 
objectives in arenas which largely escape the control of 
governments, like courts. 
In that respect, it is important to note that the 
cautious reception of supremacy and direct effect in the 
national legal orders has not affected the attitudes of 
private actors. The case of France, where the new legal 
instruments have been used shows that there is certainly a 
socialisation effect that influences the behaviour of 
private actors in the implementation process. That means, 
that some time is needed before a full assessment of this 
phenomenon can be established. However, one must also note 
the significance of two other, but equally important 
factors. First, the case of the UK shows the importance of 
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the so-called business ethos upon this behaviour. That 
means that the use of the new instruments need not be 
equally important in every single national context. 
National traditions will inevitably affect this phenomenon. 
Secondly, the availability of other, informal means of 
action will also affect the behaviour of private actors in 
the legal domain. This means that despite the importance of 
national traditions , the extensive use of regulatory 
policies based on competition may lead private actors to the 
development of a different ethos, one which is reflected 
through the recourse to informal channels of influence. 
Clearly, the European institutions are an important point of 
reference as they tend to absorb this functional pressurelO. 
Therefore, although this perspective partly justifies the 
neo-functionalist emphasis on private actors, it also 
highlights the regulated autonomy that characterises their 
action within the implementation processll. 
Following the same line of reasoning, one could also 
argue that the European institutions, the European 
Commission in particular, tend to use the private actors as 
a significant resource in the implementation process. 
Although we have not found evidence of a coherent strategy 
1OSandholtz (1996,419) rightly construes European institutions and 
private actors as potential coalition partners. 
"The two extremes of this regulated autonomy are illustrated by i) 
the systemic impact that the judgment of the ECJ in the Cassis de 
Dijon case (C-120/78) had through the establishment of the principle 
of mutual recognition (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994) as an 
instrument for regulatory policy and ii) the unwillingness to use 
litigation as a tool in implementation. 
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for the mobilisation. of these actors by the European 
Commission advocated in recent scholarship (Richardson 
1996a, 292) we have illustrated the two-level strategy that 
these actors follow in order to promote their interests. 
Has this emphasis on European institutions as 
significant players in the implementation process gone as 
far as justifying the federalist perspective? Discussing 
the possible emergence of a 'European federal balance' 
Scharpf (1991,426) has recently underlined the significance 
of a Grundeins tell ung (basic pre-disposition) of each 
political level to define and pursue, within the limits of 
its powers, its own objectives, but only to the extent that 
they do not conflict with those of other political levels, 
thus largely capturing the spirit of federalism. The 
emphasis on conflict revealed by the analysis of 
implementation in the EC is certainly misleading to the 
extent that it does not do justice to the EC's federal 
elements. 
First,, this study has largely confirmed the view 
(Spinelli 1978,80) that the ECJ is an evidently federal 
court which exercises powers attributed to it in order to 
resolve conflicts between and within various levels of 
government. Secondlyf we have also found evidence 
suggesting that the European Commission is acting as a 
federal government by monitoring and fixing the 
implementation process. Thirdly, we have identified the 
competence liee (regulated power) that the member states 
exercise by implementing EC policy. Evidence of this 
includes the interaction with the European Commission and 
the role of the ECJ. In other words, we have identified the 
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instrumental nature of the role of the member states which 
implement policies formulated collectively at the European 
level. However, we have also identified a major potential 
weakness of the EC which is the inability to implement 
judgments of the ECJ that go against the will of member 
states. Although we have f ound only one case of a judgment 
that has not been implemented, we argue here that this 
reveals a structural weakness which on the one hand 
illustrates that the EC is not yet a complete federation, 
while it also provides an indication that this is the 
direction that it has taken. 
Indeed Taylor (1981,251-2), discussing the extent to 
which the EC is short of a federal model, argued that the EC 
was closer to a confederal model because the member states 
still possessed the right to choose the laws (and more 
importantly for our argument, the judgments) that applied 
within their territory. That was correct in 1981 but is not 
accurate any more. our argument is based not only on the 
entrepreneurial spirit - or purposeful opportunism (Cram 
1997,, 170) - that we have identified in the role of the 
European Commission but also on the development of more 
formal mechanisms which do not depend on this spirit. The 
new form of art. 171 is at the heart of this argument 
because the fines that can be imposed on member states 
largely reduce the efficacy of a conscious non- 
implementation of a judgment to a short-term technicality. 
The lack of such a case in the field of public 
procurement - although Greece is very close to a judgment 
based on art. 171 relating to Directive 92/50 - does not 
limit the validity of the argument. On the contrary, the 
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significance attached by a large number of diverse actors 
(Diez-Hochleitner 1994f 126; Ritleng 1995,575-6) to the 
effective implementation of EC policies was the origin of 
the change. The importance of this development must be 
mialified in the light of two facts. ; L- 
First, the imposition of a fine does not necessarily 
constitute effective implementation. On the contrary, the 
utility of this instrument can be f ound in the potential 
that it has to dissuade member states from not implementing 
judgments of the ECJ. Secondly, a time-consuming procedure 
has to precede the imposition of a fine, thus still enabling 
the member state in question to take advantage of this 
situation. The ECJ had already opened a window of 
opportunity for individuals by recognising in its judgment 
in the Francovich case (joined cases C-6 and 9/90) that 
member states may be liable to pay damages if they violate a 
directive conferring rights on individuals, which is more 
important in cases of provisions lacking direct effect (Ross 
1993,60). More importantly, we would underline the clear 
need to examine the dynamics of the EC's operation instead 
of focusing upon the static analysis of the formal 
distribution of powers between the EC and the member 
states12. The analysis of the implementation process in the 
EC substantially reinforces the view that a combination of 
12M6ny (1985,9) rightly argues that the fact that studies of the 
implementation process have first appeared in federal states like the 
USA and Germany is not a coincidence, as the inherent difficulties of 
implementation are reinforced by the fragmented nature of their 
structures. 
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existing theoretical perspectives is best suited for the 
understanding of integration (Peterson 1995a, 84). 
How could one describe the contribution of this 
dissertation to our understanding of implementation in the 
EC? This contribution could be summarised in the following 
points. First, we have illustrated the direct link between 
the fragmented or integrated nature of national politico- 
administrative structures and the quality of implementation. 
In that sense we have identified a cause of problematic and 
successful implementation of EC policy at the national 
level. 
Secondly, we have identified the ways in which national 
governments use the tools of government (nodality, 
authority, treasure and organisation) in order to improve 
their implementation profile. 
Thirdly, we have identified the nature and the limits 
of the role of European institutions and target groups in 
implementation. They are parts of a wider implementation 
structure which is directly linked to the wider patterns of 
implementation that we have identified. In particular, we 
have demonstrated the political nature of implementation in 
the EC. 
Fourth, we have also demonstrated the value of a 
significant methodological point, namely the need to take 
account of formal implementation only as a part of the wider 
implementation process. In this sense, we illustrated that 
formal implementation is only a minor part of the problems 
that some member states face in the implementation of EC 
policy. Therefore, existing research and political 
strategies which focus on this aspect of implementation 
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(like the attempts of the Greek conservative government in 
the beginning of the 1990s) can, at best, address only a 
minor part of these problems and certainly not the most 
difficult ones. 
Fifth, we have illustrated that there is a stage of 
macro-implementation in the European policy process. Its 
analysis gives a wider view of the factors that shape the 
national implementation profiles. In other words, we have 
illustrated that one need not analyse implementation at 
street-level (micro- implementation) as a part of the 
existing literature has done, in order to understand why 
some member states implement EC policy more effectively than 
others. 
Sixth, although we left unexplored the potential 
lessons that one may draw from micro-implementation (e. g. 
the precise nature of interactions between target groups and 
street-level bureaucrats) we have identified factors which 
affect the national implementation profiles in a horizontal 
manner. The weakness of this methodological choice is the 
lack of precision and the subsequent need to have recourse 
to broad concepts and analytical tools. Nevertheless, the 
strength of this approach is the possibility to address 
problems of implementation in wider strategic terms which 
help us depict a broader outline of this stage of the 
European policy process and the ways in which national 
governments can act in order to change their respective 
implementation profiles. 
Seventh, we have identified the contribution of the 
European fixers in the implementation process in a manner 
which could not have been achieved through the focus on 
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street-level implementation. Indeed, the analysis of macro- 
implementation of the EC's public procurement policy has 
been characterised by the very limited direct role of the 
European Commission at street-level. Therefore, one could 
not have identified the interactions between this 
institution and national governments and the subsequent 
action of the latter by focusing, for example, on the action 
of awarding entities. 
Eighth, it is only through this wider perspective and 
the analysis of informal channels that one could identify 
the potential and the limits of the role of target groups 
(potential and actual tenderers in our case study) in the 
implementation process. 
Highlighting these points does not imply that we claim 
to have identified the only factors affecting the 
implementation of EC policy at the national level. On the 
contrary, research at street-level may reveal that there are 
other factors that also influence implementation along with 
fragmented or integrated politico-administrative structures. 
Furthermore, comparing the implementation of various 
policies will produce useful lessons. In any case, it is 
clear that analysis must certainly include and go beyond 
transposition in order to capture the rich political 
activity that is an inherent part of implementation. 
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APPENDIX 
Forty-three elite interviews have been carried out between 
March 1996 and June 1997 in the following institutions 
(numbers in parentheses indicate the number of interviews in 
each institution): 
Athens' Water, and Sewage Company, Athens (1). 
Commission Centrale des Marches., Paris (3);. 
Department of Trade and Industry, London (3). 
European Commission/Directorate General XV: Internal Market 
and Financial Services, Brussels (2). 
European Secretariat/Cabinet Office, London (3). 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London (1). 
HM Treasury, London (2). 
Kingston Communications, Hull (1). 
Kingston upon Hull City Council, Hull (1). 
Ministeýre de 1 'Agricul ture, de 1a Pä ch eet de 
l'Alimentation.. Paris (1). 
Min-istere de, 1 Economie et des Finances, Paris (2). 
Mini-stere de l'Equipment., du Logement., des Transports et du 
Tourisme, Paris (1). 
Ministere de 1 'Industrie, Postes et Telecommunications, 
Paris (1). 
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris (2). 
Mimstere du Travail et des Affaires Sociales, Paris 
Ministry of Development, Athens (3). 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens (2). 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Social Security, Athens (1). 
Ministry of National Economy, Athens (4). 
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Ministry of the Environmentr Spatial Planning and Public 
Works, Athens (1). 
Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU, Brussels (1). 
Permanent Representation of the UK to the EU, Brussels (2). 
Secretariat General du Comite Interministeriel pour les 
questions de cooperation economique europäenne, Paris (1). 
Secretariat G6neral du Gouvernement Paris (1). 
Special EC Legal Service/ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens 
(2). 
Thirteen interviews have been carried out with British 
officials, thirteen with French officials, fifteen with 
Greek officials and two with officials of the European 
Commission. 
These officials have been identified through the Civil 
Service Yearbook, the Repertoire de 1 'Administration 
Frangaise,, the EC's interinstitutional directory and direct 
contacts with Greek ministries. The overall positive 
response rate exceeded 90%. 
Although senior officials have been chosen (Heads of 
Unit,, Sector, Directorate) as the main target group, an 
effort has been made in order to include desk officers as 
well. 
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